Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/P–NSC files, lot 62 D 1, NSC 141

Report to the National Security Council by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security ¹

top secret
NSC 141

Washington , January 19, 1953.

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security

References:

A.

NSC Action Nos. 668 and 688²

B.

NSC 135/3 and Annex to NSC 135/1³

C.

Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Reappraisal of United States Objectives and Strategy for National Security”, dated November 14, 1952⁴

At the direction of the President, the enclosed memorandum to the President from the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security and its attached report on the subject, submitted pursuant to NSC Action No. 668–b, are transmitted herewith for the consideration of the National Security Council.

The report contains Conclusions (Part One—page 6) approved by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security on the basis of the Analysis contained in Part Two (page 34).

The appendices listed on page 103,⁵ which were of assistance to the Steering Committee on this Reexamination in reaching its conclusions, are being circulated separately through the members of the Senior NSC Staff as supplementary data in connection with the Reexamination. None of these appendices received departmental approval or clearance.

Special security precautions are requested in the handling of the enclosure.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Memorandum for the President by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security

top secret

[ Washington ,] January 16, 1953.

• Subject:
• Re-examination of United States Programs for National Security

We are enclosing herewith certain materials which you requested us to submit pursuant to National Security Council Action No. 668.

We believe it important to point out in this covering memorandum what this study has attempted to accomplish—as well as what it has not attempted to accomplish.

NSC 135/3 contains a balanced statement of the position of the United States in the world today; the threats which face us in the period ahead; and our basic strategy for meeting these threats. This study takes NSC 135/3 as its starting point and makes no effort to restate or re-examine the conclusions reached in that paper.

The present study deals with the limited question as to whether the allocation of our resources under existing programs is appropriately related to the threats which we face and to our strategy for meeting these threats. The nature of this examination necessarily results in a concentration of attention on the dangers ahead and the respects in which existing programs may not adequately meet these dangers. In view of the limited purpose of this paper, no attempt was made to obtain the same over-all balanced view of our position as was contained in NSC 135/3. Nor was any attempt made to indicate what has been accomplished in the last few years or what strains and difficulties our growing strength is causing the U.S.S.R. We point these facts out in order that the study not be misunderstood and interpreted as an unduly pessimistic assessment of our position at the present time.

We also wish to emphasize one additional point. This study reaches the conclusion that there is need to apply more resources to our continental defense and our civil defense programs. This conclusion has as its premise that these programs for defense of the United States against atomic attack constitute new and distinct requirements and that resources additional to those now programmed should be made available to meet them. No conclusion has been reached as to the extent to which these programs should be undertaken in the event additional resources are not made available. We feel that we must not sacrifice our capability of projecting our power abroad by concentrating too heavily on the purely defensive aspects of our security should general war occur.

In view of the short time available, we have not had an adequate opportunity to carry to greater depth and precision the consideration of certain of the basic questions dealt with in the study, particularly with respect to the impact on our strategy and programs of modern atomic weapons. Nor has there been an opportunity to consult with other interested departments and agencies with respect to those portions of the study with which they may be particularly concerned. It is therefore suggested that it may be desirable for the National Security Council to take this study under further consideration.

Dean Acheson

Secretary of State

Robert A. Lovett

Secretary of Defense

W. Averell Harriman

Director for Mutual Security

[Subenclosure]

top secret

[ Washington , undated.]

Report by the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director for Mutual Security on Reexamination of United States Programs for National Security

A. Terms of Reference

1. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 668, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security were directed on September 4, 1952, “to undertake, in consultation as appropriate with other departments and agencies, the preparation of materials necessary for a reexamination of the amounts and allocations of resources to various areas in terms of kind, quantity, timing and priority, to determine:

• “a. Whether a general increase in the level of free world programs and military forces is required to deal with the several threats.^*
• “b. Whether the present allocation of resources as between U.S. military forces and other free world forces is appropriate.
• “c. Whether the present balance between military assistance and the various types of economic assistance is appropriate.
• “d. Whether these allocations are in proper relationship to the threats facing the United States in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East, to the importance of these areas for U.S. security, and to United States commitments.”

