Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret
NSC 159/4

Washington, September 25, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Continental Defense

References:

A.

NSC 159, 159/1, 159/2 and 159/3²

B.

NSC Action No. 915³

C.

Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 21, 23 and 25, 1953⁴

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director, Bureau of the Budget, the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission, and the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator at the 163rd Council meeting on September 24, 1953 adopted the reference report on the subject (NSC 159/3) subject to the substitution of the following for paragraph 20–b (2) thereof (NSC Action No. 915–c and d):

. . . . . . .

The Council also noted that the Director of Central Intelligence will submit recommendations to the Council regarding the implementation of paragraph 11 on “Improved Intelligence” at the time the Council considers the report by the Department of Defense to be submitted pursuant to NSC Action No. 915–d (1).

NSC 159/3, as amended and adopted, including certain factual corrections in paragraph 21 on “Port Security” requested by the Treasury Department, is enclosed herewith. The financial appendix transmitted by the reference memorandum of September 21 is not reproduced herein in view of the fact that, as indicated below, it is subject to review before December 1, 1953.

The President has this date approved the enclosed statement of policy as a guide to the respective departments and agencies in implementing their programs during FY 1954 and in developing their programs for future years, subject to the following:

(1) Before November 15, a more precise definition by the Department of Defense of the following programs and their phasing, and the identification of the portion of Defense Department effort and costs related to such defined programs:

• Paragraph 15–a: Seaward extensions of the Southern Canadian early warning system.
• Paragraph 15–b: Fighter interceptor forces. Anti-aircraft forces.

(2) Before December 1, determination by the Council of the manner of financing the recommended integrated programs for continental defense in FY 1954 and future years, in proper relation to the over-all budget and taking into account FY 1955 budget submissions by the departments and agencies.

Accordingly, NSC 139 is hereby superseded.⁵

It is requested that special security precautions be observed in the handling of the enclosure and that access to it be very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know basis.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Here follow a table of contents and a list of cited documents.]

[Enclosure]

Statement of Policy by the National Security Council

top secret

[Washington,] September 25, 1953.

Continental Defense

general considerations

Interrelation of Continental Defense to other Elements Constituting National Security

1. The survival of the free world depends upon the United States maintaining: (a) sufficient strength, military and non-military, to deter general war, to prevent or counter aggression, and to win a general war if it is forced upon us; and (b) a sound, strong economy, capable of supporting such strength over the long pull and of rapidly and effectively changing to full mobilization.

2. a. The strength of the United States which must be so maintained is an integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements. Each of these elements has its proper role in the defense of the vitals of America against attack and destruction. For example, our existing commitments to help in creating outposts of indigenous strength in NATO countries and in the Orient contribute to the defense of the continental United States as well as does the development of an early warning system in the Western Hemisphere. Accordingly, each element of this integrated complex should be in proper balance with all the other elements. We shall not have satisfactory over-all strength if one element is allowed to develop out of proportion to the other elements.

b. Just as there must be a proper balance among the several elements comprising our strength, there must also be a proper balance between military and non-military measures within the element of “continental defense”.

3. In recent years we have emphasized the elements of peripheral defense, offensive capabilities, and mobilization base more than we have emphasized the element of “continental defense”. Yet this latter element is necessary for the protection of our vitals and for the survival of our population and our Government in the event of attack. “Continental Defense” is now clearly inadequate.

Inadequacy of Existing Continental Defense System

4. a. The Report of the Continental Defense Committee (NSC 159, July 22, 1953) reviewed the significant studies and estimates which have been made on continental defense in recent years. The latest of these was “The Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955.” (NSC 140/1, May 18, 1953)⁶

b. Findings of the Report of the Continental Defense Committee, (NSC 159, July 22, 1953) include:

(1) The USSR has now a growing capability to deliver a devastating atomic attack on the United States, (para. 9, p. 4)

(2) Our current atomic offensive capability is a most significant deterrent to Soviet atomic attack upon the continental United States. It will continue to be a powerful factor in deterring hostile military action by the USSR. In any program of national security, our offensive capability must be maintained not only for gaining our war objectives, but for its marked deterrent value in protecting our homeland, (para. 10, p. 4)

