S/PNSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Review of Basic Natl Sec Policy, Sept–Nov, 1954”

Paper Prepared by the Director of the Foreign Operations Administration (Stassen)1

top secret

Revision of NSC 162/22

1.
The broad concepts upon which NSC 162/2 is based remain valid.
2.
Changes in NSC 162/2 are required because of the following significant developments which have occurred during the past year.
a.
The USSR has greatly modified its tactics and techniques for achieving its objectives in the political, psychological and economic fields. In addition, revised intelligence estimates give the USSR and the Soviet bloc significantly increased capabilities in the nuclear and military fields.
b.
Significant breakthroughs in U.S. national policy have been made in the Middle East and possibly in Germany. In the Far East there have been fewer successes in the achievement of U.S. objectives and in Southeast Asia there has been an important Chinese-Soviet bloc expansion of power.
c.
Developments by the U.S. in the thermo-nuclear field have been extremely significant.
d.
Basic national differences between the U.S. and our allies in both the Eastern and Western Hemispheres, which have been submerged in the face of the serious Soviet threat, are becoming more evident.
3.
The general objectives of the new document should include achievement of a just peace within which the vital security interests of the U.S. are preserved.
4.
A continuing strong military posture and a determination not only to assume our share of world leadership, but to use force if [Page 771] necessary to safeguard vital U.S. interests, remain basic. The U.S. is in the process of regrouping its military forces to carry out the concepts set forth in NSC 162/2. The U.S. has found that maintenance of modern armed forces by underdeveloped countries requires very substantial economic support. To counter the type of threat encountered in Vietnam, an elite constabulary and small, mobile, well trained military forces are the minimum essential requirement. World-wide U.S. commitments must be reviewed and revised to meet the current and projected situation.
5.
There is a need for a clearly stated concept outlining the relationship between U.S. and Allied military forces, particularly in the underdeveloped areas and a policy statement as to the desirable degree of integration of these forces in the event of both local operations and in the event of a general war. This would lead to a later review of force goals of U.S. allies, particularly in the underdeveloped areas, and the establishment of U.S. force levels which will give minimum security to peripheral areas during the possible local wars, without jeopardizing U.S. war plans dealing with general war.
6.
Overall U.S. policy towards Europe needs to be reviewed. An assessment as to the situation after Germany begins to make her full contribution to Western defense is essential with evaluation of the role of modern weapons in allied hands.
7.
Our China policy, including East-West Controls of China trade, should be reviewed and revised. New efforts must be made to regain the initiative in Asia and the Near East.
8.
Our success in the Near East should be exploited by following through to establish greater cohesion and increased strength of the area.
9.
General policies on Africa should at least receive mention in the new document.
10.
Generally, the NSC should reexamine the relative emphasis which should be assigned to military and economic programs in the underdeveloped countries of the Free World. In these areas, technical assistance, economic and educational programs and training and internal police forces should be strengthened to bring about better and more stable governments, sounder economic principles and practices and generally strengthen free world ties among these people as insurance against tactics of “creeping expansion—internal subversion” employed successfully by the enemy in many such areas. As a general objective the U.S. should act sympathetically and in a humanitarian manner towards the people and emerging nations of the underdeveloped areas in their struggle for independence and higher standards of living.
11.
The U.S. should take stock of its ability to meet the more flexible and less predictable Soviet tactics, particularly in the political, internal police, economic and psychological fields, and make the necessary changes in organization and short-range policy to meet the new situation.
12.
There must be made available adequate resources to execute national security policies and to maintain the U.S. military posture.
  1. A covering memorandum of transmittal from Lay to the NSC, dated Nov. 19, notes that the “enclosed suggestions of the Director, Foreign Operations Administration” concerning the review of basic national security policy called for in NSC Action No. 1251 were being circulated to the NSC in anticipation of Council consideration at the meeting on Nov. 24. For information on NSC Action No. 1251, see footnote 3, p. 738.
  2. Dated Oct. 30, 1953, p. 577.