2. The Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Director for Mutual Security herewith submit their report in response to the directive of September 4. They have approved the Conclusions (Part One) on the basis of the Analysis (Part Two).

B. United States Objectives and Strategy

3. The starting point of this paper is the statement of United States objectives and strategy for national security contained in NSC 135/3. In re-examining the amounts and allocations of resources for national security, this report attempts to assess the probable contribution to national security of present programs in the light of the objectives stated in paragraph 4 of NSC 135/3. The statement of objectives reads as follows:

[Here follows a lengthy restatement of the objectives set forth in NSC 135/3.]

C. Major Developments Subsequent to the Date of Approval of NSC 135/3

4. In making this re-examination, certain developments subsequent to the date of approval of NSC 135/3 have been taken into consideration. These developments include the following:

a. There has been a reduction of the prospects for an early settlement of the Korean issue. This is indicated by the Communist rejection of the United Nations General Assembly resolution.

b. The situation in Indochina has become more precarious. The situation in Iran has continued to deteriorate, although very recently the prospects for settlement of the oil dispute have improved.

c. There has been a reduction of the prospects for an early ratification of the EDC Treaty and related European arrangements.

d. The United States has developed a thermonuclear device.

e. Added information on communist intentions has been gained from the statements of communist leaders at the recent communist party congress in Moscow. These statements give some basis for the view that the Soviet rulers will direct their major efforts during the immediate future to dividing and weakening the Western alliance, while maintaining and perhaps increasing their cold-war pressures against what they estimate to be the particular vulnerabilities of the West.

Part One—General Conclusions

i. Distribution of Resources Between United States and Other Free World Military Forces

1. The first question is whether the present allocation of resources as between United States military forces and other free world forces is appropriate. This question has two aspects which should be separately considered. One is the requirements for air and civil defenses for North America in light of the growing Soviet atomic threat. The other aspect involves the question whether the requirements for military forces in the free world could be more efficiently and effectively met than at present by changing the present allocation of resources as between United States and other free world forces. These two aspects are separately considered below.

A. Defense of the United States Against the Soviet Atomic Threat Relevant Considerations

2. The defense of the United States against the growing Soviet atomic threat involves both passive and active defense measures. For some years to come the deterrent power of the United States will reside largely in its ability to deliver an atomic attack of tremendous force upon the Soviet Union. The power of our striking forces is now substantial and is improving. For the foreseeable future, the willingness of the United States to employ atomic weapons in the event of general war is essential to the success of our strategic plans. The willingness of the United States, however, to initiate an atomic attack in the event that the Soviet rulers take certain actions which we would regard as a casus belli will be significantly affected by the casualties and destruction which the Soviet system could inflict in retaliation. Even at the present time, these casualties and this destruction would be very high and the prospect, under a continuation of our present programs, will rapidly worsen. There is an increasing danger that unless a large-scale civil defense program and measures to improve greatly our defense against air and sea attack are undertaken, the United States might find its freedom of action seriously impaired in an emergency.

3. It is estimated that American Civil Defense is only 10% to 15% effective at the present time and that a continuation of present programs will no more than double this effectiveness by the end of 1954. Additional programs—particularly for shelters— could substantially improve the situation. Care should be taken in developing and carrying out any new civil defense program to minimize the fear of atomic attack throughout the country and to avoid wasting resources on areas not likely to be attacked.

