Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “Misc. NSC Memos”

Memorandum to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary (Lay)¹

top secret

Washington, October 11, 1954.

• Subject:
• Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy

References:

A.

NSC 162/2

B.

NSC 5422/2

C.

NSC 5429/2

D.

NSC 5428

E.

NSC 5432/1

F.

NSC 5433/1

G.

NSC 166/1²

The enclosed working paper on the subject, prepared by the NSC Planning Board, is transmitted herewith for the use of the National Security Council in connection with its review of basic national security policy. The enclosure is not to be used as an authoritative restatement of basic national security policy.

At the Council meeting of October 21, 1954,³ General Cutler will summarize the principal elements of existing Basic National Security Policy and request the Council Members to submit for consideration at the Council Meeting on November 18, 1954, statements of such changes as each thinks should be made in the existing basic policy. Such statements should be made available for information in advance of the Council meeting through the Planning Board.

It will be noted that the Net Capabilities Evaluation Report will be presented at the Council Meeting on November 9, 1954. In presenting suggested changes in existing basic policy, each Council Member will also have available certain studies made pursuant to the last section of the paper on European policy (NSC 5433/1), discussed at the Council Meeting on September 24, 1954 and the report of the Secretary of State relating thereto made not later than October 28, 1954. The report by the Secretary of State on policy toward Communist China in Part I of NSC 5429/2 will also have been considered by the Council in October.

Statements of changes proposed by Council Members at the meeting on November 18 should be in non-technical language, so that the point of each suggested change can be readily grasped and discussed by the Council, with a view to providing guidance as to whether the change is acceptable.

After the Council on November 18 has provided guidance as to the changes which should be made in existing basic policy, it will be the responsibility of the Planning Board to redraft the statement of policy so as to incorporate such changes and to submit the policy statement for final consideration by the Council on December 9.

The President has not yet determined whether at some time a panel of outside Consultants may be called in to review the revised basic policy statement mentioned above.

James S. Lay, Jr.

[Here follows a one-page table of contents.]

[Enclosure]

Working Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Planning Board

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy

(Based on NSC 162/2, as modified by subsequent policy statements; the source of each statement is indicated in parentheses following it.)

basic problems of national security policy

1. To meet the Soviet threat to U.S. security (paras. 1 and 31, 162/ 2), and to improve the power position of the United States and the rest of the free world in relation to the Soviet bloc, (paras, 1–a, 31–a and 42–a, NSC 162/2)

2. In meeting the Soviet threat, to avoid seriously weakening the U.S. economy or undermining our fundamental values and institutions, (paras. 1–b and 31–b, NSC 162/2)

3. With our allies, to create and sustain the hope and confidence of the free world in the ability of its basic ideas and institutions not merely to oppose the communist threat, but to provide a way of life superior to Communism, (para. 45, NSC 162/2)

Policy Conclusions^*

i. defense against soviet power and action

4. The United States, prior to the achievement of mutual atomic plenty, should create conditions under which the United States and the free world coalition would be prepared to meet the Soviet-Communist threat with resolution and to negotiate for its alleviation under proper safeguards, (para. 45, NSC 162/2 and para. 16, NSC 5422/2)

A. National Security Programs to Meet the Soviet Threat

5. In the face of Soviet threats to U.S. security, the United States must develop and maintain, at the lowest feasible cost, requisite military and non-military strength to deter and, if necessary, to counter Soviet military aggression against the United States or other areas vital to its security, (para. 34, NSC 162/2)

a. The United States should minimize the risk of Soviet aggression by maintaining a strong security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory strength and defensive strength. This must be based on massive atomic capability, including necessary bases; an integrated and effective continental defense system; ready forces of the United States and its allies suitably deployed and adequate to deter or initially to counter aggression, and to discharge required initial tasks in the event of a general war; and a mobilization base adequate to insure victory in the event of general war; all supported by the determined spirit of the U.S. people, (para. 34–a and 9, NSC 162/2)

b. In particular, pursuant to a above, to ensure Soviet fear that strategic nuclear attacks upon the U.S. would be followed by the nuclear devastation of the USSR and the destruction of the Soviet regime, the U.S. should:

(1) Maintain the striking forces necessary for such retaliation.

(2) Take all practicable measures to protect this retaliatory capacity against any foreseeable Soviet attack, (para. 6, NSC 5422/2)

c. The United States should also accelerate its military and non-military programs for continental defense set forth in NSC 5408⁴ to the fullest extent deemed feasible and operationally desirable and give to these programs very high priority, having in mind that it is estimated the Soviets will reach a high capability for strategic nuclear attacks by July 1957. (para. 7, NSC 5422/2)

d. There must be continuing examination and periodic report to the National Security Council in regard to the likelihood of neutralization of U.S. retaliatory capability by a surprise Soviet attack, (para. 46, NSC 162/2)

6. In support of the strong security posture referred to in subparagraph 5–a above, the United States should also

a. Develop and maintain an intelligence system capable of:

(1) Collecting and analyzing indications of hostile intentions that would give maximum prior warning of possible aggression or subversion in any area of the world.

