Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 163d Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, September 24, 1953¹

[Extracts]

top secret
eyes only

September 24, 1953

The following were present at the 163rd Council meeting: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Under Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1 and 2); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1 and 2); the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Items 1 and 2); the Secretaries of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force (for Items 1 and 2); the Civilian Consultants on Continental Defense (Messrs. Baxter, Black, McDonald, and Page), for Item 2; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; the Chairman, Continental Defense Committee (for Item 2); the NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 2); H. Marshall Chadwell and Kenneth D. Coleman, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 1); Justice M. Chambers, Federal Civil Defense Administration (for Items 1 and 2); the Executive Secretary, NSC; the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC; and Hugh D. Farley, NSC Special Staff Member.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

. . . . . . .

2. Continental Defense (NSC 159, 159/1, 159/2 and 159/3;² Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated September 21 and 23, 1953³)

With the assistance of a series of charts, Mr. Cutler gave an oral presentation of the subject report (NSC 159/3) which lasted over an hour and which constituted a thorough and complete briefing as to the general considerations, objectives, courses of action, and recommended programs of the report and continental defense.

In the course of his presentation, the President interrupted Mr. Cutler to ask for more detailed information with respect to the program for producing a device or devices which would enable the detection of fissionable material surreptitiously introduced into the United States.

Mr. Cutler explained how such devices might be used, and Admiral Strauss pointed out that no such devices had actually been produced to date.

The President also inquired as to the probable date of completion of the “plan” for the dispersal of essential functions of Government. Mr. Cutler replied that it was thought that this report would be produced in a month or so, and the President commented that any planning after the event (atomic attack) would be worth nothing.

There was also a discussion of the appropriate size of rewards which would be offered by the Government for information regarding the introduction of fissionable materials into the United States. Mr. Cutler pointed out that it was proposed to offer a reward of $500,000, but that it was the opinion of the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission that a reward of $1 million would be cheap, since this would be less than the cost of the fissionable material which would have been recovered.

Secretary Wilson commented that if we raised the ante too high, people would seek to introduce fissionable material into the United States. (Laughter)

The Vice President made an inquiry as to the status of reciprocity between our Governments and the governments of the Soviet bloc with regard to the treatment of diplomatic shipments and baggage.

Secretary Smith undertook to sketch the existing relationship. Although he admitted that while the present situation could not be described as one of reciprocity, he questioned the wisdom of our tightening up our own practices in this matter at the moment when the Soviet bloc nations were liberalizing their own.

At the conclusion of his oral presentation, Mr. Cutler requested Mr. Arthur Page, as spokesman for the Civilian Consultants, to express their view on the problem of continental defense. Mr. Page complied by reading a statement, copy of which is filed with the Minutes of the 163rd NSC meeting.⁴

Mr. Cutler then presented certain additional views on this subject by Dr. Alan Gregg, one of the Consultants, who had been obliged to leave Washington prior to the meeting.⁵

Mr. Cutler then suggested that before the meeting was thrown open to general questions, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be invited to state their views on continental defense.

Before Admiral Radford had undertaken to express the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the President requested him to comment on what inferences were to be drawn from a recent test in Seattle in which one of our new B–52 bombers hopelessly outdistanced one of our F–86 interceptors. It seemed to the President that this was a development which cast doubt on the value of fighter interceptors against bombers which could fly so fast at such very high altitudes as 50,000 feet.

Admiral Radford acknowledged the validity of the President’s doubts, and said that it would probably be possible to intercept B–52 bombers by the use of guided missiles.

Admiral Radford then proceeded to state the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the present report. He noted that the Joint Chiefs had kept in touch with Mr. Cutler and with the Planning Board during the whole period in which this report had been developed. He said that the great anxiety of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was that some particular program such as this would be approved by the Council at too early a date and thus tie the hands of the military in their attempts to work out an appropriate over-all military program. Speaking personally, continued Admiral Radford, he felt that the various studies which had been made by committees and individuals on the problem of continental defense had proved most valuable. On the other hand, he did feel that most of these reports tended to be based on assumptions as to the enemy’s capabilities. Admiral Radford stated that if we continued to do this we might wind up with an impossible program of continental defense.