4. With respect to active defense, our present capability to defend the continental United States from atomic attack is considered to be extremely limited. As of mid-1952 probably 65–85% of the atomic bombs launched by the U.S.S.R. could be delivered on target in the United States. Defensive measures in current programs will not provide an effective defense against mass atomic attack. The U.S.S.R. will possess, in the period 1954–1955, the capability to make an air attack upon the United States which would represent a blow of critical proportions. There are, however, a number of additional measures which, if accomplished, would materially increase our capability to meet the atomic threat in 1955 and thereafter. Whatever additional programs are undertaken in the immediate future, there is a clear need for additional intensive research and development in this field.

5. The best defense of the United States in this period of weapons transition lies in an effective land, sea and air offensive capability sufficient to deter the would-be aggressor or render him impotent should he choose to attack.

Conclusions

a. A continuation of our continental defense and civil defense programs at the level of present appropriations involves critical risks.

b. Basic to the attainment of the objectives defined in NSC 135/3 is the allocation of large additional resources to continental defense and civil defense.

c. These programs constitute distinct and new requirements on the United States for which additional resources must be provided if the United States is to guard itself against the threat of atomic attack without disrupting its programs for building strength in the free world.

d. Additional programs should be prepared as a matter of urgency in such detail as to provide firm cost estimates and firmer estimates (1) of the results which could be accomplished by the programs and (2) of their impact on other security programs.

B. Distribution of Resources Between U.S. and Other Free World Military Forces

Relevant Considerations

[Here follow paragraphs 6–8.]

9. The purpose to be served by building up the military strength of allied and friendly nations varies from case to case. The buildup of Japanese and NATO forces will increase the ability of the free world to wage global war and will thereby provide additional deterrents to overt aggression by the U.S.S.R. and to limited aggression by China or the European satellites. In the Middle East, however, with the exception of Turkey and possibly Pakistan, there is no immediate opportunity to create forces strong enough to be of major significance in the event of global war. Initially, the purposes to be served by building up local forces in this area are to (1) strengthen the structure of government, (2) provide internal security, and (3) obtain base and transit rights for U.S. military forces. In creating such forces, the weak and unstable economies in the area must be taken into account. In South and Southeast Asia, it will be a long time before any forces can be created which would exercise a significant influence in the event of global war. But stronger indigenous forces in this area would serve not only to provide internal security (as in the Middle East); they would also ultimately contribute to security against the threat of expanded aggression by communist China. Finally, the development of effective local forces in Japan, South Korea, and Viet Nam would not only serve these local purposes, but would also free United States forces now deployed in the Far East, or, in the case of Viet Nam, French forces, for other assignments and thereby have a doubly beneficial effect. In general, it is clear that the strain on United States forces can be reduced and an adequate strategic reserve reconstituted only as other free world forces are strengthened and improved in these areas.

10. The volume of resources that can be effectively used in building up the military forces of allied and friendly nations in the Middle East and Asia is limited by the rate at which such resources can be absorbed, and by such special political circumstances as the constitutional prohibition of rearmament in Japan, the popular distrust of French motives in Viet Nam, and India’s distrust of Pakistan. A build-up more rapid than envisaged in present programs would appear to be possible and desirable (a) in the immediate future in Korea, Indochina, and Formosa and on a modest scale in the Middle East, (b) in Japan, as soon as the constitutional and political obstacles can be overcome, and in Pakistan, if it can be accomplished without involving unmanageable problems with India, and (c) perhaps at a later date in other Asian countries.

11. In the NATO countries of Western Europe, the build-up of military forces could be accelerated through the use of United States resources. The military efforts that can be put forth by these countries themselves are, however, sharply limited by their economic and political capabilities. Continued pressure by the United States for a military effort greater than justified by the European sense of urgency would weaken the alliance. In the last analysis, United States diplomatic pressure and economic aid cannot substitute for a political determination by the Europeans to devote larger resources to their own security. Even if it is not possible to secure a major increase in the level of the defense effort of the European NATO countries, and even if no strong case can be made for a major increase in the level of United States assistance, there is nevertheless good reason for certain specific revisions to provide, for instance, for some air defense measures and to fill several of the more serious recognized gaps in present defense plans, such as the inadequate provision for interceptors and ammunition reserves. But apart from the continuation and improvement of present NATO programs, a large part of the additional build-up of NATO military strength can only come from the creation of German contingents.