(3) The present continental defense programs are not now adequate either to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or covert attacks which the USSR is capable of launching, nor are they adequate to ensure the continuity of government, the continuity of production, or the protection of the industrial mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and exposed metropolitan centers. This condition constitutes an unacceptable risk to our nation’s survival, (para. 11, p. 4)

(4) The creation of a defense system approaching invulnerability is probably unattainable and, as found by the Kelly Committee, is completely impractical, economically and technically, in the face of expected advances in Soviet offensive capabilities. However, a reasonably effective defense system can and must be attained. Such a system must be phased to meet the changing character of the threat, and therefore fixed programs extending over a period of many years are unsound. Relatively short-term programs should be embarked upon now to achieve as rapidly as possible an ability to cope with the manned aircraft and submarine-launched guided missile threat as it probably will exist through 1957. (Enclosure A, para. 3, p. 50)

(5) No acceptable degree of over-all defense readiness is provided in programs recommended in NSC 159 until about 1956. But the Continental Defense Committee concluded that, during the period 1956 to about 1960, the USSR would not have the net capability of destroying the war-making capacity of the United States, provided:

(a) The over-all continental defense programs recommended in NSC 159 are carried out vigorously, and

(b) In the military area, the defense system not only is kept modern, but the quantity of its weapons is increased consistent with any significant increase in the size or performance of the Soviet long range air force. This condition might obtain well into the 1960’s. Sometime after 1960, due to the possible development of long range air-to-ground or ground-to-ground guided missiles, there can be no assurance that the proposed programs will give the high degree of protection required. Unless our defensive system is constantly reviewed and kept thoroughly modern, including a defense against such possibilities as an intercontinental ballistic missile, we face the possibility of having our continental defense program largely nullified. However, any doubt about the future must not prevent us from meeting the urgent requirements of the present, (para. 120, pp. 44–45)

5. There has been a growing recognition in the United States of the situation outlined in the reports referred to in para. 4 above. In December, 1952, the United States adopted a policy that an early warning system deemed capable of providing three to six hours of warning of aircraft approaching the United States from any likely direction of attack should be developed and made operational as a matter of high urgency (NSC 139). Our most recent over-all security policy statement (NSC 153/1, June, 1953)⁷ emphasized the “development of a continental defense system, including early warning, adequate to prevent disaster and to make secure the mobilization base necessary to achieve U.S. victory in the event of general war.”

6. a. The above-mentioned reports and policy statements were published prior to the demonstration on August 12, 1953, of Soviet thermonuclear capabilities. These papers must now be considered in the light of evidence from this explosion, which indicates that the Soviets may have developed a method of substantially increasing the total energy yield from their available supplies of fissionable uranium. This would enable the Soviets to increase the number of bombs of 30–100 KT yield now estimated to be in their stockpile, or to make their weapons individually more destructive, or to create very high yield weapons (500–1000 KT) by accepting a reduction in total number of weapons. Further, the test indicates that the USSR may have reached an advanced stage in the development of true thermonuclear weapons yielding more than a million tons of TNT energy equivalent.

b. The Soviet demonstration of August 12, 1953, has placed a premium upon:

(1) Successfully deterring general war.

(2) Improvement of our intelligence regarding Soviet capabilities and intentions.

(3) An early warning system.

(4) Maximum attrition of attacking forces before reaching targets.

(5) A ready offensive striking force.

(6) Non-military defense measures suited to the new threat mentioned in a above.

Financing “Continental Defense”

7. a. Our existing national policy seeks to limit Federal expenditures to a level not in excess of Federal revenues, in the interest of preserving a sound and strong national economy. In FY 1954 the largest elements of Federal expenditures will be the total major security programs, estimated in NSC 149/2⁸ at not to exceed 52.1 billions (military at 43.2 billions). “Continental defense” program expenditures for FY 1954 were estimated in NSC 159 at 4.3 billions (military at 3.8 billions), an increase over FY 1953 of 1.6 billions.

b. In determining the source of funds to finance increased emphasis, and resulting larger expenditures, on “continental defense,” full weight must be placed upon new factors which have entered on the scene since the United States undertook the commitments supporting some of the elements other than “continental defense” in our integrated complex. These new factors are the rapid approach of the Soviets to a stockpile of “atomic plenty” and the now undoubted possession by the Soviets of a thermonuclear device of quality indicating the use of independent technology.

c. If larger expenditures than in FY 1954 are to be made on “continental defense,” and the funds therefor cannot be realized from savings resulting from reducing expenditures for other elements in our integrated complex, then they would have to be provided in addition to the expenditures for implementing such other elements. If security program expenditures in FY 1955 are to be less than in FY 1954, and if the same or larger expenditures are to be made in FY 1955 for “continental defense,” then the impact of the latter would fall principally on expenditures for security program elements other than “continental defense.” Any such lessening of security program expenditures in FY 1955 would necessitate a re-examination of all U.S. security programs. The programs recommended in paragraph 15–a, and presently-authorized action on other programs, should not be held up pending such re-examination.

