Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

INR files, lot 59 D 27, “CIA Estimate of World Situation Through 1953”

Estimate Prepared by the Board of National Estimates¹

top secret

[Washington,] 21 November 1952.

• Subject:
• Estimate of the World Situation Through 1954^*

Conclusions

1. For the time being the worldwide Communist expansion has apparently been checked. There are indications that the USSR has recognized this situation and has been shifting to less openly aggressive tactics. Since Korea the Soviet bloc has undertaken no new military adventures and it has not increased its aid to Communist insurrectionary movements during the last year. These changes are due in great part to the fact that the principal Western countries have grown politically, economically, and militarily stronger.

2. While the formerly widespread fear of imminent global war has notably lessened, the Soviet leaders have not moderated their hostility toward the free world. No general settlement between the Bloc and the free world is in prospect, nor any substantial Soviet concessions. No new indications of weakness have appeared in the Soviet Bloc; on the contrary it grows stronger. The Kremlin continues to expect an ultimate victory over the capitalist world.

3. We believe that the outlook is for a continuation of Soviet efforts to undermine and destroy the non-Communist world by cold war tactics. The Communists will resort to armed aggression and to armed revolt by indigenous Communist parties when they believe these courses of action are the best means to achieve Communist objectives. If the growth of free world strength and unity continues, however, the Communists will probably place greater emphasis upon “united front” tactics and upon propaganda and diplomatic moves designed to split the Western allies and to promote dissension within non-Soviet countries.

4. Thus, great danger to the free world during the period of this estimate will lie in political and economic difficulties and divisions within the free world itself which would check the development of free world unity and strength and lend themselves to Communist exploitation.

5. We believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war during the period of this estimate. However, there will be continuing grave danger that general war may arise from a series of actions and counteractions in a situation which neither side desired to develop into general war.

I. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Soviet Bloc

A. Political

6. The Soviet regime is firmly entrenched in power, and there is no apparent prospect of its control being threatened or shaken. Internal stresses and strains appear less serious now than ever before. Such rivalries and policy disagreements as may exist are unlikely to affect the unity and resolution of the regime.

7. Soviet control over the European Satellites, now virtually complete, will probably be maintained through the skillful and experienced use of military and police power and through political and economic controls. The popular discontent now present will persist and perhaps increase, but will probably not develop into more than a minor impediment to the Soviet program.

8. The Chinese Communist regime has firm control over mainland China, and there is little likelihood of this control being threatened by domestic forces. Unlike the European Satellites, Communist China is not directly and completely controlled by the Kremlin. The Chinese Communists have retained some capacity for independent action and for influencing the shaping of Communist policy in the Far East. Both the Chinese and Soviet leaders apparently view their present relationship as advantageous, and appear to recognize that neither side can substantially change the nature of their relations—by the USSR attempting to establish complete domination over China, or by Communist China asserting complete independence of the USSR—without jeopardizing the attainment of its own objectives.

9. Outside the Bloc, the Communists’ political strength derives mainly from the international Communist movement, the appeal of Communist doctrine, and the power and size of the Bloc itself. Bloc size and strength generate fear and defeatism, especially among those unable to defend themselves. Communist doctrine is used both as an inspiration to the faithful and an appeal to the frustrated. Through the international Communist movement and through front organizations under its control, the Soviet leaders are able to exploit weaknesses and divisions throughout the non-Soviet world in the furtherance of Communist objectives.

B. Military

10. Soviet Bloc military strength, already formidable, will continue to increase. The modernization program in the Soviet military services will continue. Special emphasis will continue to be placed on weapons of mass destruction and upon defense against such weapons. By mid-1955, the USSR will probably have about 300 atomic bombs (30–100 Kiloton yield);^† it may have a thermonuclear weapon; it will have developed improved methods for delivering these weapons against the U.S. and its allies. Soviet air defenses, already substantial, will probably further improve.