12. It will be necessary to make more effective and flexible use of United States resources in order to ensure during the period 1954–55 a volume of military supplies and equipment sufficient to permit (a) the presently planned build-up of United Forces, (b) the presently scheduled delivery of equipment to NATO, German, Japanese and South Korean forces, and (c) provision for a somewhat increased rate of build-up and the setting of somewhat larger force goals in the case of certain Asian and Middle Eastern nations. United States war reserves now programmed must continue to be regarded as available to help meet unforeseen contingencies in the cold war. This is an additional reason for building up these general war reserves to programmed levels. And as the mobilization base is developed and production levels off, the base must be kept in a condition which will permit its rapid utilization.

Conclusions

a. The build-up of U.S. forces to presently planned levels should be completed as rapidly as practicable. The present programs are believed to be adequate for this task, provided they are not subject to repeated downward adjustment and delay.

b. The allocation of a growing share of U.S. output of military end-items to our allies is consistent with a. It is also urgently needed in light of the threats facing the U.S. in certain key strategic areas on the periphery of the Soviet bloc and is feasible in terms of the absorptive capacity of certain friendly countries. However, allocation and delivery of military end-items and other material should be based on the ability of the recipient nations to maintain the material and use it effectively. Any increase in present military assistance programs should depend upon the contribution such an increase can make to the collective security of the free world. Each area must be considered on its merits.

c. Present programs are inadequate to exploit all opportunities for developing effective local forces in Asia and the Middle East. The devotion of moderate additional resources to this purpose in the Middle East and South Asia, and substantially larger additional resources in the Far East, together with required political measures, would greatly strengthen the free world against what is believed to be, for the next few years, the most immediate threat with which it is confronted.

d. Substantial additional resources could be used in building up additional military forces in the NATO countries. In view, however, of the nature of the circumstances which limit the military effort of which the Europeans seem capable, no attempt should be made to secure a general upward revision of present programs. It seems clear, however, that in Europe, as elsewhere, substantial military assistance programs will have to continue over a period of years. The main effort of the United States in this area should be concentrated upon (a) resisting further whittling down and postponing of present military programs, (b) insuring that there is steady progress in carrying out these programs, and (c) fulfilling U.S. commitments to deliver military equipment. However, specific programs to fill particular gaps should be urged and, if necessary, financially supported.

e. While improvements will be realized under current and projected programs, the present state of the U.S. military reserve forces will involve acute risks in the event of new acts of local aggression or of general war so long as U.S. forces are committed in Korea and present manpower policies remain in effect.

ii. relationship of military and economic assistance

13. The third question is whether the present balance between military assistance and the various types of economic assistance is appropriate.

Relevant Considerations

14. We believe that the following considerations are relevant to this question.

[Here follows paragraph 14 a, outlining the relevant considerations involved in assessing the relationship of military and economic assistance.]

b. It will almost certainly be necessary for the U.S. to continue for a period beyond 1955 to provide military assistance to a number of its major allies, particularly the NATO countries (and Germany) and also Japan, if forces envisaged in present programs are to be achieved and maintained. It should be recognized that insofar as such continued military assistance involves off-shore procurement, it will also contribute directly to the alleviation of balance of payments difficulties and, therefore, reduce the need for other kinds of economic aid.

c. There will continue to be countries—notably Greece, Turkey, Korea, and perhaps at a later date Pakistan and Viet Nam—in which the burden of the military effort undertaken is so heavy and is of such importance to us, and whose economic capabilities are so limited, that it will be necessary and desirable to assist them indefinitely in meeting a part of the financial burden of their defense. This is clearly the case where the alternative to such assistance is an increased requirement for U.S. forces. Also there will continue to be countries, like Austria and Formosa, which have special economic difficulties, which are important to our security, and to which it will probably be necessary to continue to provide grant aid.

