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Statement by the United States Representative on the Additional Measures Committee (Gross)
US/A/AC.52/28
Mr. Chairman: The business before us today is the report of our Subcommittee. In that report the Subcommittee unanimously recommended that when the full Additional Measures Committee took up again the examination of additional measures to repulse the aggression in Korea it should give priority to the study of economic measures. At our meeting on February 15 I suggested that the task of this Subcommittee would be to devise a program of additional measures which would give support to the forces of the United Nations and help in bringing about genuine negotiation and peaceful settlement. The numerous consultations and exchanges of view which are mentioned in the Subcommittee’s report showed that, of the whole range of possible additional measures, economic measures could be most speedily agreed to and most effectively applied.
Let me recall briefly what the United States itself has done in its economic relations with the Chinese Communists. As things now stand, we license no goods for export to Communist China, we prohibit our ships and planes from calling at its ports or carrying goods which are destined for Communist China, and we have frozen Chinese Communist assets within the United States. We believe that this is a sound policy. We believe that it is in the interest of peace and of collective security and therefore is in the interest of all peace-loving nations.
Several members of this Committee have already taken concrete steps in this field to support the United Nations effort to weaken the capacity of the Chinese Communists to continue their aggression in Korea. For example, the Philippines has imposed a complete embargo on trade with Communist China. Australia has imposed a strategic embargo. Our colleague, Sir Gladwyn Jebb, pointed out last month in San Francisco that the United Kingdom does not permit the export of arms, munitions or strategic goods to the Chinese Communist Government, whose troops are fighting against United Nations forces. I stress the fact that these are examples.
I hope that as our work goes on we shall keep in mind the potential advantages of a full embargo as an instrument which may help us achieve our purposes in Korea. Such an undertaking, of course, presents complex economic issues and administrative problems which are not to be worked out in a day or a week, as our consultations have [Page 1981] abundantly shown. The effectiveness of economic measures depends on two factors: first, what the measures are; second, how widely the measures are adopted. In the view of my government, it will be more effective if most of us agree now to a strategic embargo rather than having a smaller number of us agree to a complete embargo. The United States therefore urges a program which can be immediately and effectively applied on the widest possible scale.
The United States is strongly of the opinion that this Committee should recommend to the General Assembly the imposition by all states of an embargo on the shipment of war materials to Communist China. We have in mind a formula which would call for the embargo of shipments to Communist China of arms, ammunition and implements of war; petroleum; atomic energy materials; and items useful in the production of arms, ammunitions and implements of war. These are items which would be of immediate consequence on the Korean battlefield. To cite only one example, the denial of petroleum to the Chinese Communist armies would have a serious effect on their mobility. We believe the formula should be flexible: therefore, we suggest that this Committee recommend to the General Assembly that each state determine for itself what specific commodities it would embargo under this formula, and what controls each state would apply to make the embargo effective. We believe further that the resolution should recommend that each state would undertake not to nullify, through trans-shipment, re-export, or enlargement of its volume of trade, the effectiveness of the embargoes on commodities applied by other complying states.
In our view, such a resolution should also create machinery to keep the program under continuous review and to determine the effectiveness of these economic measures. This would suggest the establishment of a Committee—perhaps this Committee itself—to which all states complying with the resolution would report periodically on the measures they had taken. The Committee would review these reports and consider the appropriateness of the measures taken in the light of changing circumstances. By so doing it would be able to assist the General Assembly to arrive at sound recommendations aimed either at increasing the scope of the embargo or terminating it entirely if there were a cessation of hostilities and a peaceful settlement in Korea.
My government believes that this plan conforms to the common interest and would further the successful functions of the United Nations collective security system. My government believes it is now time to record the actions some United Nations members have already taken, to widen through cooperation the scope of such measures, and [Page 1982] in this way to support the activities of the United Nations forces in Korea.
I do not believe that any member who supports the United Nations action in Korea will object to recording the determination that no United Nations soldier fighting there should be the target of a bullet manufactured in the free world. The program I have outlined does not involve the problem of sanctions as it arose in League of Nations experience. There the economic measure was an end in itself. Here the situation is entirely different. The United Nations is already using armed force. What my government now proposes is a supplementary measure to ease the pressures being brought to bear upon United Nations forces in the field. The program I have outlined is designed not only to limit the fighting to Korea but to help bring it to a conclusion there.
Beyond this, we believe that to proclaim our collective agreement on such measures will impress upon the Chinese Communist regime and their supporters the unity of our purpose and our determination to repel the aggression. We should not under-estimate the effect such a demonstration of strength and solidarity would have on the forces of aggression.
The United Nations has dual functions. It is a system for collective action to repulse aggression, and it is an organization for the peaceful adjustment of disputes. One function does not exclude the other; the two run side by side. Where they converge—where effective resistance to aggression opens the way to peaceful adjustment—true collective security may be found. It is from this viewpoint that my government views the function of this Committee and of the Good Offices Committee. The Good Offices Committee has unfortunately been unable to report satisfactory progress in its efforts up to date. But we must not lose hope, nor withdraw our support of its efforts, nor put it in the position of having failed or of being no longer available. Action now upon the program we propose does not signal failure of the efforts of the Good Offices Committee or of the President of the General Assembly to find the basis for a peaceful solution.
In the view of the United States, it is only firmness and decision, unity and strength, which will induce the Chinese Communists to negotiate. They must be brought to recognize that it is in their own interest to cease their aggression. What I have suggested is a step designed to help bring them to this realization. It is a step for collective action in support of the United Nations forces and in support of the Charter. It is a step, my government hopes, which may help persuade the Chinese Communists to seize the opportunity offered them by the President of the General Assembly and by the Good Offices Committee to [Page 1983] arrange a cease-fire and enter into arrangements for ending the aggression and guaranteeing against its resumption.