Intentions of the USSR

8. Although the USSR has a growing capability to launch an aggressive attack on the United States, we believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war during the period covered by current estimates (through mid-1955). However, it is possible that general war might result from miscalculations by either side as a result of a series of actions and counteractions not intended by either side to have that result. Moveover, despite Soviet “peace offensives” and similar moves, there is no substantial reason to believe that the USSR has altered its basic hostility to the free world and its ultimate objective of dominating the world. Accordingly, plans for improving at home the defenses of our vitals should proceed in a rapid and orderly fashion.

Scope of This Report

9. In considering the objective and courses of action which follow, these points should be borne in mind:

a. The elements of continental defense included in this report are those of an essentially defensive nature, and accordingly do not include those elements of offensive strength of the United States and its allies which contribute materially to continental defense.

b. There are included in this report certain existing programs which, although contributing to continental defense, are not undertaken primarily for that purpose and would be carried on in any event by the agencies responsible for them. Examples of such programs are:

(1) Personnel security in the Executive Branch of the Federal Government.

(2) Physical security of government facilities.

(3) Coastal escorts and coastal anti-submarine patrol.

(4) Various elements of an integrated program of counter measures for the detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons, such as F.B.I, investigations, border patrol, customs and immigration procedures, passport and visa control, etc.

c. Conversely, many of the continental defense programs will make a valuable contribution to other programs. For example, the air control system can increase civil air traffic capacity and reduce accidents. Nonmilitary programs will be very useful in handling domestic disasters. Military forces which would perform roles in the continental defense program could be deployed overseas in the latter stages of a war.

d. The military programs described in NSC 159 were largely based on unilateral service projection, which are still subject to integration and approval by the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The military programs referred to in this report are intended to mean those as finally approved by the Department of Defense.

e. This report is designed primarily to fix the timing and guidelines which should govern the various continental defense programs. The costs of programs in paragraph 15–a and b can be estimated with reasonable accuracy, both for FYs 1954 and 1955 and over-all. But as to some of the programs in paragraph 15–c and d, cost estimates beyond FY 1954 will necessarily depend on a determination of our new basic national security policy and a detailed review of our over-all military program by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The cost estimates of such programs for FY 1955 will be included in the forthcoming budget submission.

objective

10. To achieve in a rapid and orderly manner as a part of our national security, and to maintain, in collaboration with Canada, continental defense readiness and capability which will give reasonable assurance of:

a. Contributing to deterring Soviet aggression.

b. Preventing devastating attack that might threaten our national survival.

c. Minimizing the effects of any Soviet attack so as to permit our successful prosecution of a major war.

d. Guarding against Soviet-inspired subversive activities.

e. Preventing the threat of atomic destruction from discouraging U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale.

courses of action

Improved Intelligence

11. In view of the implications of atomic and thermonuclear weapons in the hands of the Soviet Union, greater knowledge of Soviet capabilities and intentions is essential for military and non-military measures to reach maximum effectiveness.

Agreements with Canada

12. Canadian agreement and participation on an adequate scale is essential to any effective continental defense system. Although machinery for reaching and implementing agreements exists, the Canadian government should at once be approached at the highest levels in order to establish a common appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.-Canadian security and the measures required to meet it. Exploration should be made of the extent to which Canada may wish to take leadership in developing parts of the system and in contributing to its expense.

Research and Development

13. Adequate support for coordinated programs of basic and applied research and development is essential to gain and maintain the required technological superiority over the USSR. Weapons development by us has acquired even greater importance with the development by the USSR of a thermonuclear capability. Basic and applied research must keep abreast of the changing Soviet threat, including intercontinental ballistic guided missiles.