d. Direct economic assistance on a grant basis tends to have unfavorable political and psychological repercussions, and it is desirable to avoid the use of grants-in-aid where practicable. The amounts of economic assistance required in the form of grants-in-aid will, however, probably not be large, especially if off-shore procurement and other U.S. military expenditures are continued in the countries of Western Europe and Japan and if new forms are developed for financing productive investment in those parts of the world and in those types of projects which offer a reasonable chance of repayment but with some danger of foreign exchange difficulties.

Conclusions

a. A healthy society is the essential basis of a strong defense, and economic capabilities set a limit to the size of the defense program a society can, at any given time, safely undertake. It may well be that in the future it will be desirable to give somewhat more emphasis than at present to economic assistance, particularly to areas outside Western Europe, and to needed changes in our foreign economic policies. There may be cases in which it will be necessary and desirable to carry out economic programs even at the cost of reducing or stretching out military programs. A specific answer to the question of the balance between economic and military assistance could only be given on the basis of the varying situation country by country.

b. It is desirable that we have flexibility to shift funds as between areas and as between uses in whatever way will best advance our security interests.

c. There is need for a large flow of both private and public capital from the United States to the rest of the world, a need which must be expected to be long continued. Only a part of the public funds provided for this purpose need to be in the form of grants-in-aid, but not all of them can be provided in the form of fixed dollar loans. There is need to develop new forms of intergovernmental financing of productive investment in those parts of the world and for those types of projects that offer a reasonable chance of repayment but with some danger of foreign exchange difficulties.

d. There is a need to search for ways of minimizing the adverse political and psychological effects of continued grant assistance where such assistance is necessary.

e. The problem of economic weakness and instability in the free world, urgent as it is, is a complex one and is not susceptible of solution through a single course of action, through purely temporary programs, or through action solely by the United States. What appears to be required is a comprehensive and concerted approach to the long-range problems enumerated in paragraph 14–a above. In particular, the action most urgently required of the U.S. is to reduce the barriers to imports and to take other steps which will increase the ability of other nations in the free world to earn dollar exchange.

iii. distribution of resources by areas

15. The third question is whether present allocations of resources are in proper relationship to the threats facing the United States in Europe, the Far East, and the Middle East and South Asia, to the importance of these areas for U.S. security, and to United States commitments. The following considerations are relevant to this question.

Relevant Considerations

A. Western Europe

16. The United States has committed itself to regard an attack on Western Europe as an attack on itself, and a Soviet attack on Western Europe will therefore mean general war. With respect to the cold war, present programs will not greatly improve conditions in the next few years, but instability will probably not constitute a serious problem. With respect to the threat of general war, substantial progress has been and will be made in European rearmament under present programs. Western Europe will probably not have reached a security position by 1955 which would be adequate to assure its defense against a determined Soviet attack. Assurance that Western Europe can be defended in the event of general war, however, is by no means the only measure of the value of the NATO forces. The growing capability of waging a delaying action is of great importance. For to the extent that Western forces can make a Soviet attack costly (in terms of time, the necessity to concentrate forces, the inability to capture Western Europe’s industry substantially intact, and casualties), they may deter an attack even though they could not successfully hold against it.

17. It has also become clear that the Western European countries will not or cannot increase appreciably the proportion of their total output which they are now allocating to defense. The limiting factors, on both the rate of build-up and ultimate force goals are essentially economic and political, and involve such political circumstances as a lesser sense of urgency in some countries than prevails in the U.S. Government, a grave lack of internal political cohesion in France, Italy, and Germany, and the still unresolved rivalry and mutual suspicion between France and Germany, and such economic factors as the precarious state of their balance of payments, the widespread mistrust of currencies, and the low rate of savings. Moreover, it is evident that the fulfillment by 1955 of force goals which would make the defense of the NATO Area of Western Europe a possibility would require the application of very much greater resources than the U.S. or European governments are now projecting for this purpose. Heavy pressure by the United States in an effort to make the Western European countries increase their defense efforts would probably be counter-productive for the time being. The important thing is to make steady progress.