Admiral Radford then said that he had other points which he felt were desirable to stress. As to some of the programs which were recommended for Council approval in developing an adequate continental defense, real doubts had arisen in the minds of the Joint Chiefs as to the validity of the recommendations. He said that the Joint Chiefs were certainly reconsidering the value of seaward extensions of the southern Canadian defense line at the present time. He pointed out that with regard to these seaward extensions, we were counting on very nearly perfect performance by those who manned the line and its extensions, 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, for the indefinite future. It would be extraordinarily difficult to secure personnel with sufficient skill to accomplish this task, and it would also be terribly expensive to maintain this line once it had been developed.

Another factor which seemed deserving of the most careful study, said Admiral Radford, was the loss of efficiency which was inevitable when individuals were compelled to do the same job day in and day out with the same instruments. He had in mind, he said, radar operations in some such dreary waste as northern Canada. Personnel who at the outset were 80% efficient at performing their function would be, after an interval, perhaps only 30% efficient, particularly if no enemy aircraft were found. This was a consideration which must certainly be taken into account in evaluating the effectiveness of this kind of defense.

With respect to what he called the “immediate programs”, presumably those set forth in paragraph 15–a of the report, Admiral Radford assured the members of the Council that the Joint Chiefs regarded the development of these programs as urgent, and stated that they would be included in the detailed program that the Joint Chiefs of Staff are formulating for the next fiscal year, FY 1955.

Lastly, Admiral Radford said that he wished to call the attention of the Council to the acute problem of adequate military personnel and manpower. He pointed out that the continental defense program outlined in the current report was a program for the long pull. This being so, and in the absence of any more authority than the Government now had to hold military personnel in service, he felt that it might be necessary to undertake a complete reappraisal of our total military capability. Actually, the problem of inadequate manpower, with respect to continental defense, was a more severe problem than finance or the budget. Even if we had all the funds we requested to do what we felt necessary, Admiral Radford said that under existing arrangements we would just not have the trained people to carry out the program.

The President was the first to comment on Admiral Radford’s statement. He observed that it seemed to him that the Council had been tending to dodge the essential dilemma which faced the country. The United States was confronted with a very terrible threat, and the truth of the matter was that we have devised no way of meeting this threat without imposing ever-greater controls on our economy and on the freedom of our people. We had been trying, in other words, to have our cake and to eat it at the same time. We were engaged, continued the President, not only in saving our money or in defending our persons from attack; we were engaged in the defense of a way of life, and the great danger was that in defending this way of life we would find ourselves resorting to methods that endangered this way of life. The real problem, as the President saw it, was to devise methods of meeting the Soviet threat and of adopting controls, if necessary, that would not result in our transformation into a garrison state. The whole thing, said the President, was a paradox.

Secretary Wilson commented that we were not only faced with the problem of saving our free economy, but we were also confronting the limitations of our manpower.

The President agreed, and said that this was only part of the paradox which he had outlined, of trying to meet the threat to our values and institutions by methods which themselves endangered these institutions. In any case, said the President, this was a problem which must be faced and not evaded.

Mr. Stassen admitted the seriousness of the manpower problem as Secretary Wilson had sketched it, but said he believed that he had one or two suggestions which might assist in solving it. The first of these was to provide better opportunities for technological and scientific study in our high schools. He felt that in this area we had been wasting our resources in the past, and that an opportunity offered to increase greatly the number of students with the necessary skills of a technological and scientific nature.

His second suggestion, said Mr. Stassen, was to try to identify those areas where it might be possible for the armed services to depend to a greater degree on automatic devices as opposed to manual operations. This transition could, thought Mr. Stassen, result in greatly diminishing the number of personnel which the services now had to devote to complicated scientific and technological operations.

The President’s comment on these suggestions was to point out that Mr. Stassen had perhaps overlooked the fact that as you go into the sphere of the automatic, the machine would be ever more difficult to handle and the expense of maintaining it and keeping it modern would be very heavy.

Secretary Wilson added that you could never avoid the fact that at present it was all that the country could do to maintain approximately three million men in the armed services.

Mr. C.D. Jackson then stated that he had one further suggestion which might be of value in meeting the shortage of skilled manpower. As we increasingly made use of new weapons, said Mr. Jackson, he saw no reason why the military services should be obliged to continue their elevated standards of mental and physical fitness. It seemed to him that a soldier with flat feet or dandruff might be completely competent to operate a Nike.

