Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

611.40/8–24

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Merchant) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

Washington, August 24, 1953.

• Subject:
• European Attitudes Toward the United States

Discussion

Complete replies have now been received from our European mission chiefs in response to circular telegram 53 of July 23,² requesting their analysis of current European attitudes about the United States. While the replies vary considerably, most of them indicate growing resentment in Europe toward American policies and actions, and declining American popularity and prestige. The major causes of this unfavorable trend, as cited, are: (1) “McCarthyism”; (2) fear that United States policies toward the Communist world will be too inflexible to take advantage of opportunities for a relaxation of tension; (3) uncertainty about the efficacy and consistency of American policies and prospects of public and Congressional support for the Administration’s program; (4) suspicion that America’s interest in Europe is lessening; (5) resentment of pressures and criticisms from the United States; (6) fear that American economic policies (foreign aid, US tariffs and restrictions, East-West trade) will frustrate Europe’s search for economic health. The Mission Chiefs have also submitted a number of recommendations for dealing with these problems.

Of the sizable volume of material contained in the reports, I believe certain portions are worthy of your special attention. Among these I would include:

a. Ambassador Dillon’s covering summary of the report on France (Paris despatch 469); Tab A³

b. Ambassador Aldrich’s report (London’s despatch 699); Tab B⁴

c. Part 2 and Part 5 of Ambassador Hughes’ report on NATO relationships (Polto A–84, pages 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 10); Tab C pp. 3–5; Tab D pp. 8–10⁵

d. The last section (pages 5 and 6 of Copenhagen’s despatch 120); Tab E⁶

e. The conclusion of Ambassador Luce’s report (Rome’s despatch 357); Tab F⁷ Also attached for possible reading is an Analytical Summary of the replies; Tab G

Recommendation

That you attempt to find time to read personally the materials (Tabs A–F) described above, and that you consider bringing these materials to the attention of the President.

[Tab G]

Draft Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of European Affairs

top secret

[Washington, undated.]

• Subject:
• European attitudes toward the United States

The purpose of this paper is to present an analytical summary of the responses of United States Mission Chiefs in Europe to Circular telegram 53 of July 23, which requested their appraisal of current European public and governmental attitudes toward the United States.

General Situation

At the present time there are certain serious divergences between American and European attitudes. During the last year, the trend of European attitudes has been distinctly unfavorable to the United States interests and objectives.

This trend varies considerably among different countries, and there are several countries in which no perceptible change in governmental and public attitudes has been found. Taking Europe as a whole, however, there is evidence of declining confidence in United States leadership, growing resentment against American policies and actions and a decrease in American popularity and prestige.

There is no evidence that the immediate situation is desperate or that the present trend of European attitudes is irreversible. The basic amity existing between the United States and Europe is deeply rooted in numerous common interests. By broad historical standards, United States prestige remains near its peak. There is a vast reservoir of good will and admiration for the United States among the majority of the population of free Europe. The personal popularity of President Eisenhower, in particular, is very high. While there is some suspicion of United States motives in certain quarters, most Europeans do not seem to mistrust our basic intentions and motivations. Rather, they seem primarily concerned about the ability of American statesmen, operating within the political, constitutional and psychological complex of American society, to translate their motives into concrete and realistic policies and programs which will serve the mutual interests of Europe and the United States.

The sources of European doubts, fears and antagonisms relating to the United States are varied. Some are natural and inevitable products of different cultural systems and different national interests. For example, the European stereotype of United States political immaturity, Europe’s desire for maximum independence of action, and the latent European jealousy of United States wealth and power are fundamental psychological conditions which have long existed. Other negative attitudes, however, seem directly related to recent events.

Significant Attitudes Unfavorable to the United States

Current European sentiments toward the United States are compounded of a hodge-podge of intermingled attitudes and interests, often irrational and sometimes contradictory. It appears that no generalizations about these attitudes would be fully applicable to all the countries included in the present survey. In certain countries, views about the United States are conditioned by local issues and circumstances, such as the Trieste question in Italy, French sensitivity concerning America’s anticolonialism doctrine as it relates to North Africa, and the bitterness of German Social Democrats over what they consider America’s active assistance to Adenauer’s election campaign. However, the responses of our Chiefs of Mission indicate that there are certain general attitudes which cross national lines, some of them prevailing throughout free Europe. The most significant of these are as follows:

1. Virtually all segments of European society share a pervading fear that American policies and actions will eventually result in an all-out war with the Soviet bloc, or in an indefinite prolongation of the “cold war”.

