216. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency1

4131. 1. Feel may be useful to provide our general views:

A.
Conflict still in two parts, first, strict military Calligeris phase, second, hope of army defection prompted by high level take over from regime.
B.
First phase as yet wholly untested. Regime has chosen to permit initial movement unopposed. Small towns therefore have been taken without shot. Some volunteers have joined Calligeris but he has also suffered some defections so his forces are pitifully small.
C.
Regime planning soon to start active opposition with Hank probably representing a significant moment in this phase. Calligeris victory which can only occur with authorized air action plus poor opposition or failure to defend prove great incentive both to Calligeris forces and for defection and internal resistance support. Chances of success are however slight considering small attacking forces plus prepared defenses.
D.
Meanwhile no evidence of army take over in capital has appeared though there is still circumstantial evidence that army is split and not solidly behind regime.
E.
Assuming either victory or defeat at Hank without substantial army defection or take over we will be faced with the necessity of providing Calligeris with all possible support.

2. In light above we believe:

A.
Must be in position give all possible support military action not only to aid its success but to prove to army that a foe of some power is involved. This includes the authority to give such air support as the military requirements demand.
B.
Make air strikes against important targets such as POL storage at Adam and Bond as well as such possibilities as rail bridges, ammo dumps, etc. These have dual purpose of weakening opposition as well as possibly providing the proof allegedly required by [name not declassified] and army.

3. To extent that WSBURNT territory is taken by Calligeris possibility of controlling air strips increases and landing arms or taking off [Page 363]for missions though something of a formality due lack fuel, matériel, etc, can occur.

A. Conclusion. A strictly military type situation has materialized and it must be treated as such or complete defeat accepted. We urge former and request authority on a broad rather than piecemeal basis to take actions set forth in paras 2 A and B above as situation requires. Such authority may not achieve success but lack of same in our opinion will probably mean total defeat in about 48 hours. This conclusion has been forced on us by refusal to date of army to act against regime.

5. Above request not based on feeling that LINC views differ from those of Hqs but on inevitable time lags resulting from communications. Reversals once they begin will only be prevented if at all by quickest possible counter action.

  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 6, Folder 3. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.