This statement of policy reflects the presentation of the three major
military programs by the Department of Defense at the Council meeting on
January 14 (NSC Action No. 1010–a) and
brings up to date the statements of all programs in the light of other
developments and Council actions since the approval of NSC 159/4.
When final review of cost estimates is completed a revised financial appendix
and a revised paragraph 8–d will be circulated.
A “Special Annex” to this report, containing a more detailed description of
the early warning system, anti-aircraft forces and fighter interceptor
forces referred to in paragraphs 15–a, 16 and 18 of the enclosure, has been
circulated separately through the members of the Planning Board. This
“Special Annex” must be returned to
[Page 611]
this office for destruction after Council action on the enclosed
statement of policy.
Attention is invited to the fact that the Financial Appendix and the “Special
Annex” do not form a part of the enclosed policy statement.
Recommendations on improving the organization of government with respect to
the “continental defense” functions in Part VI of NSC 159 are being prepared by the Director of the Office of
Defense Mobilization pursuant to NSC Action
No. 873–d and will be transmitted separately for Council consideration on
February 17. The substance of these recommendations, if adopted, will be
substituted for paragraph 14 of the enclosure.
It is intended that Council action on the enclosure will constitute final
Council action on “continental defense” policy, subject to revision when and
if warranted by major developments. Reports on progress in the
implementation of the “continental defense” programs and of changes therein
will be made the subject of progress reports.
[Enclosure]
Draft Statement of Policy Proposed by the National
Security Council
top secret
[Washington,] February 11, 1954.
Continental Defense
general considerations
Interrelation of Continental Defense
to Other Elements Constituting National Security
1. The survival of the free world depends upon the United States
maintaining: (a) sufficient strength, military and non-military, to
deter general war, to prevent or counter aggression, and to win a
general war if it is forced upon us; and (b) a sound, strong economy,
capable of supporting such strength over the long pull and of rapidly
and effectively changing to full mobilization.
[Page 612]
2. a. The strength of the United States which must be so maintained is an
integrated complex of offensive and defensive elements. Each of these
elements has its proper role in the defense of the vitals of America
against attack and destruction. For example, our existing commitments to
help in creating outposts of indigenous strength in NATO countries and in the Orient
contribute to the defense of the continental United States as well as
does the development of an early warning system in the Western
Hemisphere. Accordingly, each element of this integrated complex should
be in proper balance with all the other elements. We shall not have
satisfactory over-all strength if one element is allowed to develop out
of proportion to the other elements.
b. Just as there must be a proper balance among the several elements
comprising our strength, there must also be a proper balance between
military and non-military measures within the element of “continental
defense”.
3. In recent years we have emphasized the elements of peripheral defense,
offensive capabilities, and mobilization base more than we have
emphasized the element of “continental defense”. Yet this latter element
is necessary for the protection of our vitals and for the survival of
our population and our Government in the event of attack. “Continental
defense” is now clearly inadequate.
Scope of This Report
4. Because there are many interrelated programs which affect the defense
of the continental United States in various ways it is necessary, before
considering the element of “continental defense”, to decide which
programs are to be included in and excluded from such consideration. As
used herein the term “continental defense” is limited by the following:
- a.
- There are included in this report those elements contributing
to the defense of the continent which are of an essentially
defensive nature. Accordingly, this report does not include
those elements of offensive strength of the United States and
its allies which contribute materially to the defense of the
continent.
- b.
- There are included in this report certain existing programs
which, although contributing to the defense of the continent,
are not undertaken primarily for that purpose and would be
carried on in any event by the agencies responsible for them.
Examples of such programs are:
- (1)
- Personnel security in the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government.
- (2)
- Physical security of government facilities.
- (3)
- Coastal escorts and coastal anti-submarine
patrol.
- (4)
- Various elements of an integrated program of
counter-measures for the detection and prevention of
clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic
weapons, such as FBI
investigations,
[Page 613]
border patrol, customs and immigration procedures,
passport and visa control, etc.
- Conversely, many of the “continental defense” programs will
make a valuable contribution to other programs. For example, the
air control system can increase civil air traffic capacity and
reduce accidents. Some non-military programs will be very useful
in handling domestic disasters. Some military forces which would
perform roles in the “continental defense” program could be
deployed overseas in the latter stages of a war.
