167. Draft Memorandum1


  • Present status and possible future course of PBSUCCESS
Mr. [name not declassified] has reported his very tentative view—which is his own estimate of the situation and which lacks the benefit of a report from [name not declassified] (who will return to LINCOLN Monday night),2 that in case the originally conceived, carefully-timed paramilitary action should prove difficult of fulfillment, an alternative approach might will be considered. Nothing but tentative conclusions are possible with careful review of all available facts resulting from the SEMANTIC action and from [name not declassified] are studied.
The main premise for any plan from now on should be the build-up of pressures both internal and external on WSBURNT both because the internal situation is such that anti-government action should result in continued tension and uncertainty and because there should be fairly quick counter action to avoid any inference that the SEMANTIC episode has caused any problem.
The basic concept for any successful result is that the WSBURNT army must move against the regime—consequently the major issue is what action is necessary to persuade the appropriate officers to move. It is felt that a carefully integrated large scale action, as originally planned, would clearly produce the result. Due, however, to unforeseen problems in material movement, uncertainties as to the leadership of Calligeris and possible internal losses via the SEMANTIC episode, the capacity for achieving the integrated plan may have to be unduly delayed or actually substantially changed. Therefore, a different stimulus to produce Army reaction should be planned at least as a contingency alternative.
The most promising alternative would seem to be the despatching of organizers and RRUS as soon as the effects of the SEMANTIC episode establish the proper method for doing it. Concurrently leaflet drops, specific sabotage and possibly political assassination should be carefully worked out and effected. Moreover, material should be moved into WSBURNT and cached in all ways possible. The hope would be that this approach might persuade the [Page 304]WSBURNT Army to take anti-Arbenz action on its own. If not, the results of the organizers’ efforts, accentuated by the affirmative steps just mentioned, could be assessed. If resistance potential develops, material could be distributed either from internal caches, if developed, or dropped by night flights and action comparable to the original plan undertaken. If early action proves unwise, then a classical longer range resistance build-up can be adopted with a view to action at the first propitious movement.
It is obvious that this alternative in the first instance would mean a different use of existing assets than presently contemplated. On the other hand, the possibility of successful pressure on the Army for independent action, and the alternative of longer range build-up of earlier solutions do not occur.
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. Secret.
  2. June 7.