11. In the European Satellites and in Communist China, programs for the improvement of military strength are also going forward. In the Satellites, the emphasis is on expansion and equipment of conventional forces and will result in a substantial addition to Soviet military strength in Europe, offsetting, at least in part, the growth of Western strength. In Communist China, emphasis is on re-equipping existing forces, and their combat effectiveness is likely to increase.

C. Economic

12. We estimate that by 1951 the gross national product of the USSR was 20 to 30 percent above the prewar level, and that it is now increasing at an annual rate of 6 to 7 percent. Soviet production constitutes about 60 percent of the total production of the Bloc, including Communist China. In 1951 the combined gross national product of all Bloc countries was less than one-third that of NATO countries, and the Soviet gross national product was about one-fourth that of the U.S.

13. Since the end of World War II, the Bloc as a whole has devoted a much larger proportion of its gross national product to military purposes than the West. We believe that the USSR now devotes about one-fifth of its national product to military expenditures. Traditionally low living standards and the controls prevailing within the Bloc enable the Bloc states consistently to assign to military purposes a much larger proportion of total output, particularly of scarce materials and goods, than is feasible in Western countries. Furthermore, the Bloc is able to assign a higher proportion of its military outlay to actual munitions production than is done in the West.

14. The Soviet economy is organized with a view to possible hostilities in the near future as well as in the more remote future. These two objectives compete to some extent in the allocation of resources. The Kremlin places a high priority upon stockpiling reserves, not only of military end items but of food, capital equipment, and materials needed for maintaining the economy under wartime conditions or other emergencies.

15. The Bloc could increase its exports to the non-Communist world within the period of this estimate. We estimate that even a slight increase of trade with the non-Communist world would constitute an important political warfare weapon and might obtain for the Bloc some critical equipment and materials now difficult or impossible for it to obtain.

16. The USSR is engaged in a large-scale research and development program. This includes both pure and applied research, with an emphasis upon applied research in fields of military application, especially atomic energy, electronics, jet aircraft, guided missiles, and submarines. In all of these fields, Soviet scientists and technicians have demonstrated a high level of proficiency.

II. The Strengths and Weaknesses of the Free World

A. General

17. The military and economic power of the United States, and its political and moral influence, still constitute the principal center of strength and leadership for the free world. The manner in which the U.S. utilizes its power will greatly influence the extent of progress which can be made in developing resolution, a common purpose, and strength within the free world. There is in the rest of the free world a substantial reservoir of political and economic strength and a growing realization of the threat which Soviet military power and political ideology pose for the national interests and aspirations of all peoples.

18. However, the existence of varying interests and aspirations among the peoples of the free world, though in many respects an element of strength, also makes the free world subject to divisive influences. In particular, conflicts have been created in important world areas by the rise of nationalism, much of it anti-Western. Within some areas, a low standard of living, an inflexible social structure, and ineffective leadership have hindered the growth of internal strength and have exposed those areas to Communist and extremist pressures.

19. In many parts of the free world there is also resentment, fear, and distrust of the United States itself. In some quarters there is fear that the U.S. will precipitate a general war and leave various countries unprotected after doing so. There is resentment over U.S. trade policies. There is a feeling among many of the dependent and semi-dependent people’s that the U.S. is supporting the colonial powers. Despite their appreciation of the importance of the U.S. to their survival and a desire for continued U.S. economic aid, many countries are unhappy over the need to ask for U.S. help, the made-in-America label on the aid when it is forthcoming, and the open or implied U.S. requirement for support to U.S. policy in return.

B. Western Europe

20. During the period of this estimate Western European political and economic strength will probably increase. The movement toward continental integration and toward strengthening the NATO structure will probably make further progress. Ratification of the European Defense Community agreements and creation of some form of limited European political authority are likely. There will almost certainly be some increase in NATO rearmament, including a start toward a German defense contribution, though not as rapid as currently planned. Over-all Communist strength in Western Europe will probably continue to decline, but the French and Italian Communist parties will retain substantial propaganda and subversive capabilities and significant political strength.

