Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, National Security Affairs, Volume II, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 185th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, February 17, 1954¹

[Extracts]

top secret
eyes only

February 17, 1954

The following were present at the 185th meeting of the Council: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Acting Secretary of Defense; the Acting Director, Foreign Operations Administration; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Items 1, 2 and 4); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 4); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Items 1, 2 and 4); the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Research & Development); Mr. Slezak for the Secretary of the Army; the Acting Secretary of the Navy; the Acting Secretary of the Air Force; the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Gen. Bolte for the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army; the Chief of Naval Operations; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; the Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps; the Director of Central Intelligence; Gen. John E. Hull, Department of Defense (for Item 7); Gen. Willard S. Paul, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Mr. Shapley, Bureau of the Budget (for Items 1 and 2); Mr. Sullivan, Department of Defense, Mr. Ash, Office of Defense Mobilization, and Mr. Hurley, Office of Defense Mobilization (for Items 1 and 2); the Assistant to the President; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; the NSC Representative on Internal Security; Richard L. Hall, NSC Special Staff Member; Bryce Harlow, Administrative Assistant to the President; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

A summary of the discussion at the meeting follows, together with the main points taken.

1. Continental Defense (NSC 5408)²

At the outset of the meeting, Mr. Cutler announced that he had prepared a detailed presentation to analyze and explain NSC 5408, as directed by the Council at its previous consideration of continental defense. Mr. Cutler explained that NSC 5408 represented a complete and up-to-date revision of NSC 159/4³ to reflect the January presentation by the Department of Defense of the three major programs and the Financial Appendix. Mr. Cutler also referred to the “Special Annex”, which gave details with respect to the three major programs,⁴ and informed the Council that the intelligence estimates in NSC 5408 were based upon a scrutiny of the latest intelligence available on Soviet capabilities and intentions.

Mr. Cutler then proceeded to summarize, or to read in toto, the early paragraphs of NSC 5408. When he reached paragraph 8, which summarized the expenditures for continental defense, he distributed a 1-page statement entitled “Comparison of Final Estimates, Feb. 12, 1954 (NSC 5408) With Previous Estimates, Sept. 24, 1953, on Charts Based on Financial Appendix to NSC 159/3” (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).⁵

When he reached paragraph 14, Mr. Cutler informed the Council that the report on organization for continental defense referred to in this paragraph would presently be completed by Dr. Flemming, would thereafter be submitted to the Planning Board, and scheduled for consideration by the Council on March 4.

Turning to a series of charts, Mr. Cutler explained to the Council the significant changes which this revision made in the three major programs listed as 15–a and 15–b. He explained that there had been some concern expressed at the meetings of the Planning Board as to whether the change of title with respect to these programs, from completion “with all possible speed” to completion “with all practicable speed”, indicated an intention to slow down the completion of these programs. Mr. Cutler did not think this was the case, and pointed out that the present revised statement reflected, as the Council directed, the presentations by the Department of Defense of the three major programs.

Mr. Cutler also noted with respect to these programs that the policy called for developing as rapidly as practicable the operational capability of the installations required by the Southern Canadian line, and once this operational capability had been established, to install the line as rapidly as possible. The majority of the Planning Board had agreed that this constituted a reasonable procedure.

Mr. Cutler then referred to a letter which he had received from Dr. DuBridge,⁶ Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee of ODM (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting). He read two paragraphs from this letter, in which Dr. DuBridge contended that the present level of technological development was sufficiently advanced to permit the installation of the Southern Canadian defense line and the seaward extensions of this line by the dates originally contemplated last September, and that no delay need be contemplated because of the fear that rapid technological advance in the future would render the installations obsolete. With respect to the points made by Dr. DuBridge, Mr. Cutler referred to the statement at the top of page 12 of NSC 5408, to the effect that the programming projected in the “Special Annex” and the Financial Appendix to NSC 5408 “is not intended to preclude a more rapid phasing or earlier completion of the early warning and other programs.” Accordingly, said Mr. Cutler, there were no fixed dates for the completion of the programs, nor had the Department of Defense given any indication of a desire to slow down or that lack of funds was a consideration with respect to the pace at which these programs were to be completed.

Mr. Cutler then explained that beyond paragraphs 15–a, –b, –c and –d, the revised report contained few changes of any significance. He did, however, wish to call attention to the only dissent in the paper, which had been presented by the Federal Civil Defense Administration with respect to the Northern Canadian early warning line. He explained the complexity of the problem, and expressed the opinion that the language proposed by FCDA in paragraph 16–c was rather too finite in dealing with a problem about which, as yet, we could know very little.

When no questions were forthcoming after Mr. Cutler’s detailed analysis, he invited Dr. Flemming to comment on the revised report.