This report is designed primarily to fix a timing and
guidelines which should govern the various “continental defense”
programs. Details of the programs in this report will be determined by
the responsible departments and agencies.
Inadequacy of Existing Continental
Defense System
5. a. The Report of the Continental Defense Committee (NSC 159, July 22, 1953)5
reviewed the significant studies and estimates which have been made on
continental defense in recent years. The latest of these was “Summary
Evaluation of the Net Capability of the USSR to Inflict Direct Injury on
the United States up to July 1, 1955”. (NSC 140/1, May 18, 1953)6
b. Findings of the Report of the Continental Defense Committee (NSC 159, July 22, 1953) include:
- (1)
- The USSR has now a growing capability to deliver a devastating
atomic attack on the United States. (par. 9, p. 4)
- (2)
- Our current atomic offensive capability is a most significant
deterrent to Soviet atomic attack upon the continental United
States. It will continue to be a powerful factor in deterring
hostile military action by the USSR. In any program of national
security, our offensive capability must be maintained not only
for gaining our war objectives, but for its marked deterrent
value in protecting our homeland. (par. 10, p. 4)
- (3)
- The present continental defense programs are not now adequate
either to prevent, neutralize or seriously deter the military or
covert attacks which the USSR is capable of launching, nor are
they adequate to ensure the continuity of government, the
continuity of production, or the protection of the industrial
mobilization base and millions of citizens in our great and
exposed metropolitan centers. This condition constitutes an
unacceptable risk to our nation’s survival. (par. 11, p.
4)
- (4)
- The creation of a defense system approaching invulnerability
is probably unattainable and, as found by the
Kelly Committee, is completely
impractical, economically and technically, in the face of
expected advances in Soviet offensive capabilities. However, a
reasonably effective defense system can and must be attained.
Such a system must be phased to meet the changing character of
the
[Page 614]
threat, and
therefore fixed programs extending over a period of many years
are unsound. Relatively short-term programs should be embarked
upon now to achieve as rapidly as possible an ability to cope
with the manned aircraft and submarine-launched guided missile
threat as it probably will exist through 1957. (Enclosure A,
par. 3, p. 50.)
- (5)
- No acceptable degree of over-all defense readiness is provided
in programs recommended in NSC
159 until about 1956. But the Continental Defense Committee
concluded that, during the period 1956 to about 1960, the USSR
would not have the net capability of destroying the war-making
capacity of the United States, provided:
- (a)
- The over-all continental defense programs recommended
in NSC 159 are carried
out vigorously, and
- (b)
- In the military area, the defense system not only is
kept modern, but the quantity of its weapons is
increased consistent with any significant increase in
the size or performance of the Soviet long range air
force. This condition might obtain well into the 1960’s.
Sometime after 1960, due to the possible development of
long range air-to-ground or ground-to-ground guided
missiles, there can be no assurance that the proposed
programs will give the high degree of protection
required. Unless our defensive system is constantly
reviewed and kept thoroughly modern, including a defense
against such possibilities as an intercontinental
ballistic missile, we face the possibility of having our
continental defense program largely nullified. However,
any doubt about the future must not prevent us from
meeting the urgent requirements of the present, (par.
120, pp. 44–45)
6. a. The Soviet demonstration of thermonuclear capabilities in August,
1953, subsequent to the above Reports, indicated that: (1) the Soviets
have developed a method of substantially increasing the total energy
yield from their available supplies of fissionable materials, enabling
them to increase the number of bombs of 30–100 KT yield now estimated to be in their stockpile, or to make
their weapons individually more destructive, or to create very high
yield weapons (500–1000 KT) by accepting
a reduction in total number of weapons; and (2) the Soviets may have
reached an advanced stage in the development of true thermonuclear
weapons yielding more than a million tons of TNT energy equivalent.
b. This Soviet demonstration has placed a premium upon:
- (1)
- Successfully deterring general war.
- (2)
- Improvement of our intelligence regarding Soviet capabilities
and intentions.
- (3)
- An early warning system.
- (4)
- Maximum attrition of attacking forces before reaching
targets.
- (5)
- A ready offensive striking force.
- (6)
- Non-military defense measures suited to the new threat
mentioned in a above.
