795.00/9–751
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (Perkins) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Merchant)1
Subject: JCS Comments on Department Position Paper Re UN Controls
The JCS recommends a change in the language of the heading of subparagraph (a) under United States Position, to include the situation during an armistice, with the effect of treating both a cease-fire and an armistice situation in the same manner. The JCS argues that an armistice also creates no more than an interim situation and that any re-examination of economic controls which might lead to relaxation would be premature and could grant the enemy an unwarranted military advantage. On this general point, CA has no comments except to note that EUR argued this question vigorously and was upheld by Mr. Matthews in distinguishing a cease-fire situation and an armistice situation in the Department’s position paper.
As a substitute for the language of subparagraph (a) relating to armistice, the JCS proposes language which would favor the continued application of the General Assembly Resolution of May 18 unless there is agreement on a political settlement in Korea. CA has no quarrel with this approach.
A separate position paper regarding Formosa has been prepared2 and injection of the Formosa question in this form in a paper which deals with UN controls seems illogical and unnecessary. Furthermore, while the proposed sentence merely affirms U.S. freedom to undertake certain measures, these measures are themselves contrary to existing U.S. policy and reference to them at this time and in such ill-defined terms is likely to arouse British and French apprehension and might well lead to requests that we reverse what the JCS refer to in paragraph 4 as the “tacit approval principle”. We may, of course, under changed conditions find it desirable to undertake the measure mentioned by the JCS, but to raise the matter now with the British and French before we have, ourselves, decided that they are desirable and before we can cite the justifying circumstances would seem unnecessary and disadvantageous.
CA believes that it would be unwise to introduce the question of naval blockade in the categorical form proposed by the JCS into discussions with the British and French at this time. CA would [Page 2014] favor, alternatively, rewording of subparagraph (c) along the following lines, which might meet partially the JCS desire:
“In the event of a breakdown of the Kaesong negotiations, the United States would consider action envisaged in the UNGA resolution of May 18 inadequate and would seek both in the UN and outside to develop to the maximum practicable extent economic and political pressures against Communist China and North Korea.
“Such measures might include, if circumstances warranted, support and assistance of a maximum number of the nations participating in the Korean campaign in the imposition of a naval blockade of Communist China.”3
- Sent also to Mr. John K. Emmerson.↩
- Reference is to document WFM T–15, August 20, not printed.↩
- No further draft of document WFM T–10/2a, August 27, was prepared, but see document WFM T–10/1a, September 8, p. 889. See also the minutes of the meeting of September 11 between Mr. Acheson and Mr. Morrison, p. 893.↩