21. However, progress toward the U.S. objective of an economically viable and militarily defensible Western Europe will still be beset by numerous political and economic problems and Europe will remain in need of U.S. leadership and material support. The difficulties involved in achieving effective action by a coalition will almost certainly weigh heavily on the military program. Moreover, even with U.S. aid, the European NATO members probably will not meet current NATO goals. The allocation of a sufficiently large share of resources to rearmament will continue to be prevented by the political weakness of continental governments and their reluctance to adopt more effective tax systems and anti-inflationary controls. Inflation and other economic difficulties, together with a growing feeling that the Soviet threat has diminished, will increase the political pressures on Western European governments for curtailment of the rearmament program.

22. Present indications are that West Germany will become a full member of the European Defense Community sometime in 1953. Despite Soviet exploitation of neutralist and unity sentiment in West Germany, most West Germans now appear to recognize that unity on anything but Soviet terms is currently almost impossible, and that Germany should join the Atlantic Community. However, Soviet maneuvers, West German bargaining tactics, and French fears of German dominance in Europe will probably delay West German rearmament.

23. French economic and political instability appears likely to continue for some years to come, and, as a result, France will almost certainly be unable to meet its current NATO commitments while simultaneously maintaining a major effort in Indochina. However, France almost certainly will remain firmly aligned with the Atlantic Community.

24. In Italy, the present coalition, led by the Christian Democrats, will probably win the 1953 elections by a narrow margin, but it appears unlikely that Italy will develop during this period sufficient economic or political strength to be anything more than a weak ally.

25. The UK will remain the most important European member of the Atlantic Community. Nevertheless, the UK will continue to be under severe economic pressure, and the government may be compelled further to reduce its rearmament goals.

26. The Berlin situation will continue to be a potentially explosive one. Because the Kremlin continues to aim at the expulsion of the Western Powers, the Soviet and East German governments almost certainly will continue to apply pressures upon the Western sectors of the city.

C. North Africa, the Middle East, and South Asia

27. The principal reaction of the Middle East to the impact of Western civilization and the international political situation is a developing nationalism which is both critical and imitative of the West. Demands for political and social reform are increasing. The nature and rate of these developments have varied from country to country. In some, the colonial powers or the traditional ruling classes (large landowners, tribal sheiks, and professional politicians) have retained control of the governments and made only minor concessions to nationalist and reformist demands. In others, Westernized or semi-Westernized urban elements have seized the political initiative, Simultaneously, a revival of Islamic traditionalism is fostering resistance to everything Western.

28. Although in most of these countries communism is not likely to become a threat, at least during the period of this estimate, a gradual and evolutionary political change in response to the new situation seems unlikely. Political change will probably be uneven and spasmodic and is likely to be accomplished by coups d’état, assassinations, and other revolutionary and semi-revolutionary processes, accompanied by increasing authoritarianism.

29. There are, however, some countries in this area—Greece, Turkey, Israel, Pakistan, and India—where there are more stable regimes less susceptible to violent change. Greece, despite recurrent Cabinet crises, has virtually eliminated the internal Communist threat. Turkey has demonstrated a capacity for peaceful political change and is moving toward political democracy on Western lines. Israel, while confronted with economic difficulties and the problem of integrating peoples of varying cultural backgrounds, will continue to be relatively stable. India and Pakistan—though troubled by disputes between themselves, disturbed by social discontent and economic evolution, and vulnerable to Communist infiltration and subversion—nevertheless have accomplished major political revolutions and are engaged in consolidating and stabilizing their new societies.

30. In Egypt a revolutionary coups d’état under the auspices of young army officers has displaced the traditional ruling class. The new group appears honest, energetic, and genuinely intent upon building a new and better society. They have also given indications that they are prepared to cooperate with the West. It is still unclear whether the present moderate leadership can retain control over the military junta, whether it can cope with counterattacks by the traditionally-dominant elements, and whether it can make sufficient progress in solving Egypt’s social and economic problems to prevent disillusionment.

31. The principal center of instability is Iran. The traditional ruling classes have lost the initiative to the National Front, which is an uneasy coalition of secular urban groups and religious fanatics temporarily united by a desire to rid the country of foreign influence. The Communists have gained strength, but are not yet capable of seizing power. The oil dispute has intensified nationalist and anti-Western feelings and aggravated economic weaknesses. Regardless cf the outcome of this controversy, instability will probably continue, with a Communist seizure of power remaining a possibility.

