PPS files, lot
64 D 563, “Natl Sec (civil defense)”
Memorandum to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary (Lay)1
top secret
Washington, June 1, 1953.
- Subject:
- Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct
Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955
References:
- A.
- NSC 140/12
- B.
- Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary,
same subject, dated May 28, 19533
The enclosed views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence
Agency, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference and the
Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security with respect to the
reference report on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information
of the Council in connection with its discussion of NSC 140/1 at its meeting on June 4, 1953.
It is requested that special security precautions be
observed in the handling of the enclosures and that access to each copy
be strictly limited and individually controlled on an absolute
need-to-know basis.
[Enclosure 1]
Memorandum by the Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff (Lalor) to the
Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Lay)
top secret
Washington, May 29, 1953.
- Subject:
- Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict
Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955
- 1.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed NSC 140/1, subject as above. They note that the purpose
of the report is to evaluate the net capability of the USSR to
inflict direct injury on the United States in the period up to July
1, 1955. They further note that the
[Page 356]
terms of reference also included USSR
capability to attack major U.S. installations outside of the United
States, such installations selected on the basis of their relative
importance to the defense of the United States or to a United States
counteroffensive against the USSR.
- 2.
- The Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to invite attention to the fact
that the terms of reference on which the report is based limit
consideration to only one aspect of the over-all problem of effects
of the possible courses of action with which the USSR may initiate
war and these terms of reference should not be construed as
representing the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to the
manner in which the USSR would wage war. Although the report is a
valuable contribution to defense planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider that it provides only a segment of the data necessary, and
therefore does not constitute a sufficiently broad basis for
planning for the over-all security of the United States.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
W. G. Lalor
Rear
Admiral, U.S. Navy (Ret.)[Enclosure 2]
Memorandum by the Director of Central Intelligence
(Dulles)
to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council
(Lay)
top secret
Washington, June 1, 1953.
- Subject:
- CIA Comments on NSC 140/1
- 1.
- The subject paper has been reviewed by this Agency and found to be
in consonance with the intelligence now available to us except for
one minor point mentioned below in paragraph 2–a. In my opinion, the
Subcommittee is to be highly commended for the quality of its report
and the unique contribution it makes to our understanding of the
nation’s defense problem. It amply justifies efforts that have gone
into it and to my mind suggests the advisability of similar attacks
on other difficult questions requiring the blending of operational
and intelligence information into “net” estimates.
- 2.
- I have only two comments as to the substance of the reports:
- a.
- On page 8, in paragraph 5 of the Discussion, it is stated
that:
“…In mid-1953, the USSR will probably possess about
1,000 medium bombers of the TU–4 type (comparable to
U.S. B–29). By mid-1955, this number may be
increased to about 1,100.…”
[Page 357]
Since this portion of the paper
was prepared, further evidence has come to light
which has caused us now to estimate that the Soviet
Union has over 1,600 of these planes at the present
time and is producing them at the rate of about 35
per month. Since the number of TU–4’s assumed to
take part in attack is well below 1,000 in the
period mid-1953 to mid-1955, the conclusions of
NSC 140/1 are in
no way affected by this revision; but it might be
pointed out that any doubts as to whether the Soviet
medium bomber fleet is sufficient to enable the
Soviet Long-Range Air Force to expend planes
relatively plentifully in one-way missions, are
pretty well dissipated.
- b.
- In order to keep the problem within manageable limits,
General Edwards’ Subcommittee based its calculations on
the “best estimate” figure as to Soviet atomic bomb
stockpile. As pointed out in SE–36, NSIE–1,4 and elsewhere, this median figure is
never given except in conjunction with upper and lower
limits—plus 100 percent or minus 33⅓ percent respectively.
Thus it should be borne in mind that by 30 June 1955, the
Soviets might have a stockpile up to
twice as large as that taken as a basis for the calculations
in NSC 140/1. Again this
does not affect, in my judgment, the validity of the general
conclusions of the report. It merely means that the
magnitude of the Soviet capability envisaged therein for
mid-1955 might be increased or reduced, or advanced or
delayed by a year or more.
- 3.
- This Agency strongly recommends NSC 140/1 to the Council as a sound intelligence
estimate and as an appropriate basis for developing national
policy.
[Enclosure 3]
The Chairman of the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference (Hoover) to the Executive Secretary of the National
Security Council (Lay)5
top secret
Washington, May 29, 1953.