Continental Defense Organization

14. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 873–d,⁹ the Director of Defense Mobilization is preparing recommendations on improving the organization of government with respect to internal security functions and with respect to the continental defense functions in Part VI of NSC 159.

Specific Programs

(There is no significance in the order of listing within subparagraphs.)

15. a. The following programs should be completed with all possible speed:

Southern Canadian early warning system and seaward extensions thereof, (para. 16–a below)

Extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage, (para. 17 below)

Methods of aircraft identification, (para. 17 below)

Completion of emergency plans and preparations to insure the continuity of essential functions of the Executive Branch of the Government, (para. 19–a below)

Development of an active technical device for the detection of fissionable material, (para. 20–a below)

b. The following programs should be developed to a high state of readiness over the next two years (and, in the case of fighter interceptor and anti-aircraft forces, be further strengthened and kept effective in ensuing years in phase with the other military programs in 15–a and b, and with developing Soviet capabilities):

Northern Canadian early warning line, if proved feasible by project Corrode¹⁰ and the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group. (para. 16–b below)

Air control system, converting as rapidly as possible to semiautomatic control centers, (para. 17 below)

Gap-filler radars for low altitude surveillance, (para. 17 below)

Low frequency analysis and recording (Lofar) for distant detection of submarines, (para. 17 below)

Fighter intercepter forces. (para. 18 below)

Anti-aircraft forces, (para. 18 below)

Emergency plan for relocation of the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the Government, (para. 19–a below)

Plan for permanent dispersal of essential functions of government, (para. 19–b below)

Certain elements recommended in NSC 159/1 of the program of counter measures for the detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons, (para. 20–b below)

Processing of cases of known subversives for detention in the event of emergency, (para. 20–b below)

Port security, (para. 21 below)

Civil defense research, (para. 22–a below)

Civil defense education and training program, (para. 22–b below)

Federal civil defense contributions to states for attack warning and communications, (para. 22–c below)

Civil defense plan for dispersal of urban populations on attack warning, (para. 22–d below)

c. The following programs should be strengthened and further developed in phase with (1) progress on the programs in paragraphs 15–a and b above and (2) developing Soviet capabilities:

Civil defense stockpiling program, (para. 22 below)

Continuity of industry, (para. 23 below)

Reduction of urban vulnerability, (para. 24 below)

Other elements of the program of countermeasures for the detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons, (para. 20–c below)

Physical security of industrial installations.

d. The following programs should be continued generally along present lines:

Harbor defense.

Federal civil defense contributions to states for other than attack warning and communications.

Coastal escorts and coastal anti-submarine patrol.

Physical security of government facilities.

Personnel security in the Executive Branch of Federal Government.

The inclusion of the latter three programs in this subparagraph is based solely on their contribution to continental defense, and is not intended as a judgment of their importance to other national security functions.

Early Warning System

16. a. An early warning system providing a minimum of at least two hours is an immediate necessity for both military and non-military measures for continental defense. The Southern Canadian Detector Line and the Alaska and Northeast Air Control and Warning Systems should be completed as early as possible. Seaward extensions of this line to Hawaii and to the Azores should be provided, beginning with the Atlantic extension, utilizing the minimum number of ships and aircraft determined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be necessary to meet the threat and enemy capabilities at any given time. In planning these seaward extensions, the maximum use should be planned of these installations for other purposes such as weather reporting, search and rescue, etc., in order to eliminate program duplication.

b. A longer warning than will be afforded by installing the Southern Canadian Detector Line is presently desirable and, in view of anticipated increases in speed of aircraft, will probably be required within the next few years. If as a result of Project Corrode and the report of the Canada–U.S. Military Study Group, the Northern Canadian Detector Line is deemed feasible, plans and preparation for its installation should be made as if the program were included in para. 15–a. Project Corrode should be carried forward with the greatest feasible speed.

Identification and Control Systems

17. Even with early warning, effective fighter control is impracticable without accurate means of identification and contiguous radar coverage to seaward of our coastlines. Therefore, an increase of identification capabilities, such as through the utilization of Consolan radio stations and the extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage, should be completed with the same urgency as the provision of early warning. As the early warning aircraft identification systems and contiguous radar coverage are completed they should be supplemented during the next two years with programs such as:

a. An air control system, utilizing the Lincoln Transition System unless a better system can be developed.

b. Low frequency analysis and recording (Lofar) for distant detection of submarines.

c. Gap-filler radars for low altitude surveillance.

