Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Guatemala

219. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida ¹

Washington, June 22, 1954, 0004Z.

05853. Refs: A. LINC 4131; B. SGUATRES 001; C. DIR 05712; D. LINC 4143; E. SHERWOOD 315.²

1. We sympathetic your desire ref A para 3A for authority on broad rather than piecemeal basis within limits approved policy but broad authority must rest on clear agreed strategic concept.

2. We agree as argued ref A para 2A and ref B para 8 that it is necessary demonstrate reality of airpower controlled by Calligeris but capabilities wholly inadequate actually to defeat WSBURNT army all over the country. Accordingly purpose must be to demonstrate power in manner best calculated to impress army and impair its morale. Since impossible inflict crippling damage, little point trying cause large number casualties which might only foreclose defection. With this purpose in mind we do not agree with ref A para 3A that “a strictly military type situation has materialized.”

3. In accordance foregoing strategic concept we have now authorized following air-ground action:

A. Flak suppression in Adam (ref C para 1A) and wherever required for defense of aircraft operating in support of ground forces.

B. Strafing of oil tanks in Adam.

C. (In response to ref D) fullest air support of attack on Hank including bombing.

4. Assume operation against Hank given highest priority today. Believe successful outcome here could be decisive importance and convinced news of effective air-ground action will quickly become known [name not declassified] and other WSBURNT military leaders in Adam and will serve as demonstration to them of power and determination.

5. With bulk of WSBURNT forces apparently moved out of capital we inclined to believe most effective targets from standpoint morale of army will also be away from Adam. Moreover UN cease–fire resolution, proposal for OAS or UN peace observation commission, and presence of press and diplomatic corps all lead us to conclude heavy political price would be paid for any bombing of Adam. According unwilling authorize at present despite ref E.

6. In order enable us give you broad enough authorization to permit forward planning and avoid delays request you supply list of possible targets (which need not be in great detail) with indication types of air-ground action contemplated, within strategic concept para 2 above. We will endeavor give you maximum authority.

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 9, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
2. References A and C are printed as Documents 216 and 215, respectively. References B and D have not been found. Reference E is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 12, Folder 4.