[Page 615]
7. There has been a growing recognition in the United States of the
situation outlined in pars. 5 and 6 above. In December 1952, the United
States adopted a policy that an early warning system deemed capable of
providing three to six hours of warning of aircraft approaching the
United States from any likely direction of attack should be developed
and made operational as a matter of high urgency (NSC 139).7 The over-all security policy adopted in
June, 1953 (NSC 153/1)8 emphasized the “development of a continental
defense system, including early warning, adequate to prevent disaster
and to make secure the mobilization base necessary to achieve U.S.
victory in the event of general war”. The most recent statement of basic
security policy (NSC 162/2, October 30,
1953)9 called for the maintenance of “a strong
security posture, with emphasis on adequate offensive retaliatory
strength and defensive strength”, based on several elements including
“an integrated and effective continental defensive system.”
Financing “Continental
Defense”
8. a. It is provided in par. 40 of NSC
162/2 that the United States must meet the necessary costs of the
policies essential for its security; and that, barring basic change in
the world situation, the Federal Government should continue to make a
determined effort to bring its total annual expenditures into balance,
or into substantial balance, with its total annual revenues.
b. In financing increased emphasis on “continental defense”, full weight
must be placed upon new factors which have entered on the scene since
the United States undertook the commitments supporting some of the
elements other than “continental defense” in our integrated complex.
These new factors are the rapid approach of the Soviets to a stockpile
of “atomic plenty” and the now undoubted possession by the Soviets of a
thermonuclear device.
c. “Continental defense” being but one element of an integrated complex
of national security programs, any future major changes in total funds
available for such integrated complex, or in the requirements of any
major element thereof, will necessitate a re-examination of all U.S.
security programs.
d. The increased emphasis on “continental defense” in FY 1954 and FY 1955 will be accomplished in accordance with the above
considerations. The FY 1955 budget, as
submitted to Congress by the President, includes expenditures as
follows:
[Page 616]
| Programs |
Expenditures in
Millions |
| FY1953 |
FY1954 |
FY1955 |
| “Continental defense”* |
|
|
|
|
Military |
2,442 |
2,939 |
3,198 |
|
Non-military† |
71 |
95 |
97 |
|
|
Total “continental defense” |
2,493 |
3,034 |
3,295 |
| All other “national security” |
47,852 |
45,781 |
41,662 |
|
|
Total |
50,345 |
48,815 |
44,957 |
| All other federal |
23,637 |
22,087 |
20,613 |
|
|
Total |
73,982 |
70,902 |
65,570 |
Intentions of the USSR
9. Although the USSR has a growing capability to launch an aggressive
attack on the United States, we believe it unlikely that the
Kremlin will deliberately initiate general war
during the period covered by current estimates (through the end of
1957). However, it is possible that general war might result from
miscalculations by either side as a result of a series of actions and
counteractions not intended by either side to have that result.
Moreover, despite Soviet “peace offensives” and similar moves, there is
no substantial reason to believe that the USSR has altered its basic
hostility to the free world and its ultimate objective of dominating the
world. Accordingly, plans for improving at home the defense of our
vitals should proceed in a rapid and orderly fashion.
objective
10. To achieve in a rapid and orderly manner as a part of our national
security, and to maintain, in collaboration with Canada, continental
defense readiness and capability which will give reasonable assurance
of:
- a.
- Contributing to deterring Soviet aggression.
- b.
- Preventing devastating attack that might threaten our national
survival.
- c.
- Minimizing the effects of any Soviet attack so as to permit
our successful prosecution of a major war.
- d.
- Guarding against Soviet-inspired subversive activities.
- e.
- Preventing the threat of atomic destruction from discouraging
U.S. freedom of action or weakening national morale.
[Page 617]
courses of action
Improved Foreign and Domestic
Intelligence
11. In view of the implications of nuclear weapons in the hands of the
Soviet Union, greater knowledge of Soviet capabilities and intentions is
essential for military and non-military measures to reach maximum
effectiveness.
Agreements with Canada
12. Canadian agreement and participation on an adequate scale is
essential to an effective continental defense system. U.S. efforts
should be constantly directed towards maintaining with Canada a common
appreciation of the urgency and character of the threat to U.S.-Canadian
security, and reaching prompt agreement on the measures required to meet
it. The United States should be prepared to agree that Canada take
leadership in developing parts of the system and contribute to its
expense.