Mr. Flemming said that of course he was always living with the problem of manpower, and had come to the conclusion that if we set ourselves an objective and proceed to convince the country of the validity of that objective, we would succeed in licking the manpower problem. As an example, Mr. Flemming cited the present two-year duration of military service. This severely hampered the armed services in meeting the manpower problem. Mr. Flemming expressed the view that it would be perfectly feasible to get this period of service extended by the Congress if we could demonstrate a clear need for such extension.

The President stated that he was impressed by Mr. Flemming’s point, but could not avoid the feeling that if, in the development of our mobilization base and in the accumulation of weapons and materials of war, we went beyond a certain point, we would have to face the likelihood that our stockpile of war materials would suffer obsolescence, not to mention terrific costs of maintenance. Again pointing out that we must adjust our defense program to something with which we can live for a long time, the President expressed the view that the desirable goal was a minimum military establishment and mobilization base that could be expanded promptly in case of need. While he expressed agreement with Mr. Flemming’s argument that we could get the people of the United States to do whatever was really necessary to preserve the national security, the President did not want the American people to do what the Administration deemed necessary over so long a period of time that it ended in the destruction of the American way of life.

Mr. Flemming then reverted to Mr. Jackson’s suggestion for ameliorating the manpower problem, and said that it was a point that must never be lost sight of. He added that we had not yet made maximum use of women to meet the shortage of men, and summed up his general position by a statement that if we really proposed to get off of dead center, we could solve the problem of manpower.

Secretary Humphrey pointed out that the many difficulties and doubts which discussion thus far by the members of the Council had brought out, seemed to him to indicate the impossibility for the National Security Council to reach any conclusion on any single part of the national security program, such as continental defense, before the members of the Council had had an opportunity to view the security programs in their entirety. There was no use worrying about one piece of the puzzle before you had all the pieces before you. Furthermore, Secretary Humphrey said he was willing to predict that when we got all through with our deliberations, the only military strength we would have would be of a fluid and mobile sort.

The President stated that the important issues in continental defense which must be faced at once were the fighter interceptor program and the seaward extension of the southern Canadian line. He expressed agreement that the latter issue might prove, upon further examination, to be somewhat academic. He also stated his agreement with Admiral Radford that we tended invariablby to underestimate the difficulties which the USSR would encounter in making an attack upon the continental United States.

At this point, Mr. Cutler asked the President if it would not be appropriate to ask the heads of the various departments and agencies who had entered dissents on various parts of the present report, to explain their views and have their day in court.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Cutler explained to the President that some baggage and shipments came with the diplomat and through the same port of entry, but that on other occasions such shipments would come independently of their owner.

. . . . . . .

Mr. Cutler then asked Mr. Flemming whether he wished to make a case for taking certain proposed programs out of one of the four categories and placing them in another, as suggested by footnotes to the paper.

Mr. Flemming replied, however, that since he was now convinced that the important thing was to get behind the total continental defense program, he was not inclined to argue in favor of any specific changes from one category to another. He did, he said, have a strong feeling that our present posture of continental defense was inadequate and that we should move ahead as rapidly as possible to develop the program in the present report. It was vital, for instance, from his point of view to get ahead with an early warning system, since this had an obvious impact on mobilization planning. He concluded by expressing the hope that the Council would endorse the program as a whole even if it were necessary to seek a supplemental appropriation from the Congress to finance it.

Thereafter, the Attorney General also agreed not to press for any further changes in the report with regard to internal security measures, and stated that he was content to have these measures left in the categories to which they had been assigned in the report.

Secretary Wilson took this occasion to point out that all should understand that even if all the measures in this paper were adopted it never would be possible to build a 100% defense of the continental United States.

Mr. Cutler then called upon Mrs. Howard, the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator, as to her wishes with respect to changes in the programs which the Civil Defense Administration had favored when the paper was before the Planning Board.

Mrs. Howard stated that in view of Mr. Cutler’s explanation of the meaning of paragraphs 15–a, –b, –c and –d, and particularly because of her very strong agreement with the position just taken by Mr. Flemming, she would not press for any changes in the paper in behalf of the Civil Defense Administration. She did wish, she said, to emphasize the need to the Council for more adequate appropriations by the Congress for civil defense. She also expressed considerable skepticism as to the feasibility of the recommendation by the Consultants that private industry take over the task of stockpiling medical supplies for civil defense purposes.

