Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political Matters, Volume I, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 157th Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, July 30, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

July 30, 1953

The following were present at the 157th meeting of the National Security Council: The President of the United States, presiding (except for the first part of Item 1, which was presided over by the Vice President); the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General; the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Assistant Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 5); the Federal Civil Defense Administrator (for Item 5); Robert R. Bowie, Department of State (for Item 5); Walter S. DeLany, Office of the Director for Mutual Security (for Item 1); Kenneth R. Hansen, Economic Defense Advisory Committee (for Item 1); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; C. D. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Col. Paul T. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the chief points taken.

[Here follow agenda items 1–3: “Economic Defense,” “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security,” and “Report by the President’s Committee on International Information Activities, Dated June 30, 1953.”]

4. Reported Decline in U.S. Prestige Abroad

Mr. Cutler read a memorandum which reported on the remarks made by the Vice President during the Solarium presentation,² to the effect that U.S. prestige in the world was lower now than ever before. The Vice President had expressed concern that U.S. prestige should be so low despite the large amounts of assistance now being furnished other nations, and suggested that the causes of this situation should be inquired into and a report made to the Council with recommendations. Mr. Cutler accordingly suggested that the Psychological Strategy Board be directed to undertake a study of the problem and submit a report to the Council.

Secretary Dulles said the Department of State had recently sent a circular telegram to all missions abroad, asking for a report on this very question.³ He suggested these reports should be used in consideration of the subject.

The Vice President said an increasing number of people had returned from aboard and emphasized the decline in U.S. prestige.⁴ The implication was that this Administration was responsible for the situation. The Vice President realized that McCarthyism was an issue abroad, but doubted that this alone was responsible for our low prestige. He added that in some areas, however—for example, the Near East—we had gained prestige.

Mr. C. D. Jackson said the PSB would be delighted to undertake a study of this problem. If the Council wished a preview of the study, he would predict that it would show that U.S. prestige abroad is very low now and that the Number One reason for this situation is McCarthyism.

Secretary Dulles felt the reason was more fundamental. In his view, the Democratic Administration had been telling other countries for twenty years that the Republicans were isolationists. Since January 20th a few developments of minor importance had tended to confirm this Democratic propaganda in the minds of people abroad. He felt, however, that when foreign countries come to appreciate fully the policies of this Administration, they will realize these policies are sounder than the old policies. He believed Western Europe was the area of low U.S. prestige.

The President said Americans go to Europe, which is expert in telling us what we do wrong, and then come back as experts on European opinion.

Mr. Stassen said that Communist tactics entered into the problem. He felt it was a deliberate Communist policy to tell every American who went to Europe that American prestige was very low there.

The National Security Council:

Directed the Psychological Strategy Board to prepare for Council consideration before mid-September a study of the reported decline in U.S. prestige abroad, with particular reference to the following questions:

a. When did the decline in prestige commence?

b. What were major causes which contributed to the decline, and their relative importance?

c. When did our prestige reach its lowest ebb?

d. Has our prestige in the world undergone any significant change in the last six months?

e. What action should the U.S. take to improve the existing situation?

Note: The above action subsequently referred to the Psychological Strategy Board for implementation.

[Here follow agenda items 5–7: “Project Solarium,” “Armaments and American Policy,” and “United States Policy on Soviet and Satellite Defectors.”]

1. Drafted on July 31 by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator of the NSC Board of Assistants.
2. For documentation on Project Solarium, the review of national security policy undertaken during the summer of 1953, see volume ii.
3. Circular telegram 53, supra.
4. In an oral history interview in 1973, Dean Francis Wilcox, former chief of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Assistant Secretary of State was asked about the Foreign Relations Committee’s main concerns during the early Eisenhower period. He replied: “Certainly one of the great preoccupations on Capitol Hill was the McCarthy problem. This had its impact of course both at home and abroad in the field of foreign policy. It had its impact in the Department of State, in the United Nations, and as I recall Senator Smith of New Jersey and I took a trip to Asia at the request of Secretary Dulles, in order to report to him on the situation in Asia as we found it, and I must say that everywhere we went we had strong representations made to us about the McCarthy situation. When was somebody going to do something about it? Why did we let him go as he did, to do the things he did, to spread terror and confusion in this country and abroad? Our allies simply couldn’t understand why a man like McCarthy was allowed to exercise the influence that he apparently was exercising. When we came back from Asia, Senator Smith and I went to see the President and expressed our great concern at what was happening here, and the President nodded his head. He said yes, he knew, he had reports from abroad and these reports verified what we were saying to him, that our allies were very much concerned about McCarthyism and hoped that someone would do something relatively soon. But he said, ‘Gentlemen, I refuse to get down in the gutter and fight with Senator McCarthy. I think that this is something that the Senate should and must do, and I think that it would only be degrading to the office of the President of the United States for me to engage in combat with a person like Senator McCarthy’” (Columbia Program in Oral History, Interview with Dean Francis Wilcox, 1973).