Research and Development
13. Adequate support for coordinated programs of basic and applied
research and development is essential to gain and maintain the required
technological superiority over the USSR. Weapons development by us has
acquired even greater importance with the development by the USSR of a
thermonuclear capability. Basic and applied research must keep abreast
of the changing Soviet threat, including intercontinental ballistic
guided missiles.
Continental Defense
Organization
14. Pursuant to NSC Action No. 873–d, the
Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, is preparing recommendations
on improving the organization of government with respect to the
“continental defense” functions in Part VI of NSC 159.
Specific Programs
(There is no significance in the order of listing within
subparagraphs.)
(The Financial Appendix and the “Special Annex”10 hereto do not form part of this policy
statement. The programming projected in these supplemental documents is
not intended to preclude a more rapid phasing or earlier completion of
the early warning and other programs.)
15. a. The following programs should be developed to a high state of
readiness with all practicable speed, and subsequently strengthened and
kept effective in phase with developing Soviet capabilities:
[Page 618]
Southern Canadian early warning line. (par. 16–a)
Seaward extensions of Southern Canadian early warning line. (par.
16–b)
Extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage. (par. 17)
Method of aircraft identification. (par. 17)
Fighter interceptor forces. (par. 18)
Anti-aircraft forces. (par. 18)
Completion of emergency plans and preparations to insure the
continuity of essential functions of the Executive Branch of the
Government. (par. 19–a)
Development of an active technical device for the detection of
fissionable material. (par. 20–a)
b. The following programs should be developed to a high state of
readiness over the next two years, insofar as practicable, and
subsequently strengthened and kept effective in phase with developing
Soviet capabilities:
Northern Canadian early warning line, if proved feasible by
project Corrode11 and agreed to by Canada and
the United States. (par. 16–c)
Air control system, converting as rapidly as possible to
semiautomatic control centers. (par. 17)
Gap-filler radars for low altitude surveillance. (par. 17)
Low frequency analysis and recording (Lofar) for distant
detection of submarines. (par. 17)
Emergency plan for relocation of the Legislative and Judicial
Branches of the Government. (par. 19–a)
Integrated plan for the continuity of essential wartime functions
of the Executive Branch of the Government. (par. 19–b)
Certain elements in the program of counter measures for the
detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and
detonation of atomic weapons. (par. 20–b)
Processing cases to determine known subversives for detention in
the event of emergency. (par. 20–c)
Port security. (par. 21)
Civil defense research. (par. 22–a)
Civil defense education and training program. (par. 22–b)
Federal civil defense contributions to states for attack warning
and communications. (par. 22–c)
Civil defense plan for dispersal of urban populations on attack
warning. (par. 22–d)
c. The following programs should be strengthened and further developed in
phase with (1) progress on the programs in paragraphs 15–a and –b above
and (2) developing Soviet capabilities:
Other elements in the program of countermeasures for the
detection and prevention of clandestine introduction and
detonation of atomic weapons. (par. 20–d)
Civil defense stockpiling program. (par. 22)
[Page 619]
Continuity of industry. (par. 23)
Reduction of urban vulnerability. (par. 24)
Advice and guidance on the physical security of industrial
installations.
d. The following programs should be continued generally along present
lines:
Harbor defense.
Federal civil defense contributions to states for other than
attack warning and communications.
Coastal escorts and coastal anti-submarine patrol.
Physical security of government facilities.
Personnel security in the Executive Branch of Federal
Government.
The inclusion of the latter three programs in this subparagraph is based
solely on their contribution to continental defense, without regard to
their importance to other national security functions.
16. Early Warning System. The longer an effective
advance warning of enemy attack on the continental United States, the
more successfully can many military and non-military measures be carried
out. In fact, certain steps—such as emergency dispersal of urban
populations—would be impossible without effective advance warning.
- a.
- Certain important military and non-military measures require
prompt provision of at least two hours’ effective early warning.
It is urgently necessary for the United States and Canada to
decide as soon as practicable upon equipment operationally
capable of assuring such early warning and as soon thereafter as
possible to install and put in operation the Southern Canadian
Early Warning Line and to complete the early warning provided by
the Alaskan Command and the U.S. Northeast Command Aircraft
Control and Warning systems.
- b.
