Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 140th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, April 22, 1953 ¹

[Extracts]

top secret
eyes only

April 22, 1953

Present at the 140th Meeting of the National Security Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were W. Randolph Burgess, for the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Interior (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 5); the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 5); Robert LeBaron, Department of Defense (for Item 5); General Vandenberg, for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Sherman Adams, Special Assistant to the President (for Item 3); the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Council Affairs; the Special Assistant to the President for Cold War Planning; the Special Assistant to the President for Atomic Energy Matters; the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a general account of the main positions taken and the chief points made at this meeting.

. . . . . . .

5. Basic National Security Policies and Programs in Relation to Their Costs (NSC 149;² NSC 149/1;³ NSC Action No. 762;⁴ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated April 21, 1953⁵)

Mr. Cutler called attention to the revision of Part I of NSC 149/1 as a result of the Council’s consideration at the last meeting of this statement of policy. He also called the Council’s attention to the proposed action on this paper as set forth in the Note by the Executive Secretary. This called for approval of the paper and direction to the Planning Board to use it as a guide in the preparation of a more detailed statement of basic national security policy to supersede the NSC 20, 68 and 135 series.

Mr. Cutler further informed the Council that the Secretary of State, before his departure for the NATO meeting, had sent a letter to the President expressing the hope of himself, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury that no further cuts would be made in the major security programs by the Council, and that the Council would avoid imposing too much rigidity on the programs set forth in NSC 149/1.

Finally, Mr. Cutler informed the Council of a number of changes in the wording of NSC 149/1 which had resulted from his meeting with the President and Mr. Lay at their briefing earlier that morning. He explained that the President had been desirous of removing the tabular statement of estimated levels of expenditure for FY 1954, 1955 and 1956 which appeared on page 11, on the ground that such precise figures might be construed by the Congress as ironclad promises which subsequently the heads of the executive departments might find it difficult to keep.

The President himself intervened to state that he did not want the responsible members of the Executive branch to make iron-clad commitments to the Congress on expenditure levels since, if changes later proved necessary, the heads of these agencies would be crucified for having failed to live up to the letter of their promises.

Mr. Cutler also stated that a letter had been received from the Secretary of Defense, recommending that the proposal to postpone and stretch out the large ship reactor program and the aircraft nuclear propulsion program should be changed to call for the complete elimination of these two programs, with the result that further savings could be made in the Atomic Energy Commission’s program for FY 1954 and 1955. Mr. Cutler said that a decision by the Council on this recommendation would be in order, as would be a decision on the suggestion of the Secretary of Defense as to the desirability of a careful review of weapons requirements. If these could be stretched out or lowered, it would be possible for the Atomic Energy Commission to effect still further savings.

In summarizing his introductory remarks, Mr. Cutler said that he presumed that as a result of previous consideration by the Council of Part I of NSC 149/1, he could safely assume that the Council was now prepared to adopt Part I and to direct the Planning Board to proceed with the drafting of a new and more detailed statement of national policy along the lines of Part I.

Secretary Smith, however, informed the Council that in its present form Part I was unsatisfactory to the Department of State. He therefore suggested that Part II of NSC 149/1 be approved by the Council, but that Part I be returned to the Planning Board for revision.

Both the President and Mr. Cutler stated that they were unable to understand the objections which the State Department found in Part I, and Secretary Smith was requested to clarify these objections.

Secretary Smith replied that he had no objections to the substance of Part I, but that there were a good many nit-picks and editorial clarifications which the State Department felt would be desirable.

After Secretary Smith pointed to one or two concrete instances, the President indicated agreement that a certain conditioning of the phraseology of Part I would be desirable. The President therefore suggested that the Council approve Part I in substance with the understanding that certain editorial clarifications would be made.

The Council then turned to the consideration of Part II of NSC 149/1, and Mr. Cutler requested Secretary Kyes to comment on the Military Program therein set forth.

The most vital objective, said Secretary Kyes, was to secure authority to cut back on certain portions of the Military Program. He did not envisage any considerable change in the force strength of the Army and Navy as contemplated in the Military Program, but additions would be made to the strength of the Air Force, which he anticipated might reach 106 wings by June 30, 1954. A great deal more time would be needed to refine and elaborate the force levels which could be achieved within the expenditure figures and personnel strengths indicated in the Military Program as set forth in Part II. It was quite possible that as a result of this process still further cuts could be made in the costs of the Defense Department program.