Most Europeans are fully convinced that a war between the East and the West would be synonymous with the destruction of Europe, regardless of the eventual victor of such a war. Therefore, they are extremely sensitive to any action or development which, in their opinion, increases the risks of war or obstructs the relaxation of international tensions. It is difficult to exaggerate the profound yearning of the Europeans for a reduction of international tension. There is considerable doubt in European minds that the United States Government will be able, in light of American public attitudes, to seize and exploit promising opportunities for improving relations between the East and the West.

Few Europeans believe that the United States wants war or that we would willingly prolong East-West tension. However, after many years of war and crisis, Europeans are inclined to wishful thinking about the Soviet threat and are responding, in part unconsciously, to the Soviet “peace offensive”. Concurrent with this reaction to Soviet gestures, the fear is growing that United States policies will not be sufficiently flexible to put Soviet peace moves to a fair test. While President Eisenhower’s April 16 speech was favorably received throughout Europe, Europeans have interpreted other American statements and actions, including our continued emphasis on the undiminished Soviet threat, as evidence of strong reluctance to alter present policies.

Many Europeans are especially fearful that the policy of “rolling back the iron curtain” involves a substantially increased risk for European security. Since it is widely believed that the liberation of Soviet-dominated areas can be accomplished only by military victory over Russia, Europeans fear that a United States commitment to the policy of liberation means eventual war.

While some of the earlier fears aroused by the “containment vs. liberation” argument have now been allayed, many Europeans remain fearful that United States policies toward China and Eastern Europe will indefinitely prevent the United States from finding a basis for a negotiated settlement of differences with the Soviet Union. The hesitancy of the United States Government to endorse Prime Minister Churchill’s original proposals for four-power talks, and the criticism with which United States officialdom has greeted successive moves of the Soviet “peace offensive”, have gravely disturbed the large body of Europeans who are anxious that no stone be left unturned in the search for peace.

2. Europeans have always been inclined to regard the American people as politically immature and, in particular, to believe that we take a naive and unrealistic approach to the problem of Communism. At present, there is a strong feeling that the United States is suffering from an acute attack of anti-Communist hysteria. This feeling is found even among political sophisticates. Many less enlightened citizens, with memories of Hitler still undimmed, fear that the violent United States reaction to the Communist menace is pushing the United States down the road to fascism.

Several of our Mission Chiefs report that the domestic political phenomenon known as “McCarthyism” has done more to weaken American prestige and tarnish American leadership than any other single development. In this sense, “McCarthyism” not only applies to the activities of Senator McCarthy himself, but to all other indications that the United States Government and its people are intolerant of non-conformity and are motivated by fierce and irresponsible hatred of Communism. It is reported that the controversy over United States libraries abroad has made the American Government appear ridiculous and childish in foreign eyes, and that “star chamber” congressional investigations have raised grave questions about the internal political health of the nation to which other free peoples have looked for leadership. In brief, “McCarthyism” has become synonymous with neo-fascism in European minds, and is regarded by some European leaders as Communism’s greatest present asset in Europe.

It is evident that the political influence of Senator McCarthy himself has been distorted and exaggerated, and that “McCarthyism” has provided an extremely effective propaganda theme for the Communists and crypto-Communists. The effects of “McCarthyism” are particularly serious among European Socialists and other non-Communist leftists who fear that American thinking tends to “lump together” Communism, Socialism and all other unorthodox philosophies. In conjunction with obvious and energetic Soviet efforts to revive a “popular front” spirit among European leftists, it is possible that “McCarthyism” will alienate a vital segment of European public opinion and thereby diminish the prospects of maintaining middle-of-the-road coalition governments sympathetic to American objectives and interests.

3. It was to be expected that the advent of a new Administration would produce many uncertainties in European minds as to the future course of United States policy. On the whole, it appears that these uncertainties are not so great today as they were six months ago. However, lacking a full understanding of the inner workings of the American political system, many Europeans have been disturbed about reported conflicts between the Executive Branch and the Congress, and some are disappointed at what they regard as “weakness” in the Administration’s leadership.

It is difficult for Europeans to understand how basic American policies can be attacked in public speeches by congressional leaders of the President’s party. This lack of understanding produces doubts as to the Administration’s ability to obtain acceptance and support of its policies. While it appears that most Europeans have great respect for the President’s motives and opinions and welcome any direct assertion of presidential leadership, many feel that the President’s leadership has not yet been sufficiently manifest.

This viewpoint bears a direct relation to the European attitude toward “McCarthyism”. While governmental leaders and other well-educated persons make a clear distinction between “McCarthy-ism” and the position of the United States Government, even these individuals frequently ask why the President does not denounce the Senator publicly.

4. Europeans are disturbed by what they regard as inconsistency and lack of realism in certain major United States policies.