- Seaward extensions of this line to Hawaii and the Azores,
beginning with a wing outward from Argentia, should be provided
primarily by picket ships and early warning aircraft operating
under a patrolling schedule capable of maintaining effectiveness
under sustained operating conditions. The primary functions of
the seaward barrier are to provide early warning of air attack
to the Continental United States and to detect and report the
passage of submarines. Forces engaged in early warning barrier
operations should have a corollary use in the provision of
weather information, search and rescue services, and air and
surface surveillance for protection of convoys and, if ordered,
should be capable of controlling intercepts of aircraft and
conducting limited anti-submarine warfare within the area of
operations. The phasing of the program is designed to give
initial emphasis to the provision of early warning for the
northeastern part of the United States, and should be in
consonance with progress on the Southern Canadian Early Warning
Line and U.S. operational experience. Considering that it is not
feasible to establish an absolute defense against air attack,
[Page 620]
development of the
seaward extensions should be weighed against the increasing
Soviet capability so as to provide a reasonable early warning of
air attack through the most probable sea approaches.
- c.
- A longer warning than will be afforded by installing the
Southern Canadian Early Warning Line is presently desirable and,
in view of anticipated increases in speed of aircraft, will
probably be required within the next few years. If a Northern
Canadian Early Warning Line is deemed feasible and agreed to by
Canada and the United States, it should be installed as soon as
practicable. Project Corrode should be carried forward with the
greatest feasible speed.
Identification and Control
Systems
17. a. Even with effective early warning, fighter control is
impracticable without accurate means of identification and contiguous
radar coverage to seaward of our coastline. Therefore, an increase of
identification capabilities, such as through the utilization of Consolan
radio stations, single and multiple corridor procedures and the
extension to seaward of contiguous radar coverage, should be completed
with the same urgency as the provision of early warning.
b. As aircraft identification systems and contiguous radar coverage are
completed, they should be supplemented during the next two years,
insofar as practicable, with programs such as:
- (1)
- An air control system, utilizing the Lincoln Transition
System unless a better system can be developed.
- (2)
- Low frequency analysis and recording (Lofar) for distant
detection of submarines.
- (3)
- Gap-filler radars for low altitude surveillance.
Weapons Systems and Force
Requirements
18. a. The recent Soviet thermonuclear test brings home that it is
essential with all practicable speed substantially to augment the
capability to destroy attacking aircraft and submarines before reaching
their targets. All possible efforts should be made to expedite12 the equipping of
adequate forces with aircraft and missiles which will achieve a high
“kill ratio” before the enemy attack reaches our borders. These forces
must be built up in a phased and orderly manner to a level which can be
maintained and continuously be kept modern with new aircraft and
missiles to keep pace with anticipated increases in Soviet capabilities.
This process is essential to achieve the objective of this policy.
Moreover, some of these forces deployed initially for continental
defense could be of great value in other areas and roles in the event of
a long war. To
[Page 621]
this extent
they contribute materially to our over-all military strength.
b. In developing the forces and weapons required under these programs,
every effort should be made to achieve maximum utilization of existing
equipment and forces based upon continuous evaluation of the disposition
of U.S. forces and material world-wide.
Continuity of Essential Wartime
Functions of Federal Government
19. a. Emergency plans and preparations to insure the continuity of
essential wartime functions of the Executive Branch should be completed
with the utmost urgency. Within the next two years, an emergency plan
should be completed for the relocation of the Legislative and Judicial
Branches of the Government.
b. In view of the Soviet nuclear threat, plans for the continuity of the
essential wartime functions of the Federal Government should provide a
wider dispersal of governmental facilities with improved communications
and transportation links.
Internal Security
20. a. Efforts to develop an active technical device for the detection of
fissionable material should proceed with the utmost urgency. When such a
device has been successfully developed, its appropriate use will be the
subject of further Council recommendation. Without awaiting the
development of such a device, all incoming unaccompanied baggage,
effects and shipments of Soviet bloc personnel, exclusive of the
diplomatic pouch, should be subject to overt inspection and manual
search.
b. Certain elements in the program of countermeasures for the detection
and prevention of clandestine introduction and detonation of atomic
weapons should be in operation within the next two years. These elements
include
- (1)
- Controlled dissemination of detailed information on this
subject to officers of the Government who are in supervisory or
administrative positions in agencies having responsibilities for
detection of or defense against clandestine atomic weapons.‡
- (2)
- Controlled dissemination of descriptive data concerning atomic
devices and their component parts to operational officers of the
Government who are actively engaged in the field in detection of
and defense against clandestine atomic weapons.