Mr. Cutler then observed that since all the members of the Council had had an opportunity to express their views, he wished to invite their attention to the suggested action in the Note by the Executive Secretary on page i of the report. He was also suggesting a change in this form of action, which he read to the members of the Council.

The Vice President inquired whether the Consultants on the continental defense problem had had access to and been briefed on all the various reports which had been made in recent months on the problem. Mr. Cutler replied that they had had such access and had been thoroughly briefed on all significant aspects of the problem.

The Vice President replied that he was not so much concerned with the leaks which had appeared in the morning papers about the Council’s consideration of the continental defense problem. What really concerned him was the problem of public reaction to the present continental defense program in view of the great hullabaloo in the press on this subject. Was the program which was before the Council of sufficient size and efficiency to meet the charges of the Alsops and others that the Administration was neglecting one of the most crucial areas of national defense? In short, asked the Vice President, were the Planning Board and the Consultants wholly satisfied that this was not a “cut-rate” continental defense program?

Mr. C.D. Jackson stated that in view of the various doubts that had been raised in the course of the morning’s discussion, it would be perfectly possible for the Council to decide to postpone action on continental defense. He felt, however, that a decision to postpone action would be a very grave mistake. He pointed out that the people of the United States are already laboring under the erroneous impression that the present Administration was doing nothing in this field. It was therefore important to convey to them at once and with emphasis that continental defense is and has been a top priority concern of this Administration. Hence the Council must make a wise decision and move forward rapidly on the present program.

In reply to Mr. Jackson’s statement, Admiral Radford stated that there was no element of importance in the present report on continental defense which needed to be done during this year and next year that is not being done. As for certain recommended courses of action and programs in the report for the years thereafter, there still was some doubt as to whether we ought to carry them out. But Admiral Radford said that he was prepared to stand up today on any platform and say, with regard to continental defense, that “we could not be doing more than we are now doing.”

The Vice President came back to his original point, and commented that the columnists could be expected to do their utmost to suggest that there was dissension within the Administration on this problem. He trusted, therefore, that if a dispute developed, as, for instance, between the desirability of a 57-squadron and a 75-squadron fighter interceptor force, the Administration would make it clear that such disagreement did not stem from motives of economy alone. To this, Admiral Radford answered once again that budgetary limitations were not the overriding limitations in the solution of the continental defense problem.

The President stated, with a smile, that it was unwise for the members of the Council to let themselves get so excited about what the columnists reported, as to fail to use common sense in reaching a decision. He said he was inclined to order the Council members in the future not to read the newspapers on mornings before meetings of the National Security Council. (Laughter)

Mr. Allen Dulles said that he had one last point to make before the Council adjourned. He said that in the field of intelligence with respect to early warning, he would have three concrete suggestions to make at the time when the Joint Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to present the Council with their detailed program on continental defense.

Mr. Stassen said that he felt that it was of vital importance to secure the necessary cooperation from Canada in meeting the problem of civil defense.

The President pointed out the difficulties which confronted the United States in times of peace, in inducing other sovereign states to go along with our own recommendations. He nevertheless agreed with Mr. Stassen that present machinery for cooperation on military matters with Canada could easily be improved.

Admiral Radford, speaking to this point, expressed the view that we would encounter very little difficulty in getting all the cooperation and assistance we needed from the Dominion.

As the meeting drew to a close, the President warmly thanked the Consultants for the services that they had rendered in helping to solve this difficult problem, and expressed the hope that the Consultants would regard their services as not merely a duty, but also an opportunity.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Noted and discussed an oral presentation by Mr. Cutler of the reference report on the subject by the NSC Planning Board (NSC 159/3).

b. Noted the views of the Civilian Consultants on Continental Defense with respect to NSC 159/3, as read by Mr. Arthur W. Page, and the additional views of Dr. Alan Gregg as orally presented by Mr. Cutler.

. . . . . . .

d. Adopted NSC 159/3, as amended by c above, for submission to the President with the recommendation that he approve it as a guide to the respective departments and agencies in implementing their programs during FY 1954 and in developing their programs for future years, subject to the following:

(1) Before November 15, a more precise definition by the Department of Defense of the following programs and their phasing, and the identification of the portion of Defense Department effort and costs related to such defined programs:

• Paragraph 15–a: Seaward extensions of the Southern Canadian early warning system.
• Paragraph 15–b: Fighter interceptor forces. Anti-aircraft forces.

