Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Review of Basic Natl Sec Policy, Sept–Nov, 1954”

Paper Prepared in the Department of State¹

top secret

[Washington,] November 15, 1954.

Basic National Security Policy

(Suggestions of the Secretary of State)

i. changes in the world situation and estimate of trends over the next few years

Reappraisal of national security policy must take account of recent changes and probable trends, both in the policies and tactics of the Communist powers and in the free world situation.

1. Communist Policies

The Soviet shift to a “soft” line since the death of Stalin is a major new factor. It tends to allay the fears of free-world countries, to relax their efforts to build effective defenses, to foster neutralism, and to divide the free peoples. The ending of hostilities in Korea and Indochina reinforces these trends.

The evidence so far does not prove that the USSR has modified its basic hostility toward the U.S. and the free world. As of now, however, the USSR appears anxious to avoid general war with the U.S. and probably will refrain from actions likely to bring on such a war, and may be seeking an extended period of lower tensions.

Communist China remains bitterly hostile to the U.S. and ostensibly committed to the conquest of Formosa. Despite its bellicose talk, however, Communist China may well be more interested in strengthening its economy and its international position than in early major military ventures that would involve war with the U.S. Its main effort in expanding its power probably will take the form of penetration and subversion in neighboring countries.

The Sino-Soviet tie probably will remain intact for the next few years because it furthers the purposes of both parties. The USSR, however, may exercise a restraining influence on Communist China.

2. Approach to Atomic Parity

As indicated in NSC 5422/1,² the increased destructiveness of nuclear weapons and the approach of effective atomic parity are creating a situation in which general war would threaten the destruction of Western civilization and of the Soviet regime, and in which national objectives could not be attained through a general war, even if a military victory were won. A situation of mutual deterrence to general war could result. However, the possibility of war by miscalculation or otherwise cannot be excluded.

The growing Soviet nuclear power and the devastating nature of total war seem certain to affect allied and U.S. attitudes toward war and risks of war.

3. Trends in the Free World

The security of the U.S. continues to depend largely on the maintenance of its alliances and the cohesion of the free world.

In some respects, conditions have improved through the settling of the disputes in Egypt, Iran and Trieste; the London-Paris agreements;³ and the liquidation of the Communist regime in Guatemala. Yet serious weaknesses remain.

The fear of atomic war and the Soviet “soft” line strengthen tendencies toward lower defense efforts, neutralism, or even uncritical accommodation with the Soviets. Differing attitudes on China have been a source of difficulty with our allies, and signs of generally more independent and nationalist policies on their part point to new strains on the alliances.

The situation in Southeast Asia is extremely precarious, although the conclusion of the Manila Pact⁴ should have a salutary effect. In the underdeveloped areas, some specific situations have improved, but long-term trends still appear adverse.

ii. implications for u.s. basic security policy

Existing basic national security policy remains generally valid. Clarification and changes in emphasis, however, seem required in the following three aspects:

1. U.S. Policy should focus more effort on meeting the Communists’ cold war strategy

A prolonged period of cold war, with a reduced fear of overt aggression, will severely test the stability and cohesion of the free world. The U.S. should stress measures calculated to strengthen the political and economic fabric of the free world:

a. In the underdeveloped areas of South and Southeast Asia, the U.S. should:

(1) provide such economic and technical aid over an extended period, as can be used effectively to accelerate present slow rates of economic growth and to give those peoples a sense of present progress and future hope which is currently lacking. At present it appears both necessary and feasible to increase materially the scale of assistance to South and Southeast Asia, which are most directly threatened by Communist expansion;

(2) extend such military and related aid as may be required to enable them to maintain internal security and participate in local defense; but not press for the adoption of defense programs so extensive as to create undue internal strains.

b. In relations with Western Europe and Japan, the U.S. should:

(1) take full account of the effect of defense programs on their stability, and ensure that the rearming of the German Federal Republic and Japan is carried out at a pace and in a manner to minimize dangers of militarist revival;

(2) seek to reduce world barriers to trade and stimulate their trade prospects;

(3) in Western Europe, continue to foster economic and political integration.

c. In relation to the Latin American States,

(1) Faced with the well-organized Communist efforts to exploit economic and social conditions in these areas, the U.S. should seek to develop sounder economies there, recognizing that grants tend to perpetuate or encourage unsound fiscal policies, but that drastic shock treatment would probably be ineffective and merely strengthen the Communist position;

(2) The present close political affiliation of the American States, which is an extremely valuable asset in the United Nations and otherwise, must be preserved even at the price of slowing down somewhat our proper desire to put the financial affairs and policies of these countries on a sounder basis.

2. U.S. policy should take full account of the fact that total war would be an incalculable disaster

a. The primary aim must be to deter any Communist armed aggression and to avoid the danger that such aggression would develop into general nuclear war. For this purpose the U.S., with its allies, should maintain sufficient flexible military capabilities, and firmness of policy, to convince the Communist rulers that the U.S. and its allies have the means to ensure that aggression will not pay and the will to use military force if the situation requires.

b. The U.S., however, should (1) forego actions which would generally be regarded as provocative, and (2) be prepared, if hostilities occur, to meet them, where feasible, in a manner and on a scale which will not inevitably broaden them into total nuclear war. In the conditions facing us, such policies are necessary to assure the support of our allies against aggression and to avoid risks which do not promise commensurate strategic or political gains. These conclusions have an obvious bearing on basic military strategy and on our policy toward Communist China.

c. In organizing NATO defense around nuclear weapons:

(1) The U.S. should recognize that it will be morally committed to maintain in Europe forces for using these weapons or to supply such weapons to the other NATO countries.

(2) The U.S. and NATO should explore urgently the possibility of maintaining sufficient flexibility in NATO forces to avoid exclusive dependence on atomic weapons, without losing their deterrent effect, so as to give the Europeans some sense of choice as to the actual character of warfare. Otherwise the strategy will strain the will to fight and spur neutralism.

d. Guided missiles seem certain to become available within several years and to effect even more radically the problem of defense. It is not too soon to begin studies of their effects on our military strategy and alliances. At least in the early stages, when ranges are limited, they are likely to enhance greatly the importance of our overseas bases and our alliances.

3. Without relaxing its defense posture, the U.S. should be ready, under proper conditions, to negotiate with the Communist powers

This position is necessary and desirable both to satisfy world opinion and to explore the possibilities of actually alleviating or solving outstanding problems.

The U.S. should continue to seek:

a. Agreements on disarmament which would reduce the peril to our national existence resulting from present and prospective Soviet military capabilities and the continued possibility of total nuclear war.

b. Other means to reduce areas of tension and conflict without jeopardizing its security or that of the rest of the free world.

These efforts should have the aim of either:

a. Exposing the falsity of the Communists’ “conciliatory” line and placing on them the onus for the persistence of unsettled problems, tension and the danger of war;

b. Forcing the Communist bloc to substantiate its “peace offensive” with conciliatory actions and compromises that will benefit the free world;

c. Encouraging trends in Communist policy favorable to peaceful relations and free world interests which the Communist rulers may find it difficult to reverse.

1. A covering memorandum of transmittal from Lay to the NSC, dated Nov. 17, notes that the “enclosed suggestions of the Secretary of State” were being circulated to the Council in anticipation of consideration at the meeting of Nov. 24.
2. For information on NSC 5422/1, see the memorandum by Bowie, Aug. 4, p. 699.
3. For documentation on the “London–Paris agreements”, see vol. v, Part 2, pp. 1294 ff.
4. For documentation on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty of 1954, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.