320.2–AC/5–151: Telegram
The United States Representative at the United Nations (Austin) to the Secretary of State
1470. Re: AMC. At Jebb’s request Ross and Hyde met with him and Lacoste to hear UK instructions. Ross stated Gross would handle item at May 3 meeting, returning from leave May 2.
Jebb emphasized the great importance which the UK attaches to a declaration of UN aims in Korea “to which all would subscribe”. UK feels this is directly tied up with question of any report from AMC to GA political comite. UK would not be prepared to vote for any selective embargo report by AMC to political comite unless and until such a declaration were issued. He understands US opposes a declaration during a ChiCom offensive and did not dissent from this view but noted offensive now seems blunted.
He suggested one main objection to US plan for selective embargo is idea of vague formula with each state deciding what falls within it. He suggested general debate in AMC or sub-comite looking toward a short specific list of items to be embargoed. Developing in detail US formula is too vague and subject to objection by Asians. It could be clarified by debate. Hence US as sponsor would have to give COCOM List One in disguised form. He suggested therefore putting in COCOM List One at outset as basis for short list comprising items clearly having direct relation to war effort. This would avoid later difficulties for members in reporting. UK would have difficulty reporting under US formula because some export controls now in effect are to implement UK currency and supply policy as distinct from Korean policy. Hence US formula would create UK operating problem under COCOM List Two providing quantitive controls. Lacoste agreed that a short itemized list is far preferable to US formula.
Fact to be kept secret is restriction on exports to Soviet bloc. If short list were used UK would justify denial of exports to Soviet bloc on theory these exports might have ultimate destination PEC. India (possibly other Commonwealth countries) presents special problem, and UK would have strong objection to withdrawing open general license to a Commonwealth member. UK would probably informally ask firms to refuse Indian (or other Commonwealth) orders on evidence of PEC as ultimate destination.
We commented generally that the US formula would permit immediate action and reserve these questions for negotiation and the proposed permanent comite. The advantage of the formula would be flexibility by allowing members broad or narrow interpretation.
[Page 1979]Lacoste questioned whether proposed selective embargo would be an encouragement or deterrent to PRC in light of divided views of AMC members. If it must come up in AMC his instructions of a week ago, which he recognized might be subject to change, direct him to press for sub-comite consideration of substance of economic measures. This is because his govt feels subject should not be debated in AMC in spite of military offensive, lack of progress of GOC and attitude of PRC. France opposes going ahead with public acts which it feels will further antagonize PRC.
Ross recalled Bonnet’s suggestion to Hickerson of sub-comite action and stated that US opposition to this tactic continues. He felt US had shown great patience in light of ChiCom rebuffs to Entezam and offensive. Lacoste saw a serious risk of a division of opinion coming clearly to light in AMC, whereas time might compose it. He had greatest difficulty with idea of report to political comite. He saw opposition to US program in AMC by UK, France, Australia, Canada and Egypt. The sub-comite idea is a sound face-saving device when members are hesitant to proceed in AMC. He would be willing to debate these various points in sub-comite.
Re sub-comite suggestion Jebb had no objection but no strong feeling. If the US opposed tactic it would be impossible. Jebb projected AMC tactics as first a debate on sub-comite report and probably approval. Then UK and others would discuss selective embargo. He hoped would have first agreed on short list of items or else general formula. This would take time. Then and only then should a draft resolution be put forward. There would then be agreement on declaration of UN aims. This course will in ensuing days provide some publicity and sense of activity.
Hyde, speaking personally, wondered whether UK concern at stating publicly and immediately what it is doing in support of UN forces in field is not based on misreading of League of Nations experience with sanctions. There the sanction was a political end in itself which UK felt dangerous as leading to hostilities. Here immediate step is to publicize with UN cachet action already taken in support of troops to see to it our own forces are not faced with own material in ChiCom hands. This is a basic supplement or corollary to a UN action. It does not involve political decisions League faced with on sanctions. It is part of the collective security function of UN as now operating. It is parallel to mediation functions which we recognize should and will continue. Jebb and Lacoste thought this might be useful basis for consideration of US plan. Jebb attempted to state selective embargo as a preventive measure rather than sanction in League sense.