Weapons Systems and Force Requirements

18. a. The recent Soviet thermonuclear test brings home that it is essential that within the next two years the capability to destroy attacking aircraft and submarines before reaching their targets should be substantially augmented. In fact, all possible efforts should be made to expedite the equipping of adequate forces with aircraft and missiles which will achieve a high “kill ratio” before attacking forces reach our borders. These forces must not only be kept modern, but force levels may have to be increased consistent with any significant increase in Soviet capabilities. This process will be costly but essential if the objectives of the Continental Defense Program are to be achieved. It should be realized, on the other hand, that some of these forces deployed initially for continental defense could be of great value in other areas and roles in the event of a long war. To this extent they contribute materially to our over-all military strength.

b. In determining the forces and weapons required under this program, every effort should be made to insure that the maximum utilization of existing equipment and forces is achieved. This will require a careful evaluation of the disposition of U.S. forces and material world-wide.

Continuity of Government

19. a. Emergency plans and preparations to insure the continuity of essential functions of the Executive Branch of Government should be completed with the utmost urgency. Within the next two years an emergency plan should be completed for the relocation of the Legislative and Judicial Branches of the Government.

b. In view of the Soviet atomic and thermonuclear threat, current plans, other than the emergency plans, for the continuity of government and for the permanent dispersal of essential functions of the Federal Government should be revised so as to provide a wider dispersal of governmental facilities with improved communications and transportation links.

Internal Security

20. a. Efforts to develop an active technical device for the detection of fissionable material should proceed with the utmost urgency. When such a device has been successfully developed, its appropriate use will be the subject of further Council recommendation.

b. Certain elements in the program of countermeasures for the detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons should be in operation within the next two years. These elements include:

(1) Controlled dissemination of detailed information on this subject to officers of the Government who are in supervisory or administrative positions in agencies having responsibilities for detection of or defense against clandestine atomic weapons.

(2) Controlled dissemination of descriptive data concerning atomic devices and their component parts to operational officers of the Government who are actively engaged in the field in detection of and defense against clandestine atomic weapons.

(3) Release of information on this subject on a selected basis to representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies, etc., in order to enable cooperation with agencies actively engaged in detection of and defense against clandestine atomic weapons.

(4) Issuance of a Presidential Directive pointing out the FBI’s responsibility for making investigations with respect to the illegal production, transfer, possession, transportation, etc., of fissionable material, or equipment or devices utilizing such material as a military weapon, and requesting that information relating thereto be reported promptly to the FBI.

(5) Assignment of responsibility to the Department of Defense for disarming atomic weapons introduced into the United States.

(6) Assignment of responsibility to the Federal Civil Defense Administration for furnishing guidance on this subject to local police and civil defense agencies having responsibility for protective measures to preserve life, to minimize damage from fire, etc.

(7) Recommending legislation providing for the payment of rewards as an inducement for defectors and informants to supply information leading to the recovery or acquisition of atomic weapons or fissionable material illegally introduced or attempted to be so introduced into the United States. As an additional inducement, the right of sanctuary or asylum in the United States should apply, when appropriate, to such informants or defectors.

(8) Channeling entry of Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel through a limited number of U.S. ports by means of individual visa designation.

(9) Processing of cases of known subversives for detention in the event of emergency.

c. Other elements in the program of countermeasures should be continued and strengthened in phase with developing Soviet capabilities. These elements include:

(1) More effective control of legal but presently uncontrolled arrivals of alien crewmen, unscreened visa applicants, and others.

(2) More effective prevention of illegal arrivals of persons by:

(a) encouraging enactment of uniform State legislation to reduce falsification of U.S. birth certificates;

(b) enforcement of penalties for illegal discharge of alien seamen in U.S. ports;

(c) search and surveillance of vessels in U.S. ports to prevent landing of stowaways and excluded crewmen.

d. The present practice of the Department of State in generally retaliating, on a reciprocal basis, against Soviet bloc restrictions on the number of U.S. diplomatic representatives, should be continued.

e. The following elements in the program of countermeasures require further consideration before action by the Council:

(1) Additional protective measures at selected industrial and governmental facilities of a highly critical nature. (Action deferred pending development by ODM of a program, with cost estimates.)

