Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5422

Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, October 25, 1954.

• Subject:
• Guidelines for Mobilization

References:

A.

NSC 5422/2²

B.

Memo for NSC from the Executive Secretary, same subject, dated October 5, 1954³

At the request of the Secretary of Defense, the enclosed memorandum from the Secretary of Defense and the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject are transmitted herewith for the information of the National Security Council in connection with its considerations of the draft statement of policy contained in the reference memorandum of October 5 at its meeting on October 26, 1954.⁴

James S. Lay, Jr.

Appendix

Recommended Changes to Draft of Section III of NSC 5422/2, Guideliens for Mobilization

Recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding textual changes to the subject draft are as follows:

a. Add the following as new paragraph 28 and renumber subsequent paragraphs:

“28. There is a definite inter-relationship between the maintenance of active forces in a military establishment and the mobilization base for the expansion and support of those forces in time of war. Within limits these active forces and the mobilization base compete for appropriations and therefore they cannot be viewed separately. The funds necessary to implement the mobilization program should not be in lieu of but in addition to those funds necessary to support and maintain the forces in being.”

b. Page 1, old paragraph 28: Delete and substitute the following:

“29. The U.S. matériel mobilization potential (a combination of reserves of completed military end items and capacity to produce them) is stronger now than ever before in peacetime. Facilities actively producing matériel (except nuclear materials) have declined in number in Fiscal Year 1954 and, under current plans, will continue to decline in number through Fiscal Year 1957. Although, through Fiscal Year 1957 there will be further accretions to our reserve of completed military end items, budgetary limitations and the criteria for accumulating mobilization reserve stocks necessarily result in imbalance and deficits in items required to be in military stocks on M-day. Further, obsolescence of reserve stocks is an element for consideration. Since the other factor, reserve production facilities essential for mobilization preparedness for general war, also will be inadequate, the U.S. matériel mobilization potential will be weaker in Fiscal Year 1956.”

c. Page 1, old paragraph 29: Delete and substitute the following:

“30. a. The mobilization base for production of military hard goods is spotty. Large deficiencies exist in U.S. capacity to produce important components.

“b. From total actual deliveries of $24 billion in FY 1954, it has been estimated that, if war had commenced at the end of that year, total hard goods deliveries in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would have been $55 billion.

“c. From an annual rate of deliveries of $16.8 billion in the last quarter of FY 1955 it has been estimated that, should war commence at the end of the year, total hard goods deliveries in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would be $44 billion.

“d. From an annual rate of deliveries of $15 billion in the last quarter of FY 1957, it has been estimated that, should war commence at the end of that year, total hard goods deliveries in the first year of the war (with no reduction for bomb damage) would be $41 billion.

“e. The delivery capability of industry does not make allowance for damage by enemy action for which the USSR has a rapidly growing capability. 63% of the general industrial capacity of the U.S. is located in 53 major target areas. The forthcoming net capabilities evaluation study will provide guidance as to this factor, and when available, it will serve to modify the guidelines contained herein where appropriate.”

d. Page 2, old paragraph 30: Delete and substitute the following:

“31. From the estimates of wartime output of hard goods set forth above, it is certain that such output would not be adequate to provide logistic support to our own forces and our essential allies in the first years of war of the near future. Mobilization plans do not include provision (in terms of military hard goods) for the logistic support of essential allies. At present, a procedure for determining the post-D-day military aid requirements of necessary allies is being implemented. Currently estimated production capacity, plus stocks, of such allies is generally inadequate to support their requirements. Until wartime requirements of U.S. logistic support for our allies can be determined and combined with up-to-date computations of U.S. requirements, it will not be accurately known in what type and by what quantity of matériel the U.S. mobilization base will fall short of providing necessary logistic support in the event of war.”

e. Page 3, old paragraph 31: Delete and substitute the following:

“32. The United States should maintain its mobilization potential generally within the framework of the policy stated in paragraphs 34 and 40 of NSC 162/2 and in line with the general considerations stated in paragraphs 9 and 10 thereof. Effective implementation of this policy is dependent upon early completion of Joint mobilization plans and the determination and testing of logistic requirements based thereon; and the determination of allied wartime requirements, so that the magnitude and composition of the probable demand on U.S. resources can be identified. Furthermore, in the implementation of such policy, the United States, in recognition of the need for increased expenditures to adjust to known increases in Soviet net capabilities, should, subject to decisions on the budget and in the light of available information on the specific factors mentioned above:

• “a. Accelerate measures for dispersal to safer areas of important production capacity and, where that is infeasible, provide alternative production sources in safer areas insofar as practicable.
• “b. Detect, and remedy, such gaps as exist in the mobilization base and in mobilization reserves, taking into account probable damage to productive capacity from enemy action.
• “c. Accelerate measures to maintain, in a condition which will permit rapid reactivation or reconversion to war output, the greatly increased capacity in industrial plants, machine tools, and production equipment built up since Korea.
• “d. Undertake on an urgent basis studies to determine whether current military hard goods production (“hot lines”) can be maintained at a level which will meet the full-phased post-M-day requirements minus (1) post-M-day production capabilities (obtainable through conversion or reactivation) and (2) mobilization reserves.”

f. Page 4, old paragraph 32: Delete.

g. Page 5, old paragraph 33: Delete.

h. Page 6, old paragraph 34: Delete.

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and Central Intelligence; the Chairmen of the Council of Economic Advisers, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator.
2. Dated Aug. 7, p. 715.
3. Ante, p. 731.
4. The enclosure is accompanied by two covering memoranda. The first, dated Oct. 25, is from Defense Secretary Wilson to Lay and reads: “Forwarded herewith for the information of the members of the National Security Council are the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Guidelines for Mobilization. This is a very complicated problem and I am not in complete agreement with the assumptions that were made nor the conclusions that were drawn from them. A great deal more work will have to be done on this problem.” The second covering memorandum is from Admiral Radford to Secretary Wilson, dated Oct. 21, and reads: “The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the 5 October 1954 draft of Section III of NSC 5422/2, ‘Guidelines for Mobilization’ and submit in the Appendix hereto a recommended revision. Portions of the draft prepared by the NSC Planning Board appear to be repetitious of certain information. Other portions contain information not directly related to mobilization guidelines for the development of national security programs for FY 1956. An attempt has been made to resolve the divergencies appearing in the draft.”