Office of the Historian

795.00/9–751

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Marshall)1

secret
Washington, 31 August 1951.

Subject: Washington Foreign Ministers Meetings (Tripartite and British Talks), Draft Position Paper (WFM T–10/2a), dated 27 August 1951, Entitled “China and North Korea”

1.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have formulated, from the military point of view, the following statement of views on the Department of State draft position paper, subject as above.
2.
In subparagraph (a) of the statement of United States Position an effort has been made to distinguish between a cease-fire arrangement and a prolonged armistice. It is indicated in that subparagraph that in the event of a prolonged armistice, the matter of economic controls on China would be re-examined. An armistice, as well as a cease-fire arrangement, creates only an interim situation. During such a situation any re-examination which might lead to relaxation of economic controls would be premature. The relaxation of the controls could grant gratuitously to the enemy an unwarranted military advantage.
3.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that whenever the matter of economic controls on China is re-examined with a view to their relaxation, questions regarding the mission of the Seventh Fleet with respect to Formosa will, in all probability, be raised by our allies. The Joint Chiefs of Staff feel that discussions regarding the mission of the Seventh Fleet should not be undertaken in advance of an agreement for a political settlement in Korea. It would also be desirable for formal discussion to await a political settlement of the status of Formosa. As the United States unilaterally determined this mission, decision on the matter must rest solely with the United States.
4.
It is understood that on 4 August 1950 the Department of State concurred in Chinese Nationalist visit, search, and seizure of defected Nationalist shipping, if such visit and search were effected either on the high seas or in the territorial waters of Nationalist-controlled areas.2 The United States has generally overlooked numerous deviations from this policy. It is not at all improbable that, after a ceasefire or armistice in Korea, the British may seek reversal of the “tacit approval” principle which the United States has adhered to. If such a [Page 2012] reversal should be imminent, it might be desirable for the Chinese Nationalist Government to declare a legal naval blockade of the coast of China, as had been recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to the aggression by the Chinese Communists in Korea. In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would reaffirm the view in their memorandum for you, dated 2 January 1951, that Formosa is geographically a portion of the Asian offshore island chain which is essential to the protection of United States strategic interests in that area.3
5.
With respect to subparagraph (c) of the statement of United States Position, it is indicated that in the event of a breakdown of the Kaesong negotiations the United States would seek more stringent UN action. In their memorandum for you dated 13 July 1951, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, among other things, recommended that in such an event the 16 nations participating in the Korean campaign be pressed to support the imposition of a naval blockade of Communist China.4
6.
In view of all of the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:
a.
Subparagraph (a) of the United States Position be amended as follows:
(1)
Change the heading of the subparagraph to read: “Situation during a cease-fire or armistice.”
(2)
Delete the last two sentences of the paragraph and substitute the following therefor:

“Similarly, the General Assembly Resolution of May 18 should be continued, and the controls by NATO and other countries should continue to be applied in the event there is an armistice but no agreement on a political settlement in Korea. Until there is a final determination of the status of Formosa (including the status of the Chinese Nationalist Government there), the United States feels itself free to provide assistance to the Chinese Nationalists in order that they may establish a legal blockade of the coast of China.”

b.
There be included in subparagraph (c) of the United States Position an added statement to the following effect:

“In addition to such United Nations action, the United States would also immediately seek to obtain the support and assistance of a maximum number of the nations participating in the Korean campaign for the imposition of a naval blockade of Communist China.”

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
  1. This memorandum was sent to Secretary Acheson by Secretary of Defense Marshall under cover of a brief letter of transmission dated September 7, not printed, in which Marshall stated that he concurred in the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (795.00/9–751).↩
  2. See telegram 119 to Taipei, August 4, 1950, Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. vi, p. 419.↩
  3. Ante, p. 1474.↩
  4. Ante, p. 667.↩