(2) Accurately evaluating the capabilities of foreign countries, friendly and neutral as well as enemy, to undertake military, political, economic, and subversive courses of action affecting U.S. security.

(3) Forecasting potential foreign developments having a bearing on U.S. national security, (para. 10–a, NSC 162/2)

†b. Develop an adequate manpower program designed to:

(1) Expand scientific and technical training.

(2) Provide an equitable military training system.

(3) Strike a feasible balance between the needs of an expanding peacetime economy and defense requirements.

(4) Provide for an appropriate distribution of services and skills in the event of national emergency, (para. 10–b, NSC 162/2)

c. Conduct and foster scientific research and development so as to insure superiority in quantity and quality of weapons systems, with attendant continuing review of the level and composition of forces and of the industrial base required for adequate defense and for successful prosecution of general war. (para. 10–c, NSC 162/2)

‡d. Continue, for as long as necessary, a state of limited defense mobilization to develop military readiness by:

(1) Developing and maintaining production plant capacity, dispersed with a view to minimizing destruction by enemy attack and capable of rapid expansion or prompt conversion to essential wartime output. (para. 10–d (1), NSC 162/2)

(2) Creating and maintaining minimum essential reserve stocks of selected end-items, so located as to support promptly and effectively the war effort in areas of probable commitment until war production and shipping capacity reaches the required wartime levels, (par. 10–d (2), NSC 162/2)

(3) Maintaining stockpiling programs, and providing additional production facilities, for those materials the shortage of which would affect critically essential defense programs; meanwhile reducing the rates of other stockpile materials, (para. 10–d (3), NSC 162/2) The stockpiling program should not normally be used to help stabilize international markets for the exports of underdeveloped countries in order to enhance their foreign exchange position and assist in their internal development. Exceptions should be made in instances where, after appraisal on a case-by-case basis it is determined that there would be a clear advantage in terms of over-all U.S. interests, (para. 26, NSC 5422/2)

e. Provide reasonable internal security against covert attack, sabotage, subversion, and espionage, particularly against the clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic weapons, (para. 10–e, NSC 162/2)

B. Action to Counter Actual and Potential Communist Aggression and Subversion

7. a. Under existing treaties or policies an armed attack from the Communist bloc on the NATO area, Western Germany, Berlin, the American republics, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores, Australia, New Zealand, Philippines, [Pakistan, Thailand, Malaya, Cambodia, Laos or free Vietnam]^§ would, in accordance with constitutional processes, involve the United States in war with the USSR, or in the case of Asiatic countries at least with Communist China or the Communist satellite committing the aggression.

b. Certain other areas are of such strategic importance to the United States that an armed attack on them probably would compel the United States to react with military force either locally at the point of attack or generally against the military power of the aggressor.

c. The United States should uphold the principle of collective security through the United Nations even in areas not of vital strategic importance, (para. 13–a and b, 162/2 NSC Action No. 1148)⁵

8. The United States should be prepared to prevent, with the use of U.S. forces if necessary and feasible, further territorial expansion elsewhere by the Chinese Communists.^║ (para. 5–b, NSC 166/1)

9. In specific situations where a warning appears desirable and feasible as an added deterrent, the United States should make clear to the USSR and Communist China, in general terms or with reference to specific areas as the situation requires, its intention to react with military force against any aggression by Soviet bloc armed forces, (para. 39–a, NSC 162/2)

10. In the event of hostilities, the United States will consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions, (para. 39–b (1), NSC 162/2) This policy is subject to the interpretation stated in a memorandum dated January 4, 1954. Planning should be on the assumption that, if general war should occur, the United States will wage it with all available weapons, (para. 9, NSC 5422/2)

11. The United States should seek, as and when feasible, the understanding and approval of this policy by free nations, (para. 39–b (1), NSC 162/2) Where the consent of an ally is required for the use of these weapons from U.S. bases on the territory of such ally, the United States should promptly obtain the advance consent of such ally for such use. (para. 39–b (1), NSC 162/2)

12. The U.S. should, while exerting continued efforts to strengthen collective defense arrangements, including the ability to use such bases for nuclear attack in the collective defense of the free world, also increase emphasis on developing self-sufficiency for the conduct of offensive operations exploiting the use of nuclear weapons, consistent with sound military concepts, (para. 10, NSC 5422/2)

13. To permit appropriate flexibility in the capability of deterring or defeating local aggressions, the U.S. should be prepared to defeat such aggressions without necessarily initiating general war. For this purpose the U.S. should be prepared to assist, with U.S. logistical support and if necessary with mobile U.S. forces, indigenous forces supplemented by available support from other nations acting under UN or regional commitments. However, the U.S. must be determined to take, unilaterally if necessary, whatever additional action its security requires, even to the extent of general war, and the Communists must be convinced of this determination, (para. 12, NSC 5422/2)