- (3)
- Release of information on this subject on a selected basis to
representatives of duly constituted law enforcement agencies, in
order to enable cooperation with agencies actively engaged in
detection of and defense against clandestine atomic
weapons.§
- (4)
- Issuance of a Presidential Statement pointing out the FBI’s responsibility for making
investigations with respect to the illegal
[Page 622]
production, transfer, possession,
transportation, etc., of fissionable material, as a military
weapon, and requesting that information relating thereto be
reported to the FBI.§
- (5)
- Assumption of responsibility by the Department of Defense for
disarming atomic weapons introduced into the United States.§
- (6)
- Furnishing of guidance by the Federal Civil Defense
Administration to local civil defense and other local
governmental agencies having responsibility for protective
measures to preserve life, to minimize damage from fire,
etc.
- (7)
- Recommending legislation providing for the payment of rewards
as an inducement for defectors and informants to supply
information leading to the recovery or acquisition of atomic
weapons or fissionable material illegally introduced or
attempted to be so introduced into the United States. As an
additional inducement, the right of sanctuary or asylum in the
United States should apply, when appropriate, to such informants
or defectors.
- (8)
- Channeling entry of Soviet bloc diplomatic personnel through a
limited number of U.S. ports by means of individual visa
designation.║
- (9)
- …
c. The program of processing cases to determine known subversives for
detention in the event of emergency should be developed to a high state
of readiness over the next two years and thereafter kept current.
d. Other elements in the program of countermeasures should be continued
and strengthened in phase with developing Soviet capabilities. These
elements include:
- (1)
- More effective control of legal but presently uncontrolled
arrivals of alien crewmen, unscreened visa applicants, and
others.
- (2)
- More effective prevention of illegal arrivals of persons by:
- (a)
- Encouraging enactment of uniform State legislation to
reduce falsification of U.S. birth certificates.
- (b)
- Enforcement of penalties for illegal discharge of
alien seamen in U.S. ports.
- (c)
- Search and surveillance of vessels in U.S. ports to
prevent landing of stowaways and excluded
crewmen.
- e.
- The present practice of the Department of State in generally
retaliating, on a reciprocal basis, against Soviet bloc
restrictions on the number of U.S. diplomatic representatives,
should be continued.
- f.
- A program for additional protective measures at selected
industrial and governmental facilities of a highly critical
nature will be developed by the Office of Defense Mobilization,
with cost estimates.
. . . . . . .
[Page 623]
Civil Defense
22. The following elements of the Civil Defense Program, modified in the
light of the Soviet nuclear threat should be emphasized during the next
two years:
- a.
- Civil defense research should be brought up to date in order
to provide proper knowledge of civil defense problems and their
solution.
- b.
- Public civil defense education and training program must be
accelerated so as to inform the public and provide trained civil
defense workers.
- c.
- Attack warning and communications systems at state and local
levels should be completed under the contributions
program.
- d.
- Plans should be developed for the emergency dispersal of the
population from congested urban areas consistent with the
improvement of an effective early warning system.
The civil defense stockpiling program should be
continued and phased with the developing nature of the Soviet
threat.
Continuity of Industry
23. Current efforts to provide for the continuity of industry should be
kept in phase with the other elements of continental defense system and
with mobilization plans as affected by the development of a Soviet
nuclear capability. In particular, the following programs for the
continuity of industry should be promptly developed:
- a.
- Review of mobilization base planning, including consideration
of:
- (1)
- Maximum industrial dispersion.
- (2)
- Production logistics.
- (3)
- Assistance for relocation or transfer of production
from overconcentrated or “sole” producers.
- (4)
- Possible stand-by facilities.
- (5)
- Provision for stockpiles of inventories of finished
products.
- (6)
- Reserve stocks of long lead time tools for
rehabilitating or rebuilding.
- b.
- A system for damage assessment and reporting.
- c.
- Provision of secure transportation control centers with
necessary operating records.
- d.
- Post-attack industrial rehabilitation.
Reduction of Urban
Vulnerability
24. Changing the metropolitan pattern of America so that it presents
fewer concentrated targets for attack may be essential in the age of
inter-continental ballistic missiles. Industrial leadership and actions
by State and local governments to this end will be possible
[Page 624]
if energetic Federal
leadership and the use of strong governmental incentives are
employed.
[Here follows an 11-page Financial Appendix, not printed.]
