S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 140

Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)1

top secret
NSC 140
[Page 206]

Note by the Executive Secretary to the National Security Council on Directive for a Special Evaluation Subcommittee

References:

A.
NSC Action Nos. 687 and 6992
B.
Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Proposed Directive for a Special Evaluation Subcommittee,” dated January 15, 19533
C.
Memo for NSC from Acting Executive Secretary, subject, “A Project to Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States,” dated October 21, 19524
D.
Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject, “Summary Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Injure the Continental United States,” dated November 25, 19525

Pursuant to NSC Action No. 687–b the Director of Central Intelligence prepared a draft directive providing for terms of reference for a more adequate evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct injury on the United States and recommendations for the machinery necessary to produce for the National Security Council such an evaluation. This draft directive was concurred in by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Interdepartmental Intelligence [Page 207] Conference and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security.

The National Security Council, the Secretary of the Treasury, the Deputy Attorney General and the Director of Defense Mobilization by memorandum action as of January 16, 1953, concurred in the draft directive. The Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator expressed a qualified disapproval of the draft directive. (NSC Action No. 699)

The draft directive, together with the above action, was subsequently submitted to the President for consideration. The President has this date approved the draft directive enclosed herewith, and directs its implementation by all appropriate executive departments and agencies of the U.S. Government.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Enclosure]

Draft Directive Prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence (Smith)

top secret

National Security Council Directive for a Special Evaluation Subcommittee

1.
Pursuant to authorization of the President there is hereby directed the preparation of a summary evaluation of the USSR’s net capability to inflict direct injury on the United States, to be submitted to the Council on or before 15 May 1953. This evaluation will cover the period up to 1 July 1955, and will consider USSR net capabilities against the continental United States and major US installations outside the United States, such installations to be selected on the basis of their importance to defense of the continental United States or to a United States counteroffensive against the USSR. The evaluation will cover all possible types of attack, including direct military, clandestine military, and sabotage, physical and non-physical. The evaluation will deal primarily with the initial phases of war, or the period during which all or a major part of the Soviet atomic or thermonuclear weapon stockpile might be expended.
2.
In order to carry out this directive, there is hereby constituted a Special Evaluation Subcommittee of the NSC under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen. Idwal H. Edwards, USAF (to be retired on or about 28 February 1953) and comprising one representative each to be designated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence [Page 208] Agency, the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference, and the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security. It is expected that the members of this Committee will devote themselves primarily to this project during the period of preparation of the evaluation.
3.
The Special Subcommittee appointed herein is empowered under the terms of this directive to call on any agency of the government for relevant appraisals and information, subject only to appropriate security arrangements for handling and limitation of access to highly sensitive material, such as US war plans. The Special Subcommittee’s functions will include specifically the:
a.
Responsibility for the security of the project during the period of preparation.
b.
Over-all supervision of the project at all stages including:
(1)
Preparation of subsidiary terms of reference for material to be contributed by appropriate agencies.
(2)
Preparation of assumptions to be used as the basis for material contributed.
(3)
Review of material contributed, and issuance of requests for amplification or reconsideration thereof.
(4)
Examination of data used in the preparation of material contributed, as necessary and subject to over-riding security requirements of the agency concerned.
(5)
All decisions concerning the circulation and distribution of material contributed.
c.
Preparation of intermediate working papers as required for the Special Subcommittee’s own use or for the guidance of contributors.
d.
Preparation of the final summary evaluation for consideration by the NSC.
4.
The Chairman and members of the Special Subcommittee are authorized to designate an Executive Secretary and a Subcommittee Staff, to be restricted to the minimum number of personnel necessary for carrying out this directive. The agencies represented on the Special Subcommittee are hereby requested to furnish appropriate facilities and secretarial assistance to the Subcommittee. All personnel participating in the project will have proper security clearance and be instructed in such special security measures as are essential to the project.
5.
Distribution of the final evaluation shall be as determined by the President.
  1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Director of Defense Mobilization, and the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
  2. In NSC Action No. 543, taken on Aug. 30, 1951, the National Security Council approved a draft directive on “A Project To Provide a More Adequate Basis for Planning for the Security of the United States”, prepared by the Director of Central Intelligence pursuant to NSC Action No. 519. NSC Action No. 687, taken at the Council meeting of Nov. 26, 1952, noted that a summary evaluation entitled “Net Capability of the USSR To Injure the Continental United States”, prepared in response to NSC Action No. 543, was limited and inadequate in several respects. The Director of Central Intelligence was instructed to prepare a more adequate evaluation in collaboration with the heads of various other executive agencies. Action was deferred on a recommendation by the Director of Central Intelligence that a review be undertaken of the adequacy of existing administrative “machinery” to undertake such an evaluation. (S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Record of Actions”) NSC Action No. 699, taken by the Council on Jan. 16, 1953, accepted a draft National Security Council directive for a special evaluation subcommittee after taking note of the disapproval of the Acting Federal Civil Defense Administrator who objected to the lack of representation “of some agency which has substantial responsibility for the planning of non-military security measures.” (S/SNSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Record of Actions”)
  3. Reference is to the memorandum enclosing the draft National Security Council directive for a special evaluation subcommittee which became the subject of NSC Action No. 699. A copy of this memorandum is in S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 140 Series.
  4. Reference is to the memorandum enclosing the summary evaluation entitled “Net Capability of the USSR To Injure the Continental United States” which became the subject of NSC Action No. 687 discussed in footnote 2 above. A copy of this memorandum is in S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 140 Series.
  5. Reference is to the memorandum containing amendments to the summary evaluation entitled “Net Capability of the USSR To Injure the Continental United States” which became the subject of NSC Action No. 687 discussed in footnote 2 above. A copy of this memorandum is in S/SNSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 140 Series.