14. The threat of piecemeal Communist conquest through subversion, indirect aggression, and the instigation or exploitation of civil wars in free world countries, which is an immediate and most serious threat to the free world, should be met, not primarily by military means, but by a flexible combination of political, psychological, economic and military actions. In view of the loss of Northern Vietnam, the U.S. cannot passively accept further significant extension of Communist control. It must act, both in relation to the Communist powers and to the peoples of threatened areas, so as to prevent such extension of control. In particular, the U.S. should: (para. 13, NSC 5422/2)

a. Seek more than military solutions to the varied aspects of the Soviet-Communist threat, and create an understanding in the free world that such is the U.S. objective, (para. 13–a, NSC 5422/2)

b. Make increased efforts to develop and carry out cooperative programs, not necessarily overtly anti-communist, designed to advance the political and economic strength of underdeveloped areas, along lines indicated in Section IV–C below, (para. 13–b, NSC 5422/2)

c. Take all feasible political, economic and covert measures to counter the threat of groups or forces responsive to Communist control to achieve dominant power in a free world country, (para. 13–c, NSC 5422/2) and para. 43–b, NSC 162/2)

d. Provide military aid and training and defense support to threatened areas where such aid can effectively contribute to internal stability or the creation of strength in regional areas, (para. 13–d, NSC 5422/2)

e. In instances of civil war, be prepared, with maximum free world support, to take military action in support of friendly free world governments or forces fighting against elements under Communist control; the decision whether to take such action being made in the light of all the circumstances existing at the time, (para. 13–e, NSC 5422/2)

15. Present and planned implementation of national security programs should continue to be guided by paragraphs 34 and 40 of NSC 162/2 in the light of paragraphs 9 and 10 of the “General Considerations” thereof; recognizing that increased efforts in certain programs, involving increased expenditures, should be made as required to support national security policies and to meet anticipated increases in Soviet-Communist capabilities, (para. 14, NSC 5422/2)

ii. defense against the threat to the u.s. economy and institutions

6. a. In the interest of both the United States and its allies, the United States should insure that the support of defense expenditures does not seriously impair the basic soundness of the U.S. economy by undermining incentives or by inflation, (para. 40, NSC 162/2)

b. The United States must, however, meet the necessary costs of the policies essential for its security. The actual level of such costs should be kept to the minimum consistent with the carrying out of these policies, (para. 40, NSC 162/2)

c. Barring basic change in the world situation, the Federal Government should continue to make a determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures into balance, or into substantial balance with its total annual revenues and should maintain over-all credit and fiscal policies designed to assist in stabilizing the economy, (para. 40, NSC 162/2)

d. Every effort should be made to eliminate waste, duplication, and unnecessary overhead in the Federal Government, and to minimize Federal expenditures for programs that are not essential to the national security, (para. 40, NSC 162/2)

e. The United States should seek to maintain a higher and expanding rate of economic activity at relatively stable price levels, (para. 40, NSC 162/2)

f. The economic potential of private enterprise should be maximized by minimizing governmental controls and regulations, and by encouraging private enterprise to develop natural and technological resources (e.g. nuclear power), (para. 40, NSC 162/2)

17. The American people must be informed of the nature of the Soviet-Communist threat, in particular the danger inherent in the increasing Soviet atomic capability; of the basic community of interest among the nations of the free world; and of the need for mobilizing the spiritual and material resources necessary to meet the Soviet threat, (para. 30, NSC 162/2)

18. To support the necessarily heavy burdens for national security, the morale of the citizens of the United States must be based both on responsibility and freedom for the individual. The dangers from Soviet subversion and espionage require strong and effective security measures. Eternal vigilance, however, is needed in their exercise to prevent the intimidation of free criticism. It is essential that necessary measures of protection should not be so used as to destroy the national unity based on freedom, not on fear. (para. 41, NSC 162/2)

iii. reduction of the soviet threat

A. Action to Reduce Soviet Power

19. The policy of the United States is to prevent Soviet aggression and continuing domination of other nations, and to establish an effective control of armaments under proper safeguards; but is not to dictate the internal political and economic organization of the USSR.^¶ (para. 42–d, NSC 162/2)

20. Although the time for a significant rollback of Soviet power may appear to be in the future, the U.S. should be prepared, by feasible current actions or future planning, to take advantage of any earlier opportunity to contract Communist-controlled areas and power, (para. 20, NSC 5422/2)

21. As a means of reducing Soviet capabilities for extending control and influence in the free world, the United States should, in addition to the measures mentioned in paragraph 14 above:

a. Take overt and covert measures to discredit Soviet prestige and ideology as effective instruments of Soviet power, and to reduce the strength of communist parties and other pro-Soviet elements.

b. Undertake selective, positive actions to eliminate Soviet-Communist control over any areas of the free world, (para. 43–a and c, NSC 162/2)

22. a. Measures to impose pressures on the Soviet bloc should take into account the desirability of creating conditions which will induce the Soviet leadership to be more receptive to acceptable negotiated settlements.

b. Accordingly, the United States should take feasible political, economic, propaganda and covert measures designed to create and exploit troublesome problems for the USSR, impair Soviet relations with Communist China, complicate control in the satellites, and retard the growth of the military and economic potential of the Soviet bloc. (para. 44, NSC 162/2)

B. Negotiations

23. The United States must keep open the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China acceptable and enforceable agreements, compatible with basic U.S. security interests, whether limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues, including control of armaments. Moreover, to maintain the continued support of its allies, the United States must seek to convince them of its desire to reach such settlements. But, in doing so, we must not allow the possibility of such settlements to delay or reduce efforts to develop and maintain adequate free world strength, and thus enable the Soviets to increase their relative strength, (paras. 42–b and 14–a, NSC 162/2)