32. In French North Africa, growing nationalism conflicts with French determination to retain control. French concessions to North African nationalism probably will forestall serious trouble for the next several years, but the nationalists will remain unsatisfied. The problem of North Africa will remain a source of friction among the non-Communist states which the Communists will exploit.

33. Western military strength in the Mediterranean area will be increased by growing Turkish military capabilities and by the development of Western bases in Libya, French North Africa, and Cyprus. Nevertheless, the free world military position in the Middle East as a whole is likely to remain weak. Because of suspicions of Western motives and rivalries within the area, it will be difficult to establish a Middle East defense organization. Even if this organization is established, the countries of the area will be unable to contribute significant forces to its support, and will continue to resist the stationing of Western forces in their territories.

D. The Far East

34. The rapid postwar expansion of Communist influence in the Far East appears to have been checked at least temporarily. Some non-Communist governments have increased in strength and stability. However, the area remains vulnerable to further Communist exploitation because of the widespread sentiment against “Western imperialism,” the desire for “national independence” and improved economic status, and the ineffective leadership of most non-Communist Far Eastern governments. Communist capabilities for exploiting the situation in the Far East derive largely from the prestige and military power of Communist China and the USSR, as well as the disciplined energy and, in some cases, the armed strength of local Communist parties.

35. The chief overt threat to established non-Communist governments in the Far East has been from armed insurrections, most of them Communist-led “armed liberation” movements. It now appears that the “armed liberation” movements have been reduced in effectiveness or stalemated. In Burma the government has recently gained new stability and is moving vigorously against the insurgents. In the Philippines and Malaya, the Communist guerrilla movements have been contained, but the Indonesian government continues to be threatened by political factionalism and various insurrectionary movements. In none of these areas has armed resistance been eliminated, and it will continue to place a strain on government energy and resources.

36. In Indochina the situation is one of political and military stalemate. No decisive shift in the balance is likely during the period of this estimate. The French military effort in that country constitutes a heavy drain on the resources of metropolitan France. We believe that the French will continue their commitment in Indochina at approximately the present level, but will attempt to transfer to the U.S. the burden of any increasing costs or additional effort.

37. In Korea, the Communists have the capability of launching a large-scale offensive virtually without warning. We believe that the Communists will protract the armistice negotiations so long as they consider that they can continue to gain political and military advantages from the situation in Korea and so long as they estimate that a continuation of the Korean war does not involve grave risk of global war. Even if an armistice is concluded, Korea will almost certainly remain an area of grave danger, and the object of intensive Communist political warfare.

38. The emergence of Japan as a Far Eastern power aligned with the West has contributed greatly to strengthening the non-Communist position in that area. During the period of this estimate, Japan will almost certainly maintain its present alignment with the West and will probably make gradual progress with its rearmament. In the long run, however, Japan’s continued association with the Western powers will depend largely upon whether Japan’s serious economic problems can be solved in cooperation with the West. If they are not so solved, the Japanese may be compelled to seek closer political and economic relations with the Communist Bloc in order to obtain the trade Japan requires.

E. Latin America

39. The traditional social order in Latin America is disintegrating. This process has produced political instability more profound than that which in the past characterized the personal politics of Latin America. The political trend is toward extremely nationalistic regimes based on support by the depressed masses, of which the Peron regime in Argentina is the prototype. The numerical strength of the Communists has declined, but the Communists, operating through various fronts, can readily exploit the social unrest and ultra-nationalism already existing in the non-Communist population. Both Communists and extreme nationalists seek, by propaganda and intrigue, to curtail Latin American cooperation with the United States.

40. For the period of this estimate, the present degree and scope of Latin American cooperation with the United States is likely to remain basically unchanged. In particular, Latin American strategic raw materials will continue to be available, but the governments concerned will seek to drive hard bargains in terms of price and economic concessions, including allotments of goods in short supply. The Communists are unlikely to gain direct control of any Latin American country. There is, however, a trend toward the development of a bloc of ultra-nationalistic, isolationist South American states. Eventually, this development may adversely affect, not only U.S. interests in Latin America, but also the strength and unity of the free world.

