795.00/12–1251: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Gifford) to the Secretary of State
flash
2709. Ref immediately preceding telegram,1 following is text of FonOff memo:
“His Majesty’s Government have studied the United States State Dept’s memorandum which was handed to Mr. Eden by Mr. Gifford on December 5 and the draft of a warning statement which was communicated to the Foreign Office later.2
2. His Majesty’s Govt have agreed that if General Ridgway is unable to obtain any satisfactory supervision arrangements and is obliged, in order to conclude an armistice agreement, to rely entirely on the bona fides of the other side, it would be wise for the countries [Page 1318] who have contributed forces in support of the United Nations action in Korea to issue a joint statement giving warning of the grave consequences which might follow if a major breach of the armistice were to be committed. If, however, reasonably satisfactory supervision arrangements can be written into the armistice agreement, there would be no need for a warning statement; and, to improve the atmosphere in which discussions for the next stage (a political settlement in Korea) could be undertaken, it might be better that no warning statement should be issued. The final decision whether any warning statement should be issued should not be taken until the time of the signing of the armistice agreement.
3. It will be necessary for the United States Government and His Majesty’s Govt to consider together what would be regarded as reasonably satisfactory supervision arrangements in an armistice agreement. It might indeed be argued that given the nature of the political tenets of our opponents and in view of the geography of Korea, no supervision arrangements could provide absolute safeguards against a surprise attack. This is not, however, the contingency which His Majesty’s Govt had in mind in their reply of November 30 to Mr. Acheson’s message. For adequate supervision the neutral teams would require freedom to travel and inspect throughout the whole of Korea and should not be limited to ‘key-points of entry’. But, if agreement on this cannot be reached, His Majesty’s Govt for their part would be prepared to agree to supervision by neutral teams at key-points, including existing and new air bases and communication centres. They hope that it will at least be possible to reach a satisfactory agreement on this basis, so that the important object of concluding the armistice agreement by December 27 may be achieved.
4. If, however, General Ridgway is unable to obtain even such limited supervision arrangements, a warning statement will have to be issued. The precise terms of the statement will depend both on the nature of the supervision arrangements themselves and on the circumstances prevailing at the time of the signing of the armistice. There is advantage in the two govts exchanging ideas now on the sort of statement which would be required in such circumstances; but the form and wording of the statement cannot be settled finally until the time of issue. His Majesty’s Govt consider that the warning in the draft statement communicated to the Foreign Office is too positive and menacing. It states that aggression after the armistice will result in hostilities outside Korea; whereas in the views of His Majesty’s Govt the warning should rather be in the form that it might not be possible to avoid the extension of hostilities. For this reason His Majesty’s Govt propose that the last sentence of the State Dept draft should be revised to read as follows:
‘We declare again our faith in the principles and purposes of the United Nations, our consciousness of our continuing responsibilities in Korea, and our determination in good faith to seek a settlement of the Korean problem. We affirm that if another act of aggression were to challenge again the principles of the United Nations we should again be united and prompt to resist. Should aggression be committed again in Korea the consequences would [Page 1319] be so grave that it might then prove impossible to confine hostilities within the frontiers of Korea.’
5. The State Dept’s memorandum recommended that the two govts should reach agreement now on certain minimum steps which might be taken in the event of a major breach of the armistice, after a warning had been issued. His Majesty’s Govt consider that there should be no commitment now to any precise course of action in hypothetical circumstances, and that decisions, which might lead to global war, should be taken only at the time and in the full knowledge of the circumstances. Subject to this, His Majesty’s Govt will be willing to consider with the United States Govt possible plans for action in the event of fighting being resumed in Korea.
6. His Majesty’s Govt hope that it will also be possible to discuss with the United States Govt as a matter of urgency plans for action in the event of an armistice being concluded and loyally observed. At the moment, the two govts have no agreed plan of action. We lay ourselves open to the risks of once again leaving the initiative for peace to the Soviet Govt and of proposals being put forward and discussed in the General Assembly before we are ready with our own. It would be particularly unfortunate if we on our side issued our ‘warning statement’ without making any constructive proposals for the next stage, while at the same time the Russians and the Chinese put forward apparently reasonable proposals for a Korean settlement.
7. The Canadian, Australian, New Zealand and South African Govts have already been informed of the earlier exchanges of view between the United States Govt and His Majesty’s Govt on this question and we understand that Mr. Casey, who is now in Washington, has had instructions to talk it over with Mr. Acheson. It would therefore place His Majesty’s Govt in a very difficult position with the above Commonwealth Govts if they were to fail to continue to keep them informed of the progress of the discussions.”3
- Not printed.↩
- See telegram 2807 to London, December 5, p. 1249, and telegram 2664 from London, December 8, p. 1282.↩
- In explanation of the reference in this paragraph to the Commonwealth Governments having been informed of earlier United Kingdom–United States exchanges of views, Mr. Eden sent a personal message to Secretary Acheson (conveyed by Ambassador Gifford in telegram 2708, December 12, from London), in which he explained that although the process of consultation with the Commonwealth Governments could not be halted, he had taken steps to limit strictly the dissemination of the information. (795.00/12–1251)↩