24. Despite serious question whether any safe and enforceable system can be achieved in the foreseeable future, the U.S. should nevertheless continue to explore fully the possibility of reaching a practicable arrangement for the limitation of armaments with the USSR. The U.S. should therefore continue to reexamine its position on disarmament, especially (a) whether a promising climate for effective disarmament negotiations can be developed, (b) whether a system of safeguards can be devised entailing less risk for U.S. security than no limitation of armaments, and (c) whether, if a safe and enforceable system for assuring effective nuclear disarmament, which might be acceptable to the USSR, can be devised, the U.S. would be willing to accept it in the absence of conventional disarmament. Meanwhile, the United States should continue to refuse to accept nuclear disarmament except as part of general disarmament, (para. 8, NSC 5422/2)

iv. maintenance of the cohesion of the free world

A. Relations with Allies and Uncommitted Countries: General Policy

25. Major allies will continue to be essential to the U.S. to prevent the loss of major free areas to Communist control and the gradual isolation of the U.S. However, increasing elements of division and weakness in free world alliances may make it difficult to take decisive collective action to halt further Soviet expansion, particularly in Asia. (para. 15, NSC 5422/2)

26. In these circumstances, the U.S. should take action as practicable:

a. (1) To overcome the following divisive factors: increasing fear of the effects of nuclear weapons, differing estimates of the nature and imminence of the Communist threat, distrust of U.S. national purposes and leadership, political instability and economic weakness of some of our allies, conflicts regarding trade policy and economic integration, historic hostility between certain of the allies, and differing approaches to “colonial” problems, (para. 16–a, NSC 5422/2; para. 5–b, Appendix A to NSC 5422/2, attached as Annex A)

(2) To strengthen the cohesion of the alliances under U.S. leadership, (para. 16–a, NSC 5422/2)

b. To convince its allies (1) that U.S. policies and actions take due account of their security as well as its own and that the U.S. and its allies will be able to meet the threat of aggression even in case of nuclear balance; and (2) that U.S. strategy, including the use of atomic weapons, is conceived and will be implemented for the purpose of mutual security and defense against the Soviet threat, (para. 16–b, NSC 5422/2 and para. 12–c, NSC 162/2)

c. To continue to seek to develop a strong feeling of a community of interest in the alliance and firm confidence in the steadiness and wisdom of U.S. leadership, (para. 36–a, NSC 162/2)

d. To continue to emphasize cooperative efforts, including equitable contributions by its allies, in building the military, economic and political strength of the coalition and stability of the free world, (para. 36–b, NSC 162/2)

e. To seek to persuade its allies of the necessity to halt further significant Communist expansion, direct or indirect, (para. 16–c, NSC 5422/2)

27. Our diplomacy must concentrate upon clarifying to our allies in parts of the world not gripped by war conditions that the best defense of the free world rests upon a deployment of U.S. forces which permits initiative, flexibility and support; upon our political commitment to strike back hard directly against any aggressor who attacks such allies; and upon such allies, own indigenous security efforts, (para. 38–c, 162/2) Under present policies, however, no major withdrawal of U.S. forces from Europe is contemplated, (para. 38–b, NSC 162/2 and para. 8 of NSC 5433/1)

28. The U.S. should attempt to gain maximum support from the free world, both allies and uncommitted countries, for the collective measures necessary to prevent Communist expansion. As a broad rule of conduct, the U.S. should pursue its objectives in such ways and by such means, including appropriate pressures, persuasion, and compromise, as will maintain the cohesion of the alliances. The U.S. should, however, act independently of its major allies when the advantage of achieving U.S. objectives by such action clearly outweighs the danger of lasting damage to its alliances. In this connection, consideration should be given to the likelihood that the initiation of action by the U.S. prior to allied acceptance may bring about subsequent allied support. Allied reluctance to act should not inhibit the U.S. from taking action, including the use of nuclear weapons, to prevent Communist territorial gains when such action is clearly necessary to U.S. security, (para. 21, NSC 5422/2)

29. With respect to those uncommitted or underdeveloped areas of the free world which are the most likely targets for Communist expansion, particularly in Asia, the U.S. should:

a. Undertake a new initiative designed to improve the political and economic stability of those nations, to enhance their will and ability to maintain their independence against Communist pressures and possible aggression, and to counter the influences exercised by the Communist powers, (para. 22, NSC 5422/2)

b. Seek their cooperation on a basis of mutual self-respect without attempting to make active allies of those not so inclined, and refrain, so far as feasible, from taking or supporting actions which run counter to the forces of anti-colonialism and legitimate nationalism, (para. 22, NSC 5422/2)

c. Adopt constructive policies, not related solely to anti-communism, to persuade these countries that their best interests lie in greater cooperation and stronger affiliations with the rest of the free world, (para. 36–c, NSC 162/2)