Dear Mr. Lay: Reference is made to your memorandum of
May 19, 1953,6 which
transmitted for review and comment by the Interdepartmental Intelligence
Conference a report prepared by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of
the National Security Council pursuant to a directive contained in
NSC 140.
[Page 358]
The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference has certain comments to
offer. The Soviet plan of attack as set forth in the report admittedly
is not the only plan which the Soviets might logically pursue. The air
attack contemplates delivery of the bulk of Soviet atomic weapons
against certain of the major population centers of the United States.
The Soviet leaders would have to weigh the advantages of such an attack
which would involve only the random destruction of critical war industry
against the fact that the bulk of the known Communist Party members in
the United States and approximately two thirds of the most dangerous
potential Communist saboteurs reside in the areas indicated for attack
under the plan proposed. The Soviet leaders have in the past, in other
countries and under war conditions utilized the indigenous Communists
for underground guerrilla and sabotage operations. Any difference in
allocation of atomic weapons under the plan of attack might have
resulted in more atomic weapons being available for clandestine use.
The damage effects from clandestine attack and sabotage are set out on
page 27 of the report. The language used in paragraph 63 thereof might
leave an inaccurate impression, since the effects of “portable atomic
weapons” are compared with those of air-dropped bombs. We understand it
is a fact that clandestinely-placed atomic demolition weapons can have a
much greater destructive power than the typical Soviet air-dropped
atomic weapons contemplated in the evaluation. Damage resulting from use
of clandestine atomic weapons could have been evaluated qualitatively
had the Subcommittee designated specific targets for demolition atomic
weapons in its plan of attack on the basis of the statements regarding
vulnerability of certain critical facilities which appeared in paragraph
49 on page 20 of the report.
The Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, applying the above
observations, approves the report.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure 4]
Memorandum by the Chairman of the Interdepartmental
Committee on Internal Security (Donegan) to the National Security Council
Representative on Internal Security (Coyne)
top secret
Washington, May 28, 1953.
- Subject:
- Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict
Direct Injury on the United States up to July 1, 1955.
[Page 359]
As requested in your memorandum captioned as above, dated May 19,
1953,7 the comments
contained below are submitted by ICIS
with regard to the report (NSC 140/1) on
this subject prepared by the Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the
NSC. This memorandum has not been
coordinated through the member departments of the ICIS.
While it is realized that other plans of attack are available to the
Soviets and might have been considered, the ICIS is confining its observations to the Soviet concept of
operation and plan of attack adopted by the NSC Special Evaluation Subcommittee. In this connection,
the ICIS believes the report
undervalues the likelihood of sabotage with atomic demolition weapons.
This could be misleading.
The ICIS disagrees with the conclusion
stated in the third sentence of paragraph 4–d (1), page 6, for the
following reasons:
Fissionable material diverted to small weapons for clandestine attack
purposes would make available more weapons than the same amount of
fissionable material would in weapons for military attack by air. If so
diverted, these small weapons would permit a broader selection of
targets and increase the likelihood of complete destruction of a greater
number of critically important facilities. The ICIS concludes, accordingly, that the effect of clandestine
atomic weapons properly placed could be considerably greater rather than
“broadly equivalent” to the effect of the same amount of fissionable
material used in air dropped weapons. Furthermore, as paragraph 4–d (1)
indicates, clandestinely employed atomic weapons are one hundred percent
effective whereas elsewhere in the report it is clearly indicated that
weapons assigned to air drop are subject to a substantial percentage of
aborts, operational losses, etc., as set forth in paragraph 7, page
9.
The ICIS wishes to emphasize that the
foregoing must be considered in direct relation to the possibility of
detection of alien fissionable material. We cannot be assured of
receiving advance information in this regard. There are no practical
technical means available either now or in the foreseeable future for
the detection of alien fissionable material. Such material, without any
reasonable likelihood of detection, can be introduced clandestinely into
the United States through varied means which include but are not limited
to the diplomatic pouch, the person, personal effects or baggage of
legal or illegal entrants, shipments by land, sea and air, either at
established ports of entry or across our unprotected coast lines and
land borders. Once so introduced there is only a slight
[Page 360]
possibility of detecting such alien
fissionable material either in disassembled or assembled form wherever
located.
If the NSC concurs in the validity of the
foregoing observations, it would appear desirable for NSC to direct a re-examination and revision
of those few segments of the report that relate directly thereto such as
paragraph 4–c—page 6, paragraph 16—page 11, paragraph 44—page 18,
paragraph 56—page 24, and paragraph 63—page 27.