(2) Before December 1, determination by the Council of the manner of financing the recommended integrated programs for continental defense in FY 1954 and future years, in proper relation to the over-all budget and taking into account FY 1955 budget submissions by the departments and agencies.

e. Noted that the Director of Central Intelligence will submit recommendations to the Council regarding the implementation of paragraph 11 of NSC 159/3 on “Improved Intelligence” at the time that the Council considers the report by the Department of Defense submitted pursuant to d–(1) above.

Note: NSC 159/3 as amended and approved by the President as recommended in d above, subsequently circulated as NSC 159/4. The views of the Civilian Consultants, including Dr. Gregg, subsequently circulated to the Council for information.⁷

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Sept. 25.

2. As a result of the discussions concerning the net capability of the USSR to inflict damage on the United States, the NSC in Action No. 804 taken at the 148th meeting on June 4 established a Continental Defense Committee of the NSC Planning Board to submit a report at an early date. In July, the Committee sent to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Robert Cutler) an undated 80-page memorandum on continental defense. Copies of this memorandum were circulated to the NSC by Executive Secretary Lay on July 22, 1953 as NSC 159. For that portion of the memorandum of discussion at the 148th meeting of the NSC concerning the net capability of the USSR to inflict damage on the United States, see p. 367. A copy of NSC 159 is in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159 Series.

   Continental defense was the subject of a number of internal commentary memoranda within both the Department of State and the Office of Defense Mobilization following distribution of NSC 159. Copies of these memoranda are in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159 Series and PPS files, lot 64 D 563, “Natl Sec (civil defense)”. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their views on NSC 159 along with supplemental pages of cost data prepared by the NSC Staff. The Lay memorandum enclosing the views of the JCS is in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159 Series. Continental defense was discussed at the 158th meeting of the NSC on Aug. 6, 1953 and was the subject of NSC Action No. 873 in which both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the NSC Planning Board were directed to submit further recommendations on continental defense to the Council. The Director of Defense Mobilization, Arthur S. Flemming, was also directed by the President to establish a special task force to study and make recommendations on improving government organization with respect to internal security functions. A copy of NSC Action No. 873 is in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”.

   On Aug. 14, 1953, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security submitted a joint 33-page report on continental defense which was circulated by Lay to the NSC as NSC 159/1. On Sept. 1, the Joint Chiefs of Staff submitted their 7-page report in conformity with NSC Action No. 873 and it was circulated by Lay as NSC 159/2.

   On Sept. 16, 1953, Lay sent to the NSC a 28-page report on continental defense prepared by the NSC Planning Board following receipt of NSC 159/1 and NSC 159/2. The Planning Board report, designated NSC 159/3, was scheduled for discussion at the 163d meeting of the NSC.

3. Lay’s memorandum of Sept. 21 enclosed a financial appendix to NSC 159/3 which was subsequently deleted from NSC 159/4. See the note by the Executive Secretary, Sept. 25, p. 475. Lay’s memorandum of Sept. 23 transmitted a one-page memorandum from Admiral Radford, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, giving JCS approval to NSC 159/3 as a “generally responsive” and “militarily sound” solution to the problem of continental defense.
4. The statement under reference cannot be further identified, but a copy of the “Views of the NSC Consultants on Continental Defense” which, in a covering memorandum, Lay indicated were those “presented orally at the Council meeting on September 25 [24] 1953”, is in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159 Series. For information on the minutes of NSC meetings, see footnote 1, p. 394.
5. A copy of “the separate additional views of Dr. Alan Gregg” which, Lay indicated, were also those presented orally at the NSC meeting of Sept. 24, is attached to the “Views of the NSC Consultants on Continental Defense” mentioned in footnote 4 above. Gregg was vice president of the Rockefeller Foundation.
6. Paragraphs a–e constitute NSC Action No. 915. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
7. For text of NSC 159/4, see infra. On Jan. 25, 1954, the Executive Secretary transmitted to the NSC two papers prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization dealing with plans for the “Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of the Executive Branch.” Copies of Lay’s memorandum with the enclosed papers prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization are in the S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 159 Series.