B. Allies and Uncommitted Countries: Policies Toward Particular Areas

30. Europe. Despite French rejection of EDC, the security of the U.S. continues to require the preservation and development of Western Europe (including the UK) as an area of strength allied to the U.S. Accordingly, the U.S. should continue to pursue the following objectives:

a. In the cold war, to prevent further extension of Soviet control in Europe and to retain the major Western European nations as allies, (para. 3, NSC 5433/1)

b. To seek the strengthening of NATO in a manner which places primary emphasis on its deterrent effect, with due regard for political and economic capabilities and for psychological factors. For this purpose we should seek the full exploitation of developing nuclear capabilities and a generally understood and accepted strategy for forward defense of the NATO area. (para. 7, NSC 5433/1)

c. To build the requisite strength and stability in Western Europe on the basis of (1) the combined efforts of the principal nations there and (2) steady progress toward integration on the continent, (para. 3, NSC 5433/1)

d. To assure the orientation of the German Federal Republic (and ultimately a united Germany) to the West by all feasible means, including institutional ties as well as treaty arrangements, (para. 3, NSC 5433/1)

31. In particular, the United States should:

a. Seek promptly to associate the German Federal Republic with the West by: (1) restoration to the German Federal Republic of its sovereignty, including the right to participate in the defense of Western Europe, without restrictions unacceptable to the Germans as discriminatory or arbitrarily imposed; (2) admission of the German Federal Republic to full membership in NATO, without precluding German participation also in the Brussels Pact or other European defense arrangements; (3) obtaining acceptable safeguards as to German rearmament; and (4) continuing to seek eventual German reunification on the basis of freedom and the maximum possibility of association with the West. (para. 4, NSC 5433/1)

b. Foster all practical measures for a greater degree of integration of Western Europe, emphasizing political and economic aspects at this stage, and encouraging European initiative and responsibility so far as consistent with U.S. objectives. Specifically, encourage closer ties between France and Germany and the greatest feasible degree of UK association with its continental allies, (para. 6, NSC 5433/1)

32. Asia. In the absence of further Chinese Communist aggression as a basic change in the situation, the policy of the United States toward Communist China should currently be to seek, by means short of war, to reduce the relative power position of Communist China in Asia.^** (para. 4, NSC 166/1) In view of the relative susceptibility of much of free Asia to the Communist tactic of creeping expansion the U.S. should devote greater efforts than heretofore to this region. The U.S. should exert its leadership in the Pacific toward the creation of a position of strength calculated to block Communist expansion in the Far East and Southeast Asia, (para. 18, NSC 5422/2)

33. The United States must maintain the security and increase the strength of the Pacific off-shore island chain (Japan, Ryukyus, Formosa, Philippines, Australia and New Zealand) as an element essential to U.S. security, (para. 2, NSC 5429/2)

34. The U.S. should protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East by a new initiative in Southeast Asia, where the situation must be stabilized as soon as possible to prevent further losses to Communism through (1) creeping expansion and subversion, or (2) overt aggression, (para. 7, NSC 5429/2)

35. In its Pacific role, the United States should be less influenced by European allies than in respect to Atlantic affairs, (para. 18, NSC 5422/2)

36. Other Areas: General. The U.S. should direct its efforts in areas of the free world, other than Europe and Asia, on a selective basis aimed at influencing for the better situations potentially adverse to its important security interest, (para. 19, NSC 5422/2)

37. The Near East. With respect to the Near East, the United States should:

a. To increase the stability and strengthen the security of the area, encourage the development of indigenous regional defense arrangements based on the concept of the “northern tier.” Be prepared eventually to participate in such arrangements, when the political climate in the area makes this practicable, (para. 13–h, NSC 5428)

b. Render limited military assistance, (para. 13–g, NSC 5428) Stimulate measures of self-help, encourage the expansion of private investment, and provide somewhat increased economic and technical assistance, (para. 13–f, NSC 5428)

c. Make every effort to deter an armed attack by Israel or the Arab States upon one another, to reduce current Arab-Israel tensions, and to promote an eventual clear-cut peace between the Arab States and Israel, (paras. 9–a and b, supplementary statement of policy in NSC 5428)

38. Latin America. Realizing the increasing importance of helping Latin America to reverse those trends which offer opportunities for Communist penetration, the U.S. should give greater emphasis than heretofore to its Latin American programs in order to safeguard and strengthen the security of the Hemisphere, (para. 3, NSC 5432/1)

C. Economic Policies and Programs

39. Economic Development. The U.S. should, as a major objective of its policy, help accelerate present rates of economic growth in the under-developed areas, particularly in South and Southeast Asia and parts of Latin America. Measures to assist and guide economic development should include continuing technical assistance, exchange programs, encouragement of U.S. private investment in these countries, and greater self-help on their part. With respect to important development programs which cannot be financed by local or foreign capital or U.S. private capital, the U.S. Government should assist countries where accelerated rates of growth are required for the attainment of U.S. objectives and where such assistance will be used effectively. Such assistance may be required on a larger scale than the present country programs, (para. 23, NSC 5422/2) While economic grant aid and loans by the United States to other nations of the free world should be based on the best interests of the United States (para. 36–e, NSC 162/2), the total level of U.S. economic assistance worldwide should be progressively reduced so far as is consistent with U.S. security objectives, (para. 23, NSC 5422/2)