Secretary Kyes then said that he had at hand a proposed action by the Council on the Military Program which he desired to read to the Council as a basis for action. An important item in this action, said Secretary Kyes, was the proposal to eliminate the large ship reactor program and the aircraft nuclear propulsion program instead of merely postponing or stretching out these two programs. The program for the atomic-powered submarine would of course continue.

Admiral Strauss, who had been invited by the President to attend the Council meeting, stated that he very much preferred to see these two programs stretched out rather than postponed indefinitely or entirely eliminated.

The President inquired as to the essential differences between reactor designs for powering submarines and for powering aircraft carriers.

Chairman Dean, who had likewise been invited to participate in Council consideration of this item, explained the very great difference in design between the two reactors. Of course, he said, if there were no military requirement for these two programs, there was no sense in the Atomic Energy Commission’s going on with them. But, he said, he must warn that the elimination of these two programs would occasion considerable readjustments in the research establishments and laboratories of the Atomic Energy Commission.

This argument seemed not to appeal to the President, who expressed his anxiety and concern about the Government’s apparent tendency to monopolize all research activity in this area at the very moment when private industry seemed anxious to move in and employ its own research facilities.

In reply, Chairman Dean stated that he believed that private industry would not be in a position to do much in this field for another five years. Accordingly, if the Government drops these two programs there will be a long time gap which might prove to be a grave mistake.

The President, however, stated that he himself was prepared to go along with the recommendation of the Secretary of Defense provided the elimination of these two programs was consistent with the national security. If there were other arguments and considerations, not touching the national security, which indicated the desirability of continuing these two programs, the President stated that he would be quite willing to have these considerations discussed separately with the Atomic Energy Commission.

Thereupon, Mr. Cutler reverted to Secretary Kyes’ recommendation for the inauguration of a review of military requirements for atomic weapons, and asked Secretary Kyes to elucidate this recommendation.

The heart of the question, replied Secretary Kyes, was whether it was reasonable to take a calculated risk and postpone for one year securing the added weapons which would result from the most recent expansion program of the AEC. He believed that it was safe to take this risk and that very great savings would result from the curtailment of the expansion program.

Admiral Strauss expressed concern over the probable length of time which would be required for a review of weapons requirements, which he had been told would amount to 60 days. If humanly possible the review, he said, should be completed at a much earlier date.

Secretary Kyes promised that he would go as fast as he could, but that the review of weapons requirements by the Joint Chiefs of Staff would take time, and that furthermore they must be the final judges of the degree of risk which would be involved in postponing for an entire year the achievement of the levels of atomic weapons hitherto contemplated.

The Director of the Bureau of the Budget said that he failed to grasp the arguments against cutting down on the production program of the Atomic Energy Commission. Every other program was being revised and cut, while the AEC program continues on a war mobilization basis. To Mr. Dodge all this made very little sense.

In support of Mr. Dodge’s point, Secretary Kyes noted that it might very well eventuate that we would not have the force levels to use all the weapons which would be produced by the AEC program. At a minimum it might be possible to save a billion dollars as a result of this reappraisal of weapons requirements.

Secretary Smith then said he wished to raise a question as to the interpretation of the statement of new policy with respect to the mobilization base as set forth in sub-paragraph c on page 8.

Secretary Kyes, in response to this inquiry, stated that what he sought with respect to the mobilization base was dispersion as a safeguard against surprise atomic attack, but not dissipation. The objective was to compress the mobilization base to ensure continued production of the vital items, rather than to shut down on any of these.

The Director of Defense Mobilization queried Secretary Kyes as to whether there was any implication in this sub-paragraph that we were moving in the direction of a constriction of the base.

Secretary Kyes replied that in general the answer was “yes”, although as regards certain specific areas he actually contemplated an expansion of the base. What he really sought, said Secretary Kyes, was to correct past errors regarding the mobilization base which had been the result of the emergency and haste, or had been caused by simple mismanagement. We are consolidating and validating the new Administration’s position with respect to the mobilization base.