European governmental leaders find it difficult to reconcile the judgment of United States military leaders that minimum NATO military requirements are much greater than the forces now available with the decision of the United States Government to reduce its national defense and mutual security appropriations.

While most Europeans seem to agree in principle, or at least pay lip service to the principle, that strategic trade with the Soviet bloc should be controlled, they feel that the United States has gone too far in trying to stop trade in non-strategic goods. Congressional investigations concerning trade with China aroused considerable European criticism. Europeans believe that the United States is highly inconsistent and unrealistic in pressing for reduced trade with the Soviet bloc while taking no effective measures to open United States markets to European products.

Most of the people and statesmen of Europe disagree fundamentally with America’s Far Eastern policies and consider our attitude toward Communist China wholly unrealistic. Few Europeans favor support of Chiang Kai-shek. Many are convinced that there can be no realistic basis for a successful negotiation of differences in the Far East until the United States modifies its policies toward Communist China.

With regard to the USSR, Europeans are inclined to believe that the United States over-emphasized the military aspect of the struggle against Communism at the expense of the political and economic aspects. There is a widely-held conviction in Europe that direct Soviet aggression in Europe is unlikely and that the “cold war” will eventually be decided on political and economic grounds. In countries where the internal power of Communism is strong, such as Italy, the provision of large sums of United States aid in the form of military assistance, accompanied by insignificant grants of economic aid, is sometimes interpreted as a “cart-before-the-horse” approach to the over-all problem of European security.

Europeans also see an apparent inconsistency between Secretary Dulles’ call for a “long term approach” to NATO defense planning and the recent demands of prominent Congressional leaders that all United States aid be terminated in 1954.

5. Second only to their deep dread of war is the persistent concern of Europeans about the stability and health of their economies. To a far greater extent than the United States, Europe’s economic health is dependent upon international developments. At the present time, it is evident that the burdens of rearmament, the chronic dollar shortage, inflation, high taxes, a levelling-off of production, and a stagnation of living standards at the 1950 level, have all combined to revive among many Europeans a sense of hopelessness bordering on the despair which they felt in the early post-war period.

While Europeans regard the NATO armament program as a major source of economic strain, there is no evidence that they attribute their economic ills directly to the United States. However, a large number of Europeans are convinced that European economic health can be attained only through the leadership and active cooperation of the United States. For this reason, they are deeply concerned about the state of the American economy and about America’s foreign economic policies.

It seems axiomatic to Europeans that they cannot simultaneously maintain strong military defenses, accept decreasing amounts of United States aid, limit trade with the Soviet bloc, and depend upon existing commercial relations with the United States. In certain countries, United States economic assistance is considered to be the only possible solution to their continuing economic problems. The Greeks and Turks, for example, feel that they cannot possibly maintain the present level of military strength without substantial United States aid, regardless of other economic developments. The French are equally convinced that they cannot continue the war in Indo-China without increased aid.

Other countries believe that substantially increased access to American markets would compensate for the loss of United States aid, and have enthusiastically welcomed the slogan of “Trade not Aid”. However, many of these people are disappointed in the failure of the United States Government thus far to take concrete measures to permit greater exports to the United States. Since cuts in aid have preceded significant revisions of American trade policies, Europeans fear that the United States may be adopting a “no-trade, no-aid” policy which would make their economic position impossible.

There is much evidence that the Europeans find continued United States economic aid psychologically galling. In fact, it is probable that the aid program has contributed substantially to European resentments against the United States. Direct military assistance is less disturbing, since Europeans regard deliveries of military end-items as a reasonable and natural American contribution to a common program. In any event, despite the unpleasant features of American aid, most Europeans are convinced that such aid is necessary unless and until there is a sweeping liberalization of United States trade policies, and Europeans are rather gloomy about the prospects that these policies will be liberalized sufficiently to compensate for announced cuts in aid.

6. The Europeans are keenly sensitive to any and all indications that American interest in Europe may be lessening. It is feared that increased American interest in Asiatic problems may not be in addition to, but rather at the expense of, continued interest in Europe.

Cuts in United States assistance to Europe, in addition to direct economic effects, have indirectly disturbed Europeans as an indication that United States interest in Europe is waning.

To those Europeans who have traditionally associated the Republican Party with isolationism, every indication of a slackening United States interest in Europe is a cause for alarm. Some Europeans are inclined to distort the significance of relatively minor events, such as official appointments. There is a persistent fear that the United States will eventually “withdraw” from Europe, and this fear has a considerable negative influence on European attitudes toward internal European problems such as the EDC.