B. Middle East and South Asia

18. Under present circumstances the threat to the Middle East is primarily a cold war threat. An armed attack on the Middle East could be made only by Soviet forces and is highly unlikely except as one phase of a general war. There is great danger, however, that political and economic conditions will continue to deteriorate and that important areas, such as Iran, might be lost to Communism as a result of this deterioration and of Soviet political warfare. The ability of the Western powers to combat this threat is limited. There is great animosity in the Arab States and Iran toward the West, particularly toward the U.K. and France. There are important steps which the U.S. can and should take, however, to remedy the situation. Certain of these steps can be taken in concert with the Western allies, but the U.S. must reserve its freedom of action to proceed if such a course is best suited to the long-range objectives which we and our allies share.

19. There is need for the U.S. to make its interest in the area more explicit and to assume increasing responsibility. On the political and diplomatic front, we must demonstrate clearly and openly that preferential treatment is not to be accorded to Israel over other states in the area and that we are determined that national borders shall be respected. Relatively modest amounts of military end-item assistance would make a valuable contribution to political stability and internal security, particularly in certain of the Arab States. The establishment of a Middle East Defense Organization, when political conditions permit, would be of utility as a means of gaining the political cooperation of the states of the area and encouraging integrated defense planning. Technical assistance and capital assistance in economic development are needed as essential parts of a long-term program. The amount of resources required is not large in comparison with the rest of our security program, although an enlarged Indian economic development program and a program of military assistance to modernize and expand Pakistani forces would be expensive.

C. The Far East

20. Present programs do not provide adequate security in the Far East against the threats of the cold war, local aggression, or general war. The danger to our interests will remain acute at least as long as Communist China remains a willing and effective ally of the U.S.S.R. The threats in the Far East are of two kinds: first, that the present fighting in Korea and Indochina (and perhaps Malaya) will increase in intensity and perhaps in extent, and second, that there will be political and economic deterioration in these and other Far Eastern countries. The free world cannot count on any more favorable eventuality than a continuation of the present basic stalemate through 1955, and—in the absence of new initiatives and more telling programs on its part—should be prepared for a deterioration of its position in the Far East.

21. There are real opportunities to build increased military strength in the Far East, immediately in South Korea, Indochina and Formosa, and in Japan if existing political obstacles can be overcome. Substantially more resources than are provided for in present programs could be effectively used for this purpose.

22. Technical assistance and economic development programs can produce significant results but only over a rather long period of time. There is need for investment funds to develop the resources of the region. This development would assist not only the countries in which the investments were made but also Japan and the Western European countries—by making available larger supplies of raw materials and foodstuffs at lower prices but also by increasing the markets for their industrial production.

Conclusions

a. No one of the three major areas outside the Western Hemisphere has yet achieved adequate security against the several threats posed by the Soviet system.

b. Europe will be in a better position to resist Soviet military attack and to withstand Soviet pressures in the cold war than either of the other two areas. Western Europe will probably not have reached a security position by 1955 which would be adequate to assure its defense against a determined Soviet attack.

c. Taking into account the serious and immediate dangers facing the free world in the Far East and the Middle East and the political and economic obstacles to a more rapid build-up of NATO forces, the U.S. should not undertake a general upward revision of present NATO programs but it should attach a high priority to the upward revision of certain specific programs to fill particular defense gaps and should be prepared to support military assistance programs for a number of years to come.

d. There is urgent need for a larger allocation of U.S. economic and military resources to selected countries, in the Middle East and South Asia, particularly Iran, Egypt, India and Pakistan, and for measures which would serve to establish American interests in the area. Such new programs would contribute directly to greater political stability and to a measure of military strength.