Mr. Flemming then sought reassurance that there was no move to sacrifice the principles of security to those of economy.

Secretary Kyes gave the requisite assurance, and replied that what he wanted to find out was where we now stood with regard to the mobilization base in order to re-evaluate and consolidate.

Mr. Flemming said that in general the statement of policy in Part I of NSC 149/1 appeared to him eminently sound, but that we must understand precisely how we are going to go about implementing that policy.

The President interposed to express hearty agreement with Mr. Flemming’s statement, and to go on to observe that the discussion was now getting to the point where there would be practical political difficulties. The President prophesied that small business would not like this constriction of the military base.

Secretary Kyes referred to his knowledge of small business during a period when he considered himself a small businessman, and expressed the view that a great deal could be done to improve the prospects for participation by small businesses in the mobilization program. This, however, would depend on small business abandoning political maneuvering in favor of a practical plan to ensure adequate participation.

Secretary Kyes then went on to say that he had another suggestion which he would like to place before the Council for its consideration. It seemed to him that it would be a very sensible move to lump together the MSA funds for foreign military assistance with the funds allocated for the U.S. military programs, with the objective of having greater flexibility in the allocation of military end items between the U.S. armed forces and the armed forces of our allies. Of course, said Secretary Kyes, it would be necessary for the Congress to appropriate funds separately to the Department of Defense and the Mutual Security Agency. What he meant was that they should pool these funds as they were allocated by the Bureau of the Budget.

The President expressed approval of this proposal if it proved feasible, pointing out that of course the Congress would appropriate separately to the two departments.

The Vice President said that Secretary Kyes’ proposal made excellent sense to him also. From the point of view of success with the Congress, we should do everything possible to emphasize the national security aspects of the foreign assistance program, and this would help to give such emphasis.

Mr. Dodge said that in effect Secretary Kyes’ proposal seemed to him a means of avoiding Representative Taber’s repeated suggestion that military assistance funds should be appropriated directly to the Department of Defense and not to the Mutual Security Agency. As an addition to this proposal by Secretary Kyes, Mr. Dodge thought that there should be some provision stating that the Defense Department should hold fast control over the expenditure of funds from new appropriations for the Fiscal Year 1954.

The President pointed out that it would be impossible to write such a provision as this into the budget itself, and Mr. Dodge agreed that this was so. Mr. Dodge thought, however, that this was something that could be advanced by way of argument in the Congressional hearings on the Administration’s budget. It would help, he was sure, to sell the budget to the Congress.

In reply, the President reminded Mr. Dodge with some warmth that there would be a very vociferous minority in the Congress which would be violently opposed to even the slightest cuts in the budgets of the national security programs. We must certainly support very firmly the reductions which have been agreed upon in this paper, and we must do all we can to help Secretary Wilson and Mr. Stassen, but we should not overlook the influence of this minority group.

Secretary Kyes observed that he hated to be regarded as a mere pennypincher. He thought there was real danger in talking so much about simply securing cuts in the appropriations for the national security programs. What we should stress and emphasize is that, as a result of the reorganization of the programs and the departments, cuts would be amply justified without damage to the national security. On the other hand, Secretary Kyes did not feel that Mr. Dodge’s suggestion would be helpful to him.

This concluded the discussion of the Military Program in Part II of NSC 149/1, and Mr. Cutler then asked the Acting Director for Mutual Security to explain the Mutual Security Program as set forth in this report.

Mr. Rand ⁶ read to the Council an explanation of this program, and stated that the approach taken by his agency to the problem of making cuts was the best approach that the agency could offer. Indeed, he observed, there might even have to be additional funds for certain special programs over and above the level of $6,300,000. Such additional amounts might run between $150 million and $300 million.

After Mr. Rand had finished speaking, Mr. Cutler explained that the President was not wholly clear as to the $750 million set down on page 16 to provide special weapons in a program to be controlled by the President.

Mr. Rand explained that the new weapons referred to included such things as atomic artillery, guided missiles, and the latest type of aircraft.

Secretary Kyes expressed the view that control of such a program should remain with the Department of Defense.