40. Regional Economic Action. In addition to bilateral actions and existing multilateral institutions, the U.S. should encourage regional economic actions and groupings to promote increased trade, technical cooperation, and investment, and to concert sound development plans, (para. 24, NSC 5422/2) Specifically, the U.S. should encourage the prompt organization of an economic grouping by the maximum number of free Asian states, including Japan and as many of the Colombo Powers as possible, based on self-help and mutual aid, and the participation and support (including substantial financial assistance) of the U.S. and other appropriate Western countries through which, by united action, these free Asian states will be enabled more effectively to achieve the economic and social strength needed to maintain their independence, (para. 3, NSC 5429/2)

41. Promotion of Freer Trade and Payments. To enhance the capacity of free world nations for self-support and defense, and to reduce progressively their need for U.S. aid, the United States should assist in stimulating international trade, freer access to markets and raw materials, and the healthy growth of under-developed areas, (para. 36–d, NSC 162/2) Specifically, to lead the free world to the reduction of restrictions on trade and payments, the U.S. should:

a. Support sound moves toward convertibility, with appropriate action on related trade matters, (para. 25–a, NSC 5422/2)

b. Urge and bargain with other free world countries to reduce barriers to their imports, (para. 25–b, NSC 5422/2)

c. Support continued effective action in OEEC on intra-European and dollar trade and, prior to moves to convertibility, on intra-European payments, (para. 25–c, NSC 5422/2)

d. Apply the principles relative to U.S. imports contained in the President’s March 30 message to Congress on the Randall Report, (para. 25–d, NSC 5422/2)

e. Take all feasible measures to increase the opportunities of free Asian countries for trade with each other and with other free world countries, (para. 4, NSC 5429/2)

D. Military Assistance to Friendly Countries

42. The United States should continue military assistance, including economic aid for military support, in accordance with current policies, taking account of the need for developing and maintaining the strength of foreign forces. The U.S. should also determine the extent to which the national interest requires that post D-day military aid requirements of our allies be included in national security programs, (para. 27, NSC 5422/2)

Annex A

(Appendix A, NSC 5422/2, dated August 7, 1954; the figures in the table on the following page have been revised as of October 5, 1954 in light of NIE 11–4–54 and NIE 11–6–54)⁵

Elements of the World Situation and Outlook

The Soviet Threat Through Mid-1959 (NIE 11–5–54; NIE 13–54; and “Explanation of Table of Comparisons of Estimated Soviet Military Capabilities in Key Respects” in Annex 4 of NSC 5422.)⁶

1. Status of the Soviet Bloc

a. The internal stability of the Soviet Union and its control of the European satellites have not diminished and may be expected to remain intact through 1959.

b. However, the Soviet bloc is faced with internal problems such as popular discontent in the satellites, agricultural shortages and opposition to collectivization, rivalries within the collective leadership and serious defections from the secret services.

c. Communist China has gained prestige more rapidly than anticipated; its power will continue to increase. Despite potential conflicts of interest, the present close Sino-Soviet collaboration will persist.

2. Soviet Bloc Military Capabilities

Estimates of certain current and future Soviet military capabilities have been raised substantially since the adoption of NSC 162/2. Key examples are shown in the following table:

		Current		Future
		’53 Estimates of ’53 Situation	’54 Estimates of ’54 Situation	’53 Estimates of ’57 Situation	’54 Estimates of ’59 Situation
Nuclear Weapons (Energy yield)
	Largest Weapon	500–1000 KT	1000 KT	500–1000 KT	10, 1000 KT
	Total Stockpile	6 MT	25 MT	25 MT	172 MT (tested technology)
				860–4300 MT (possible technology)
Long Range Bombers
	Prop Medium (TU4)	1000	1270	1200	100*
	Jet Medium (“39”)	1 Prototype	40*	50 (mid ’55)	200 (mid ’55)*
				1050 (mid ’59)*
	Jet Heavy (“37”)	–	1 Prototype	–	250*
Surface-to-Surface Guided Missiles.
	450–500 mi (V2 type)	–	–	Future Obscure	Operational by ’55*
	Inter Continental ballistic	–	–	–	Possible in 1960*
Air Defense
	All weather fighters with A–1	–	–	A few by ’55	200 (mid ’55)
	Radar.				2100 (mid ’59)
	Surface to air missile (Nitri B equivalent).	–	–	–	Operational by ’57*
Submarines
	Improved Ocean Patrol Submarines.	20	65*	100	295

Note. This table necessarily involves substantial simplification of National Intelligence Estimates existing and pending. Items marked with an asterisk (*) represent revisions since the similar table presented with NSC 5422.