Dr. Flemming stated his belief that the revision constituted an excellent paper on the whole, and that it helped greatly to clarify the issues. He had no changes to suggest in the wording of the report, but he wished to stress the importance of the introductory sentences to paragraph 16, which pointed out the urgency of obtaining as soon as possible effective advance warning of enemy attack. Many agencies were dependent upon provision of early warning in carrying out their responsibilities, and the more clearly we recognized the importance of this objective, the better. Dr. Flemming went on to state his understanding that the joint committee, made up of officials of the Royal Canadian Air Force and the U.S. Air Force, would report their findings with regard to the Southern Canadian line about June 1,⁷ and Dr. Flemming recommended that once this report was in, the Council would be well advised to take a fresh look at the early warning problem and not to regard the present dates for completion of the early warning program as frozen. Provided, therefore, the Council clearly understood that no completion dates were fixed and that the Council might look at this issue again, Dr. Flemming concluded that NSC 5408 was “a fine document”.

Mr. Cutler explained that the work of the joint committee referred to by Dr. Flemming involved the development of military criteria, the testing of equipment, and the surveying of the Southern Canadian line. Admiral Radford and General Twining indicated that everything within the committee’s area of responsibility was moving forward as rapidly as possible.

The President expressed an interest in Dr. DuBridge’s letter, and inquired whether Dr. DuBridge meant that equipment for the Southern Canadian line now available was sufficiently effective so that, even if no better equipment were to be developed in the near future, we could still install a practicable and effective Southern Canadian line.

The President’s question was answered by Assistant Secretary of Defense Quarles, who said he believed that the President’s interpretation of Dr. DuBridge’s meaning was substantially correct, but that Dr. DuBridge did not mean that presently available equipment could not be improved upon.

The President said that the installation of the line should certainly not be delayed if all we contemplated was a gradual and steady improvement in the effectiveness of the equipment installed. But he did not want us to find ourselves in a position of being compelled to rip out equipment because it proved worthless or ineffective after installation.

Secretary Kyes called the Council’s attention to the study of the Administration’s continental defense policy and program which had been made, at the behest of a Senate Committee headed by Senator Saltonstall, by Mr. Sprague. The latter found himself in complete agreement with this program, and Secretary Kyes indicated that this was a welcome endorsement by an intelligent outsider competent to make a judgment.

With respect to Dr. Flemming’s earlier comments, Secretary Kyes said he merely wished to state that the Department of Defense was accustomed to get done as rapidly as possible any task which the National Security Council directed that department to perform. Referring again to Mr. Sprague’s report, Secretary Kyes said that this report raised certain problems. It was originally intended to be used only by Senator Saltonstall’s committee, but it was now proposed to give wide distribution to what was called a “sanitized” version. Great care must be exercised in scrutinizing any report on this subject which reached a large number of people.

Admiral Strauss then said he wished to raise a point with respect to paragraph 8–b on page 8 of NSC 5408, which stated that the Soviets now possessed a thermonuclear device “of quality indicating the use of independent technology.” Admiral Strauss said that he was unable “to buy” this last phrase. Our intelligence was not sufficiently sure to permit this judgment as to the manner in which the Soviets had developed their device. He accordingly recommended deletion of this phrase, and the Council concurred in this recommendation.

The National Security Council:⁸

a. Noted a letter from the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization, regarding the technical situation with respect to the Southern Canadian early warning line and seaward extensions thereof, as read at the meeting by Mr. Cutler; and that this letter had been referred to the Department of Defense for comments.

b. Adopted the statement of policy contained in NSC 5408, subject to the following changes:

(1) Paragraph 8–b, last sentence: Delete the words “of quality indicating the use of independent technology.”

(2) Paragraph 16–c: Delete the FCDA proposal on page 15a.

(3) Paragraph 17–a, second sentence: Insert, after “Consolan radio stations”, the words “, single and multiple corridor procedures”.

c. Noted that the programming projected in the Financial Appendix and the “Special Annex” to NSC 5408 is not intended to preclude a more rapid phasing or earlier completion of the early warning and other programs; and that a review of the timing will be made in connection with the first Progress Report on NSC 5408 scheduled as of June 1, 1954.

Note: NSC 5408 as amended subsequently approved by the President. The amendments to NSC 5408 subsequently circulated for insertion in NSC 5408.