Since the purpose of this program had not been entirely clear, the President speculated that it might be a cover for some transaction which the Mutual Security Agency desired to hide (even if legitimate). In any event, said the President, it seemed to him that there was quite a leap involved from our previous policy of withholding such weapons from our allies to a new policy of giving them $750 million worth of such weapons. Was this perhaps, continued the President, designed to substitute new weapons for conventional weapons?

Whatever was the design, said Mr. Dodge, he did not like this new item in the Mutual Security Program, and furthermore, he predicted that the new weapons would not be available to send to our allies.

The President agreed with this last statement, and said he was forced to conclude that this was a counsel of desperation, because we couldn’t supply conventional weapons in the amounts which we had promised.

At this point Mr. Dodge stated that he desired to discuss the proposed Mutual Security Program in a more general and critical way. He called the Council’s attention to the fact that in former years the Congress had invariably cut the appropriations figure for foreign assistance which came from the executive departments. In spite of this fact, the Mutual Security Agency was actually asking for more money this year than they had asked the Congress for in FY 1953—$300 million more. To Mr. Dodge this was politically in-feasible, and he felt that the Mutual Security Agency should take into account the very large unexpended balances for both military and economic aid which had accumulated. The existence of these unexpended funds, said Mr. Dodge, contrasted very unfavorably with a request for such a large new appropriation for the forthcoming fiscal year.

The President said that while the Mutual Security people might have a problem with their unexpended balances, he himself was not certain that Mr. Dodge’s criticism took into account sufficiently the final objectives of our foreign assistance program. If we undertake now to cut still further on the budget of the Mutual Security Agency it was perfectly plain that we would not achieve these objectives. In fact, continued the President, he was actually astonished that the Mutual Security figure was not larger, in view of what would presently be required for the rearmament of Germany.

Mr. Dodge stuck to his guns, and stated that a request for new obligational authority of approximately $4 billion, instead of the $6.3 billion for FY 1953, seemed to him ample to ensure the necessary flexibility in administering foreign military assistance. If we persisted in asking for the larger figure, Congress was certainly likely to cut it to at least $4 billion.

The President remained unconvinced by these arguments, and again stated that we could not possibly contemplate wasting all the money that we have spent in prior years on military assistance, by casting aside important parts of our program at the very time when they were on the point of completion. This was no genuine economy and made no sense to him.

Secretary Smith said that the State Department had gone over the Mutual Security Program very carefully. He noted that we had several obligations with respect to Germany. It would cost $100 million to stockpile the necessary supplies for the City of Berlin. We had other commitments in Germany, and we must commence German rearmament the very moment that ratification of the EDC agreements made it possible. Nothing had yet been done to offset the alarming rearmament in East Germany, and there was no provision to meet any of these commitments in the present Mutual Security Program. Hence, said Secretary Smith, he could only conclude that the ceiling on appropriations for Mutual Security would have to be raised rather than lowered. The flexibility of which he had heard so much would have to be up rather than down.

Mr. Dodge remained unconvinced by these statements or by the President’s argument that Congress was firmly in favor of the program to rearm West Germany.

The President said that while he agreed with Mr. Dodge that there had been serious mismanagement by the past Administration and that this was an important reason for the existence of large unexpended balances in Mutual Security funds, this nevertheless did not appear to him to offer an excuse for a more drastic cut in the request for new obligational authority. What it indicated to the President was the need for better management of funds appropriated. Since, he continued, this Administration had agreed to place its budget in the hands of the Congress by the first week in May, it seemed to him best to discontinue discussion of the program at this point and to take it up again at an emergency meeting of the Council when its regular members had returned from Europe. It would then be possible to present to Mr. Stassen the feeling that the expenditure records and the existence of unexpended funds in the Mutual Security Program did not seem to jibe clearly with his request for new obligational authority in the amount of $6 billion.

It was agreed thereafter to defer discussion of the Mutual Security Program until another meeting of the Council.

The President left the meeting at 12:30 p.m.

After the President had left, Secretary Kyes urged the desirability of a more careful review of the matériel requirements which were sent in to MSA by our European allies. In some cases, notably British requests for ammunition, the requirements were fantastically high. There was general agreement with the proposal made by Secretary Kyes.

Mr. C. D. Jackson then raised the question of tactics in presenting the Administration’s program and budget. He asked whether, in view of the decision to postpone action on the Mutual Security Program, the President would still propose to talk the next morning with the majority leaders as scheduled.