e. There is similarly an urgent need for a substantially larger allocation of U.S. resources to the Far East, particularly to Indo-china, Korea, Japan, and Formosa. Such larger programs could provide urgently needed indigenous military forces to help the countries of the area achieve stability, to deter or resist Chinese Communist aggression, and possibly to permit the withdrawal of some Western forces to positions of greater strategic advantage.

f. There is also need for additional economic programs for the underdeveloped countries to stimulate the production of raw materials and foodstuffs and thereby benefit the Western European countries and Japan and strengthen the economic base of the whole free world.

iv. the general level of security programs

23. The final question is whether a general increase in the level of free world programs and military forces is required to deal with the several threats. This question is considered in the light of the objectives defined in paragraph 4 of NSC 135/3 and further elaborated in paragraphs 5–7.

Relevant Considerations

[Here follows paragraph 24, discussing the various considerations involved in assessing the general level of security programs.]

Conclusions

a. A continuation of present programs will not produce the situation of strength required to attain the objectives defined in paragraphs 4–7 of NSC 135/3, nor is it probable that improvements in efficiency of administration or any reallocation of resources within the limits of present programs can bring the Free World to such a situation of strength.

b. It follows, therefore, that a selective increase in the level of free world security programs will be required if the objectives defined in NSC 135/3 are to be attained. In previous conclusions of this report, specific increases have been suggested to provide for substantially larger continental defense and civil defense programs and for economic and military aid on an expanded scale to countries in the Middle East and the Far East. The specific additional programs suggested herein would require some increase in total security outlays in the immediate future but the extent to which, if at all, they would involve, after FY 1954, an absolute increase in such outlays to a rate greater than that projected for FY 1954 can not be calculated on the basis of evidence now available. It is clear however, that even with such increased programs the objectives defined in NSC 135/3 could not be fully attained within the next two or three years and that the United States must plan for a long-term effort.

[Here follows Part Two, “Analysis”, not printed (totaling 19 pages), composed of seven sections dealing respectively with Europe, the Far East, the Middle East, South Asia and Africa, Latin America, defense of the continental United States, and offensive striking power and general military reserve.]

1. NSC 141 was discussed later at the 131st meeting of the National Security Council on Feb. 11, 1953. For extracts from the memorandum of discussion at that meeting, see p. 236.
2. For NSC Action No. 668, see footnote 7, p. 123; NSC Action No. 688, taken by the Council at its 126th meeting on Nov. 26, 1952, noted the Progress Report submitted by the Chairman of the Steering Group on the reexamination of programs for national security called for by NSC 135/3. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions”) Regarding the Progress Report under reference, see the memorandum by Nitze, Nov. 13, 1952, p. 184.
3. Dated Sept. 25, 1952 and Aug. 22, 1952, pp. 142 and 89, respectively.
4. This memorandum transmitted the Progress Report submitted by the Chairman of the Steering Group discussed in footnote 2 above. (PPS files, lot 64 D 563, NSC 135 Series)
5. Reference is to eight papers, none printed. Four of the papers are the final drafts of the regional working group papers discussed in footnote 5, p. 185. Of the remaining four papers, three have not been found in Department of State files. They are: a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense dated Nov. 19, 1952, entitled “Review of Continental Defense System”; a memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense of Jan. 12, 1953, commenting on the Steering Committee draft report of Jan. 6, 1953 (discussed in footnote 1, p. 202); and an undated paper prepared by the Federal Civil Defense Administration. The fourth paper, entitled “Memorandum Prepared by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, dated 10 November [1952], relating to Offensive Striking Power and General Military Reserve” is in PPS files, lot 64 D 563, NSC 135 Series.
6. This question is dealt with last in Part One—Conclusions of the accompanying report. [Footnote in the source text.]