3. Soviet Bloc Capabilities for Political Warfare, Subversion and Local Aggression

a. Present and future Soviet bloc capabilities for expansion by action short of general war appear, in the light of developments in Indochina and at Geneva, greater than a year ago. Throughout most of the free world, especially in Asia, the Communists have the capability through hardcore activists to engage in a wide variety of forms of penetration and subversion, ranging from organized civil war (as in Indochina) through persistent guerrilla activities (as in Malaya) to inflammatory demonstrations, propaganda, “popular fronts”, and parliamentary harassment. The Communists will therefore increase their emphasis on a “creeping expansion” in preference to overt aggression, and they will continue to take over spontaneous movements bred of nationalistic fervor or economic discontent and to exploit free world disunity.

b. In the period through 1959, the Soviet rulers will almost certainly believe that, as Soviet nuclear capabilities increase, the aversion of the U.S. and, more especially, of its allies to general war will correspondingly increase, and that the Kremlin will therefore have greater freedom to take certain actions, including local military actions, without running substantial risk of general war [in situations where the allies would be likely to act as a brake on the United States.]^†† The Kremlin may employ the threat of nuclear devastation as an instrument of political warfare. The Kremlin will, however, continue to be extremely reluctant to precipitate a contest in which the USSR would be subjected to nuclear attack. At the same time, the Kremlin would probably not be deterred by the risk of general war from taking counteraction against an action by the U.S. or its allies which the Kremlin considered an imminent threat to Soviet security. The extent to which the Kremlin uses the increased freedom of action which its increased nuclear capabilities appear to give it, and the success which it achieves, will depend primarily on the cohesion of the non-Communist world, and the determination and strength of the major free world powers.

Trends in the Free World Through Mid-1959

4. Military (JCS study on “Estimate of the Military Posture throughout the Free World, FY 1956 Through FY 1959,” in Annex 2 of NSC 5422)⁷

a. The U.S. will achieve atomic plenty during the early part of this period and prior to like achievement by the Soviets. The U.S. is expected to maintain relative numerical and qualitative superiority in nuclear weapons and the means for their delivery. As the Soviets approach the absolute atomic capability of inflicting critical damage upon U.S. and other allied targets, however, there could result a condition of mutual deterrence to general war.

b. Free world forces will be confronted with quantitative superiority in ground and tactical air forces in the geographical areas contiguous to the Soviet Bloc. However, the superior tactical atomic support which can be provided our allies during this period will, if accepted by them, partially offset allied deficiencies in conventional forces. Taken as a whole, effectiveness of European forces is considered fair to good. There has been no progress in forming West German forces and limited progress in forming Japanese forces. Events in the Far East resulted in a suspension of planned redeployments from that area. D-day NATO commitments of U.S. forces in Europe remain unchanged. No progress has been made in forming a strategic reserve based generally on U.S. territory, with a high degree of combat readiness and a capability of being moved to any threatened area.

5. Alliances

a. There have been serious instances of an unwillingness of important free world nations to take concerted action which the U.S. considers necessary to oppose communist expansion, particularly as regards Indochina, East-West trade, and EDC. West Germany is becoming restive because of protracted delay in recovering its sovereignty. The long-term alignment of Japan with the free world has become less certain. The situation with respect to Indochina has deteriorated with unexpected rapidity, confronting the free world with the possible loss of Southeast Asia to Communism and causing, in the continued absence of effective countermeasures, loss of confidence, particularly in the Far East, as to the willingness and ability of the free world to prevent further losses to Communism.

b. The alliances of the free nations will continue to be strained by divisive forces and conflicts of interests which will be vigorously exploited by the USSR. In particular, unity of action will be impaired by:

(1) Increasing fear of the effects of nuclear weapons.

(2) Differing estimates of the nature and imminence of the Communist threat.

(3) Distrust of U.S. national purposes and leadership.

(4) Political instability and economic weakness of some of our allies.

(5) Conflicts regarding trade policy and economic integration.

(6) Historic hostility between certain of the allies.

(7) Differing approaches to “colonial” problems.

6. Underdeveloped Areas

The underdeveloped areas of the free world will be especially vulnerable to Communist penetration and subversion by reason of nationalism and anti-colonialism, deep-seated distrust of the West, retarded economic growth, military weakness, political ferment. Strong pressures will result from impatience to achieve political and economic aspirations. Failure of the local governments to provide some satisfaction of these aspirations will create additional trouble and disunity in the free world while benefiting the Soviet bloc and will increase the dangers of Communist take-over of independent countries without armed aggression from outside. This danger will be most acute in Asia, in dependent areas such as French North Africa which are still under European rule, and in parts of Latin America.

[Here follows Annex B, entitled “U.S. Objectives in the Event of General War With the Soviet Bloc”, which is simply a verbatim restatement of NSC 5410/1, March 29, 1954, page 644.]

1. Copies to the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Directors of the Bureau of the Budget and of Central Intelligence; the Chairmen of the Atomic Energy Commission, the Council of Economic Advisers, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Federal Civil Defense Administrator. A typed notation on the source text of this memorandum indicates that it reflects changes made on Oct. 20, 1954.
2. For text of NSC 162/2, Oct. 30, 1953, see p. 577. For text of NSC 5429/2, “Review of U.S. Policy in the Far East,” Aug. 20, 1954, see vol. xii, Part 1, p. 769. NSC 5428, “U.S. Objectives and Policies With Respect to the Near East,” July 23, 1954, is printed in volume ix. For text of NSC 5432/1, “U.S. Objectives and Courses of Action With Respect to Latin America,” Sept. 3, 1954, see vol. iv, p. 81. For text of NSC 5433/1, “Immediate U.S. Policy Toward Europe,” Sept. 25, 1954, see vol. v, Part 2, p. 1268. For text of NSC 166/1, “U.S. Policy Toward Communist China,” Nov. 6, 1953, see volume xiv.