The Vice President counseled against such a proceeding, and thought it best to postpone any discussion of the budget with the Congressional leaders until the entire program was ready, particularly if there was any possibility of a further reduction in the appropriations for the Mutual Security Agency. It was highly important, said the Vice President, in view of Congressional sentiment for more drastic cuts in the budget, not to risk Congressional repudiation of the President in the very fields in which he was an expert, namely, the military and foreign assistance fields. Unless the matter were carefully arranged, the Congress might make very drastic cuts in the Defense and Mutual Security Programs.

Mr. Jackson answered that he was in perfect agreement with these and other arguments for postponing the meeting with the majority leaders until a decision had been reached on the whole of NSC 149/1. But what, he inquired, would happen when Secretaries Dulles and Wilson and Mr. Stassen talked tomorrow at the NATO meeting? Would they not let the cat out of the bag in Europe, and would not the levels of expenditure thereafter be immediately known?

The Vice President inquired how much it would be necessary for Secretaries Dulles and Wilson and Mr. Stassen to reveal at the NATO meeting.

Secretary Kyes thought that Secretary Wilson expected word of the decision at the present Council meeting as to what it was appropriate to reveal to NATO.

Mr. Dodge, however, pointed out that they would be talking only about expenditure figures for foreign assistance and not appropriation figures, and since the expenditure figures for FY 1954 in the Mutual Security Program were not in question and were perfectly acceptable, there would be no problem at the NATO meeting.

Mr. Cutler suggested that the Vice President, Mr. Jackson, and certain other members of the Council remain behind to discuss with the President the desirability of postponing any discussion with the majority leaders until after the Council considered again the Mutual Security Program.

The National Security Council: ⁷

a. Adopted in substance Part I of NSC 149/1, including the amendments read at the meeting by Mr. Cutler, subject to editorial changes and suggestions by the Council members.

b. Adopted the statement on the Military Program in Part II of NSC 149/1 subject to:

(1) The amendments read at the meeting by Mr. Cutler.

(2) The understanding that:

The Department of Defense will proceed with the presentation of the FY 1954 budget to Congress, on the basis of the personnel strength in NSC 149/1 and in conformity with the new obligational authority and estimate of expenditures contained therein. Because of the limited time available to the Department to review and appraise the effects of these policy decisions upon the size and structure of the military organization, the Department of Defense in connection with FY 1955 will review the planned military combat units and present to the Council, at an early date, a revised force structure within the personnel limitations, new obligational authority and expenditure estimates indicated in NSC 149/1. Pending the presentation of such revisions, force structure and force combat units currently planned for June 30, 1953 will be continued as effective units, except that the Air Force may add additional combat units to the extent that it can be accomplished within the 915,000 military personnel allocation and within the total expenditure estimates available to the Department of Defense.

c. Agreed to the estimate of FY 1954 expenditures for the Mutual Security Program contained in paragraph 11–a of NSC 149/1, but deferred further action on the statement of the Mutual Security Program in Part II of NSC 149/1 until a special meeting of the Council.

d. Agreed with the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Defense that the matériel requirements stated by nations receiving military assistance should be subject to review and validation by the United States prior to the provision of such military assistance.

e. Adopted the recommendation of the Acting Secretary of Defense that the large ship reactor program and the aircraft nuclear propulsion program be eliminated as not required from the viewpoint of national security.

[Here follows subparagraph f, a brief review of atomic energy matters.]

Note: The actions in b, c and f–(2) as adopted and approved by the President transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. The action in c as adopted and approved by the President transmitted to the Director for Mutual Security for implementation. The action in d as adopted and approved by the President transmitted to the Secretary of Defense and the Director for Mutual Security for implementation. The action in f–(1) and f–(3) as adopted and approved by the President transmitted to the Atomic Energy Commission for implementation.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Apr. 23.
2. See footnote 1, p. 281.
3. Not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 149 Series) For text of NSC 149/2, Apr. 29, see p. 305.
4. See footnote 6, p. 290.
5. Not found in Department of State files.
6. William M. Rand, Deputy Director for Mutual Security.
7. Paragraphs a–f constitute NSC Action No. 768. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)