7. Paradoxically, many of the same people who fear a decrease in American interest in Europe also fear United States “domination” of Europe. There is considerable resentment of incessant United States pressures on such matters as rearmament, bases, unification, East-West trade, etc. While recognizing their dependence on the United States and demanding “stronger United States leadership”, Europeans simultaneously desire to retain maximum political, cultural and economic independence and resent slights to their sovereignty or actions which they interpret as interference in their internal affairs. Communist propaganda that the United States seeks to reduce the European nations to the status of satellites often falls on fertile ground.

8. Europeans are disturbed by what they interpret as tendencies toward unilateralism on the part of the United States Government. Many Europeans feel that the United States does not regard NATO as a true partnership of equals and will not accept a genuine partnership relation—that we wish to devise the rules of the game but will not play by them. United States pressures on other governments to accept elaborate questionnaires for the NATO Annual Review, accompanied by United States delay in answering such questionnaires, has been cited as an example of this tendency. Moreover, it is clear that the United States is held chiefly responsible for NATO’s failure to develop greater cooperation in non-military activities under Article II of the North Atlantic Treaty.

NATO governmental leaders make frequent reference to the importance of full consultation on important policy matters among the NATO governments. It is evident that several of these government leaders believe the United States has failed to consult its partners on matters of vital concern before establishing its own firm and irreversible position on such matters. Any United States action in the international sphere which is taken without consultation with, or without full regard for, allied interests, is likely to be interpreted not only as an injury to allied sovereignty but also as a tendency on the part of the United States to “go it alone”.

9. A number of Europeans are disturbed by the heavy volume of criticism of European countries emanating from members of the Congress and from the American press. Repeated statements that the Europeans “won’t fight”, that they are “soft” on Communism, that they are loafing on the job, that they won’t pay their taxes, etc., have created bitter resentment in Europe. While these criticisms apparently are not directly associated with the Administration, Europeans have gained the impression that the American people are not getting the real facts and are consequently dissatisfied and disgusted with Europe.

Recommendations by Mission Chiefs

In commenting on the major factors which should be borne in mind in determining future United States lines of action, there was considerable difference of emphasis among the Mission Chiefs. Most of the recommendations submitted are of a general nature, and some clearly relate to matters not fully within the control of the United States Government. The most significant recommendations are as follows:

1. The United States Government should seek constantly to convince the European countries of our sincere desire to find peaceful settlements of East-West conflicts, and of the essential flexibility of our policies toward the USSR and Eastern Europe.

2. The United States Government should encourage a standard of domestic political behavior which will enable us to stand as an example of democratic comportment to be respected and imitated by other countries. Specifically, it is suggested that the Administration take steps to disassociate itself clearly from “McCarthyism” and to demonstrate that this philosophy is not typical of American thinking. As one Ambassador states the proposition: “Nothing could be more effective in strengthening the foundation of Atlantic unity and restoring moral and spiritual leadership of the United States than decisive action by the Administration against extremist methods employed by some committees and individuals in Congress in its internal campaign against Communists”.

3. United States statesmen, both in the Executive Branch and in the Congress, should seek to present a united front on foreign policy matters and should emphasize the President’s firm leadership of his party, the Government, and the nation as a whole. It is believed that the great personal popularity of the President should be more profitably exploited than in the past.

4. In all official pronouncements and actions, the United States should demonstrate sympathy and understanding for the traditions, interests and problems of the free nations of Europe, and should stress its determination to maintain a genuine partnership relation with its allies. In particular, the United States should engage in more frequent policy consultations with the Western European nations, both bilaterally and multilaterally, and should give greater weight to the viewpoints of these nations in such matters as military planning and economic policy. The smaller nations of Europe are especially anxious to be “in” on important political and military decisions.

5. The United States should seek to reconcile and explain apparent conflicts in its policies. In particular, our stated military objectives in the European area should be brought into a rational relation with our actual defense efforts.

6. To the maximum extent possible, the United States should cooperate with its allies in long-term military and economic planning so as to assure them of the essential stability of our policies and to give them a more satisfactory basis for their own internal planning.

7. The United States should minimize “pressure tactics” in its dealings with Europe and, where pressures are necessary, attempt to avoid applying these pressures overtly. The United States should also avoid the appearance of lecturing or “preaching” to allied nations either in official United States pronouncements or through United States propaganda media.

8. The United States should clearly indicate its continued interest in Europe, its intention to continue making a fair contribution to the common defense system for an indefinite period, and its desire for a broader and more permanent “community” relationship with the free European nations. It is especially important that the United States demonstrate that it is prepared to participate in, rather than merely to urge, common efforts to deal with economic and political problems of mutual concern.