3. At its 218th meeting on Oct. 22, the National Security Council in Action No. 1251 “Noted an oral presentation by Mr. Cutler on the geographic coverage of existing national security policies, the principal elements of existing basic national security policy, and the procedure for reviewing such basic policy.” The Council then “Noted that each Council member and adviser would submit, for consideration at the Council meeting on November 18, 1954, statements in non-technical language of such changes as each thinks should be made in the existing basic policy; such statements to be made available for information in advance of that Council meeting through the NSC Planning Board.” The President approved this action and it was transmitted to members of the Council for implementation. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)

   Even before the Council action of Oct. 22, the Department of State’s Policy Planning Staff had submitted draft comments on the Summary Statement of Existing Basic National Security Policy printed below. Copies of draft papers by S/P, the Office of Defense Mobilization, and the Department of Defense drawn up between Oct. 12 and Nov. 10 are in S/P–NSC files, lot 61 D 167, “Review of Basic National Security Policy, Sept–Nov, 1954” and “S/P Meetings”, and in PPS files, lot 65 D 101, “Review of Basic National Security Policy, NSC 162–5422”. The earliest statement submitted to Lay for transmission to the NSC was that of the Foreign Operations Administration, dated Nov. 9, p. 770. Thereafter, the remaining agencies submitted their statements, but too late for Council discussion on Nov. 18. Accordingly Council consideration of the various agency statements, all of which are printed below, was deferred to the 225th meeting on Nov. 24; for the memorandum of discussion, see p. 787.

4. Final determination on all budget requests for programs covered by this policy will be made by the President after normal budgetary review. [Footnote in the source text.]
4. Dated Feb. 11, p. 609.
5. A proposed policy on manpower mobilization is being prepared by ODM and will be submitted for Council consideration in the near future. Decisions on a military manpower program will be made on the basis of the report on “Reserve Mobilization Requirements” (NSC 5420/2) prepared by Defense and ODM pursuant to NSC Action No. 1188–b. [Footnote in the source text. A copy of NSC 5420/2, not printed, is in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5420 Series, along with NSC 5420/3, Nov. 17, 1954, which was the approved paper in this series. NSC Action No. 1188–b, taken at the 208th meeting of the NSC, July 29, “Agreed that the Department of Defense and the Office of Defense Mobilization should develop a specific program, including cost estimates, along the lines proposed in NSC 5420 and NSC 5420/1, for submission to the Council not later than September 15, 1954, after consultation as appropriate with Congressional leaders and other interested groups.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action, 1954”)]
6. This subparagraph will be reviewed and revised on the basis of Council action on the revision of Section III of NSC 5422/1 “Guidelines for Mobilization” (Memo for NSC, dated October 5, 1954). [Footnote in the source text. For the Oct. 5 memorandum, see p. 731.]
7. These countries are covered by the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, which is subject to ratification. [Footnote and brackets in the source text. For documentation on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, see vol. xii, Part 1, pp. 1 ff.]
5. The text of NSC Action No. 1148, entitled “U.S. Policy in the Event of Overt Unprovoked Military Aggression by Communist China” is included in the extract of the memorandum of discussion at the 200th meeting of the NSC, June 3, 1954, ibid., p. 532.

6. Para. 1, Part I, of NSC 5429/2 will receive further consideration by the Council in the light of a review by the Secretary of State and, if adopted, will supersede para. 8 above. Para. 1–a of NSC 5429/2 reads as follows:

   1. Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war:

   a. (1) React with force, if necessary and advantageous, to expansion and subversion recognizable as such, supported and supplied by Communist China.

   (2) React with immediate, positive, armed force against any belligerent move by Communist China. [Footnote in the source text.]

7. This paragraph does not establish policy guidance for our propaganda or informational activities. [Footnote in the source text.]
8. Para. 1, Part I, of NSC 5429/2 will receive further consideration by the Council in the light of a review by the Secretary of State, and, if adopted, will supersede NSC 166/1. Para. 1 of NSC 5429/2 reads in part as follows: Reduce the power of Communist China in Asia even at the risk of, but without deliberately provoking, war: . . . . Increase efforts to develop the political, economic and military strength of non-Communist Asian countries, including the progressive development of the military strength of Japan to the point where she can provide for her own national defense and, in time, contribute to the collective defense of the Far East. [Footnote in the source text.]
5. Extracts from NIE–11–4–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action Through Mid-1954”, Sept. 14, 1954, are scheduled for publication in volume viii. NIE–11–6–54, “Soviet Capabilities and Probable Programs in the Guided Missile Field” is not printed.
6. Regarding NIE–11–5–54 and NIE–13–54, see footnote 5, p. 648. Annex 4 to NSC 5422 is printed on p. 676.
7. Proposed by State. [Footnote and brackets in the source text.]
7. For text of Annex 2 to NSC 5422, see p. 672.