2. Organization for Continental Defense (NSC Action No. 873–d; NSC 159, Part VI; NSC 5408, para. 14)⁹

Dr. Flemming stated that he and Secretary Kyes had reached agreement as to the character of the general set-up which would follow through on NSC 5408. As Mr. Cutler had indicated earlier, this proposal would first be submitted to the Planning Board, and come back to the Council for consideration on March 4.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

Noted that the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, would transmit his recommendations, prepared pursuant to NSC Action No. 873–d, on improving the organization of the Government with respect to the continental defense functions in Part VI of NSC 159, to the NSC Planning Board for study and report to the Council.

. . . . . . .

4. Plan for Continuity of Essential Wartime Functions of the Executive Branch (Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated January 25, 1954; NSC Actions Nos. 1023 and 1032)¹¹

Secretary Weeks¹² joined the Council at this point, and Mr. Cutler explained that since the Secretary of Commerce could be present for only a short time, it would be helpful if Dr. Flemming took up first the revised Defense Mobilization Order relative to new Federal construction in target areas, since this Order involved new responsibilities for the Secretary of Commerce.

Dr. Flemming reported that as a result of the Council’s decision of the previous week, he had revised the original draft Order in the light of the discussion at that meeting. He then distributed copies of the revised draft (copy filed in the minutes of the meeting).¹³

Before Dr. Flemming had completed his statement, the President interrupted to say that he had a good many comments to make about this problem, since he was snowed under with complaints over the abandonment of various Government facilities in different parts of the country. While we were all sitting here around this table and talking about dispersing Government agencies, we never seemed to pay any attention to the fact that a number of the facilities which we were abandoning over such violent protests, particularly military installations, might usefully serve a dispersion program. The President stated with great emphasis that we should use such abandoned installations for dispersion purposes unless it could be proved beyond reasonable doubt that these installations were unusable. Furthermore, said the President, he seriously doubted that lack of communications was a valid argument for confining the relocation of Government agencies to an area within 30 miles of Washington. With the use of telephonic communications it should be perfectly possible to relocate many of these agencies a thousand miles away from Washington.

Dr. Flemming explained to the President that ODM was already taking a look at the abandoned Government facilities, for example, Camp Pickett. Should we, inquired Dr. Flemming, adopt as a fixed procedure scrutiny of such abandoned facilities before any plans were made for the construction of new installations in connection with the relocation program?

The President indicated approval of this suggestion, and asked Mr. Dodge if the Budget Bureau had a list of Government facilities and installations which had been abandoned. Some way must be found, the President repeated, to make use of these facilities.

Secretary Humphrey said that it was his guess that if the Government issued clear instructions as to the desirability of looking first at existing buildings and installations, we would not have to spend a nickel for any new construction.

The President observed that it was an American habit to expect too much luxury in its Government buildings. As an old Army man, he himself had shared in this failing, but it was now obvious to him that a lot more could be done on an austere basis. If we merely used common sense we could save a lot of money.

Mr. Dodge then suggested that the procedure suggested by the President and Dr. Flemming, as to looking first at the possibilities of using existing facilities, be incorporated in the Defense Mobilization Order.

Secretary Kyes said that he agreed with this suggestion, but believed that after Dr. Flemming had included this point in his next draft, the Order be looked at by the Planning Board before coming to the Council for a final decision. As presently written, the Order would cause certain difficulties for the Department of Defense and quite possibly for other Government agencies, and Secretary Kyes said he wished an opportunity to have these problems aired.

The President commented that Secretary Kyes’ statement moved him to remind the Council of his views on its functions. He said that he wanted every member of the Council, both statutory and invited, to feel absolutely free to bring up any idea they wished for discussion at this table. As soon as possible, however, a written report on such a subject should be prepared and put through the Planning Board before the Council gave it final consideration. Freedom to discuss should not imply hasty decisions.

Mr. Cutler then referred to the President’s desire, expressed at the previous meeting, for the preparation of maps to illustrate target areas and communications facilities. General Paul then produced three maps, which he stated he was prepared to explain to the President and the Council. The first one, he said, dealt with possible sites for the permanent relocation program. This constituted what General Paul described as a “blow-up” of the Washington area, and the sites were included on circles with radii of 30, 100, and 300 miles from the District of Columbia.

After General Paul had commented on the first map, Secretary Humphrey inquired whether the sites indicated on the map called for the use of old buildings or whether they involved new construction. General Paul reassured Secretary Humphrey that it was proposed to utilize anything in the way of facilities which were available and usable. To this, Secretary Humphrey replied that you would have to go a lot further afield than 300 miles if you were to find suitable facilities already in existence sufficient to satisfy the need for permanent relocation.

Dr. Flemming then said that he wished to make clear that the indications on the map were to portray groupings of Government agencies rather than actual location of sites.

Thereafter, General Paul produced his second map, which was to indicated sites for emergency relocation of Government agencies as opposed to permanent nearby relocation. With respect to this second map, General Paul indicated that four Government agencies had been assigned sites for emergency relocation in the midst of the critical target area. Sooner or later these sites would have to be changed.