(2) Additional selective counterintelligence coverage by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of Soviet bloc diplomatic representatives in the United States (including personnel attached to international public organizations), whose activities are suspected to extend beyond the scope of their normal diplomatic assignments. (Action deferred pending development by the Department of Justice of a program, with cost estimates.)

f. Without awaiting the development of an active detection device, all incoming unaccompanied baggage, effects and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, exclusive of the diplomatic pouch, should be subject to overt inspection and manual search.

Port Security¹¹

21. a. The Coast Guard will continue (1) to screen seamen; (2) to screen longshoremen; (3) to supervise loading of explosives and (4) at the ten major port areas (Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Hampton Roads, New Orleans, Galveston-Houston, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Portland and Seattle), will continue (a) to supervise and restrict piers handling U.S. military and MDAP shipments; (b) to board and make special search of suspect vessels. At the ten major port areas, the Coast Guard will provide a program of 24-hour surveillance and denial of entry to Soviet and satellite flag vessels, redeploying presently authorized port security personnel and facilities (including some from port security activities other than the denial program) to carry out this program.

b. At the intermediate port areas of New London, Charleston, Savannah, Sabine Pass, St. Johns’ River and San Diego, the Coast Guard will initiate a program of surveillance and denial of entry to Soviet and satellite flag vessels comparable to that under a above. Part of this program will be put into operation by diversion of some personnel and facilities from the activities listed in a (3), (4a) and (4b) above.

Note: It is the present practice of the Coast Guard that vessels known or suspected to be owned or controlled by Soviet bloc states (but not registered under the flag of such states) are boarded, examined and searched before reaching a congested port area. Present instructions to the Coast Guard are that if suspicious circumstances come to light in such examination (such as a crew determined to be from the Soviet bloc) these ships should be denied entry.

Civil Defense

22. The following elements of the Civil Defense Program, modified in the light of the Soviet thermonuclear threat, should be emphasized during the next two years:

a. Civil defense research should be brought up to date in order to provide proper knowledge of civil defense problems and their solution.

b. Public civil defense education and training program must be accelerated so as to inform the public and provide trained civil defense workers.

c. Attack warning and communications systems at state and local levels should be completed under the contributions program.

d. Plans should be developed for the emergency dispersal of the population from congested urban areas consistent with the improvement of an early warning system.

The civil defense stockpiling program should be continued and phased with the developing nature of the Soviet threat.

Continuity of Industry

23. Current efforts to provide for the continuity of industry should be kept in phase with the other elements of continental defense system and with mobilization plans as affected by the development of a Soviet thermonuclear capability. In particular, the following programs for the continuity of industry should be promptly developed:

a. Review of mobilization base planning, including consideration of:

(1) Maximum industrial dispersion.

(2) Production logistics.

(3) Assistance for relocation or transfer of production from overconcentrated or “sole” producers.

(4) Possible stand-by facilities.

(5) Provision for stockpiles of inventories of finished products.

(6) Reserve stocks of long lead time tools for rehabilitating or rebuilding.

b. A system for damage assessment and reporting.

c. Provision of secure transportation control centers with necessary operating records.

d. Post-attack industrial rehabilitation.

Reduction of Urban Vulnerability

24. Changing the metropolitan pattern of America so that it presents fewer concentrated targets for attack may be essential in the age of inter-continental ballistic missiles. Industrial leadership and actions by State and local governments to this end will be possible if energetic Federal leadership and the use of strong governmental incentives are employed.

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security; the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence; and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. See footnote 2, supra.
3. For NSC Action No. 915, see footnote 6, supra.
4. Concerning Lay’s memoranda of Sept. 21 and 23, see footnote 3, supra. The memorandum of Sept. 25 transmitted the views of the NSC Consultants on Continental Defense mentioned in footnote 4, supra.
5. NSC 139, “An Early Warning System,” Dec. 31, 1952 and related documentation is scheduled for publication in the compilation on U.S. relations with Canada in volume vi.
6. Ante, p. 328.
7. Dated June 10, p. 378.
8. Dated Apr. 29, p. 305.
9. For information on NSC Action No. 873, see footnote 2, p. 465.
10. Documentation on Project Corrode is scheduled for publication in the compilation on U.S. relations with Canada in volume vi.
11. A typed notation on the source text indicates that this section on Port Security is a second revision dated Jan. 29, 1954.