III. Probable Soviet Estimate of the Situation and Probable Communist Courses of Action

41. We believe that all Kremlin policies and courses of action are directed toward the attainment of the Kremlin’s long-range objective of a Communist world dominated by Moscow.

42. Soviet Bloc strength has improved greatly since the end of World War II. Despite this increase in strength, the Kremlin almost certainly estimates that general war would be a gamble, involving at a minimum widespread destruction in the Bloc and the risk that the Kremlin’s system of control would be destroyed.

43. The Kremlin almost certainly estimates that the states of Western Europe are now more stable than at any time since World War II; that the position of most non-Communist states in Asia is somewhat stronger than in 1950; that progress has been made toward the unification and rearmament of Western Europe and toward improving the West’s defenses in the Pacific; and that the U.S. has made great strides toward developing its economic and military power and toward providing leadership for the West. Moreover, the Kremlin probably estimates that the West is making rapid progress in the development and production of new weapons.

44. However, the Kremlin almost certainly estimates that opportunities remain for continued progress toward its long-range objective without resort to general war. It probably estimates that:

a. The growth of Bloc economic and military power will increase Bloc prestige and influence throughout the non-Communist world.

b. The non-Communist great powers, aside from the U.S., are much weaker than they were before World War II.

c. The economies of the non-Communist states are highly vulnerable to depression and inflationary crises, which would have serious social and political repercussions.

d. Future developments, such as the revival of West German military power, the intrusion of German and Japanese products into export markets now dominated by other states, and conflicting tariff and trade policies, will undermine, if not destroy, Western political unity and the foundations of Western prosperity.

e. Opportunity exists for weakening the position of the Western powers and strengthening the position of Communism by exploiting the discontent and nationalist aspirations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

45. The Kremlin almost certainly estimates that the divergent interests of the Western Powers will sooner or later weaken or destroy their present unity. It probably also believes that no international organization which does not have the centralized leadership and control which the USSR provides the Bloc can survive the strains and pressures of modern political warfare.

46. We believe that the outlook is for a continuation of Soviet efforts to undermine and destroy the non-Communist world by cold war tactics. The Communists will resort to armed aggression and to armed revolt by indigenous Communist parties when they believe these courses of action are the best means to achieve Communist objectives. If the growth of free world strength and unity continues, however, the Communists will probably place greater emphasis upon “united front” tactics and upon propaganda and diplomatic moves designed to split the Western allies and to promote dissension within non-Soviet countries.

47. Thus, great danger to the free world during the period of this estimate will lie in political and economic difficulties and divisions within the free world itself which would check the development of free world unity and strength and lend themselves to Communist exploitation.

48. We believe it unlikely that the Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war during the period of this estimate. However, there will be continuing grave danger that general war may arise from a series of actions and counteractions in a situation which neither side desired to develop into general war.

1. A covering memorandum from Paul A. Borel, Executive Secretary of the Board of National Estimates for the Intelligence Advisory Committee, dated Nov. 25, reads: “1. The attached estimate, prepared by the Board of National Estimates, is forwarded for your information. It supersedes the previous Board estimate dated 18 April 1952 and circulated to you under memorandum dated 25 April. 2. Please note that this estimate has not been coordinated with the member agencies of the IAC.” The Board estimate of Apr. 18 along with the covering memorandum of Apr. 25 is also in INR files, lot 59 D 27, “CIA Estimate of World Situation Through 1953.”
2. This estimate was prepared by the Board of National Estimates of the Central Intelligence Agency and has not been coordinated with the member agencies of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. It is based, in part only, on published National Intelligence Estimates. Hence the Board assumes full and sole responsibility for the contents of this estimate. [Footnote in the source text.]
3. The actual figure may be from one half to twice as great as the figure given. This estimate is currently under review. [Footnote in the source text.]