9. The United States Government should move urgently to liberalize European exports to this country, and provide assurances that liberalized trade policies will be maintained over an extended period of time.

10. The United States should attempt to develop more “realistic” policies with regard to East-West trade, avoiding efforts to limit trade in non-strategic items.

11. The United States should make technical revisions in its immigration laws to remove special sources of irritation, and consider substantive revisions for the purpose of promoting expanded immigration into the United States.

12. The United States should indicate its willingness to consider a continuation of direct economic aid to countries which have special problems not presently capable of solution on any other basis.

Conclusions and observations

Analysis of the thirteen reports received from our Chiefs of Mission produces certain general conclusions and observations about the state of European attitudes. Some of these are implicit in the reports themselves; others follow logically from the phenomena reported.

1. The present state of European attitudes is not acutely dangerous to United States objectives but may become so if the trend continues. There is no immediate threat to the basic integrity of NATO. However, it is clear that unfavorable attitudes towards the United States can be expected to limit the degree of cooperation which can be obtained from our allies.

2. In one sense, increasing European criticism of the United States denotes an improvement in the psychological health of the European people. Little criticism of the United States was voiced in the period of early post-war despair and defeatism. As European self-confidence and a sense of self-sufficiency grow, it is natural that its statesmen and its people will be more willing to “speak up”. This development need not be destructive of allied unity. Rather, it may prove to be the best possible basis for long-term cooperation.

3. It is evident that the recent growth and intensification of attitudes unfavorable to the United States are, in large part, inevitable products of the change of Administration in this country. Many Europeans had “pre-judged” the Republican Administration, and some of them undertook the new relationship with “a chip on the shoulder” attitude, or at least with a very gloomy prognostication of the future course of American policy. As a result, some Europeans have been too quick to notice events unfavorable to their views or interests, to magnify these events out of proportion, and to interpret them as confirmation of their original pessimistic expectations. There is good reason to believe that this tendency toward super-pessimism will gradually disappear with the passage of time. However, this attitude must be recognized as an existing psychological fact and cannot be dismissed lightly. There can be little doubt that Europeans are currently more sensitive to. injuries and insults, real or fancied, than was true one year ago, and this consideration should enter into our policy calculations.

4. More than one of our Mission Chiefs observed that world leadership is not, by nature, a popular role. Since we are not engaged in a “popularity contest”, European attitudes toward the United States are significant primarily to the extent that they affect the ability and willingness of European governments to cooperate with us in pursuing our policy objectives. It is in this connection that the decline in United States popularity and prestige may prove most damaging. It is already apparent that an overtly “pro-US” position is no longer politically profitable in many parts of Europe. To put it bluntly, many politicians can “get more votes” by opposing policies identified with the United States than by supporting such policies. If resentment and suspicion of the United States produces this kind of reaction among an increasing percentage of the electorate, it is probable that we will face the most formidable obstacles in securing ratification of EDC, building a more adequate NATO defense system, limiting trade beneficial to the Soviet bloc, and achieving other important objectives.

5. Perhaps the gravest danger now apparent is that growing anti-American sentiment may tempt the non-Communist left in Europe, principally the European Socialists, to depart from their postwar policy of cooperation against Communism and move toward a neutralist position. Since the European Socialists, by virtue of their basic philosophy, have had little ideological sympathy for the Republican Party in this country, and since they have never been wholly convinced that the American approach to the Communist menace is the correct one, unfavorable attitudes toward the United States may be intensified among the Socialists. Moreover, among segments of the electorate to which the Socialists traditionally appeal, they may gain a distinct political advantage by taking a position in support of “conciliation of Russia” and in opposition to “excessive US influence”. Since the Socialist parties in several European countries are extremely powerful, it is not an exaggeration to say that we cannot hope, in the long run, to win the cold war in Europe without their active cooperation. The European Socialists have never seen eye-to-eye with us on certain issues, but they have cooperated on basic essentials and have thus far been able to avoid the siren call of popular frontism and neutralism. With the Soviet Union now making obvious and intensive efforts to consolidate leftist sentiment against the United States, the danger that the non-Communist left may succumb to an anti-American virus is very grave.

1. Drafted by William T. Nunley, Public Affairs Adviser in the Office of European Regional Affairs.
2. Ante, p. 1465.
3. Despatch 469 from Paris, dated Aug. 4, 1953, is printed in volume vi.
4. Despatch 699 from London, dated Aug. 12, 1953, is printed ibid.
5. Not found.
6. Despatch 120 from Copenhagen, dated July 28, 1953, is printed in volume vi.
7. Despatch 357 from Rome, dated Aug. 7, 1953, is printed ibid.