General Paul then turned to his third map, which portrayed the basic communications network of the United States.

The President inquired whether such a map did not indicate that any time you relocated a Government agency adjacent to one of these communications lines, that agency could function just as effectively as though it were located ten miles from Washington. In any case, said the President, it was perfectly plain to him that we could not plan to relocate all these agencies in areas close to Washington.

Dr. Flemming asked the President whether his statement indicated a belief that the previous limit of 300 miles from the District of Columbia for permanent nearby relocation should be abandoned in favor of more distant relocation. The President replied that he certainly did mean this, provided adequate communications facilities existed.

Mr. Cutler then stated that in his opinion the next step in carrying out the plan for continuity of essential wartime functions was for the ODM to make a general determination as to the essential wartime functions in all the major departments and agencies of the Executive Branch.

Dr. Flemming, however, indicated that it was not his intention to make such a general determination involving all the agencies, but to carry out the program on a case-by-case basis. He indicated that he would be ready presently to discuss the essential wartime functions of the Civil Aeronautics Administration, and would thereafter provide other cases. This seemed to him, he said, the best way to get at a set of ground rules.

Mr. Cutler replied that it was his understanding that the ODM was to select the units and cadres which were to perform essential wartime functions in all the agencies, in order to determine what cadre or unit in what department should be relocated outside of the District of Columbia. This task, said Mr. Cutler, seemed obviously to be the first one.

Dr. Flemming, however, repeated his previous position, and noted that CAA was the “guinea pig” right now. We would then go on, case by case, until we could formulate a general program.

The National Security Council:¹⁴

a. Discussed a revised draft Defense Mobilization Order, relative to new Federal construction in target areas, prepared by the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1032–a and circulated at the meeting.

b. Agreed that this draft Order should be amended by ODM to state that, before undertaking new construction, existing facilities should be used whenever feasible.

c. Referred the draft Order, amended by ODM in accordance with b above, to the NSC Planning Board for study and report to the Council.

d. Noted and discussed a preliminary oral report by General Paul, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1032–d, on possible groupings of agencies for permanent nearby relocation of essential wartime functions of the Executive Branch.

e. Noted a map showing 50 probable target areas and location of major communications facilities available to the Executive Branch for use in the event of war, prepared by the Office of Defense Mobilization pursuant to NSC Action No. 1032–c.

f. Noted that the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, pursuant to NSC Action No. 1023–d–(1), would transmit to the NSC Planning Board at a later date a report on those agencies of the Executive Branch considered to have essential wartime functions, with the understanding that after determination of such agencies, permanent relocation plans will be developed on an agency-by-agency basis.

Note: The action in f above subsequently transmitted to the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, for implementation.

. . . . . . .

S. Everett Gleason

1. Drafted by Deputy Executive Secretary Gleason on Feb. 18.
2. NSC 5408 is printed supra.
3. Dated Sept. 25, 1953, p. 475.
4. The “Special Annex” under reference cannot be further identified.
5. The statement has not been found. For information on the minutes of NSC meetings, see footnote 1, p. 394.
6. Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, President of California Institute of Technology. The letter has not been found.
7. Documentation on the joint U.S.-Canadian Air Force committee under reference is scheduled for publication in volume vi.
8. Paragraphs a–c constitute NSC Action No. 1041. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
9. For information on NSC Action No. 873 and on NSC 159, see footnote 2, p. 465; NSC 5408 is printed supra.
10. The following paragraph constitutes NSC Action No. 1042. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
11. A copy of Lay’s memorandum is in S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 5408. Regarding NSC Action No. 1023, see footnote 3, p. 610. NSC Action No. 1032, taken at the 184th meeting of the NSC on Feb. 11, 1954, noted discussion of a draft defense mobilization order and a pilot study concerning plans for continuity of essential wartime functions of the Executive Branch as well as a Presidential request for a map showing probable enemy wartime target areas and location of communication facilities available to the Executive Branch in time of war. It also noted agreement by the Council that the Director of Defense Mobilization should proceed with the selection of possible emergency relocation sites as well as for permanent “nearby relocation of essential wartime functions”. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)
12. Sinclair Weeks, Secretary of Commerce, Jan. 21, 1953–Nov. 10, 1958.
13. The reference draft order is presumably that referred to in NSC Action No. 1032, discussed in footnote 11 above. No copy of the revised defense mobilization order has been found. For information on the minutes of NSC meetings, see footnote 1, p. 394.
14. Paragraphs a–f constitute NSC Action No. 1044. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95, “NSC Records of Action”)