Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 69: Telegram
The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)
operational immediate
JCS 89473. From JCS.
1. Reur C 59130.1
[Page 1320]a. It is considered that reptvs from folg countries acceptable to United States for nomination by UNC:
Switzerland, Sweden and Norway, subj of course to consent of nations concerned who are now being consulted on this matter.2 You will be advised promptly of their acceptance.
b. We consider there is no choice among satellites. USSR not acceptable.
c. If agreement reached on non-combatant observer teams responsible to bilateral MAC, agreement should not necessarily provide that each side nominate same number countries but only that total number observers from each side be equal. We have in mind it may be difficult for only one or two of above mentioned countries to supply total required.
2. Reur CX 59128.
a. We agree that an alternative is necessary in event negotiations reach breaking point on issue of MAC composed equally of belligerents. We further agree to your proposal of a non-combatant chairman as one such alternative but before agreement is reached on nomination it should be approved here. However, we consider it very unlikely that agreement could be reached on such a chairman acceptable to both sides.
b. Reur para 2, we recognize that MAC whether composed of equal numbers from each side or with a non-combatant chairman will result in each side having de facto veto regardless of armistice terms. Our intent is that the terms of armistice agreement itself be so formulated that such substantive issues as scope of inspection (such as places outside the demilitarized zone where inspectors will be stationed) and the rights, duties, and priviliges of teams (such as freedom of movement of inspectors to and from specified points of inspection, internal procedure of teams in submitting reports, freedom of communication of individual mbrs of teams with MAC, responsibility for supply and facilities, etc.) be expressed in such clear and detailed terms as not to require major substantive decisions by MAC.
c. Even with the safeguards outlined above, the danger of ineffectiveness of such inspection as is agreed upon is always going to be present regardless of type agreement on MAC. It is our view that in the final analysis, deterrent to aggression must rest upon type of declaration referred to in JCS 87239.3 If agreement cannot be reached to [Page 1321] make such a declaration by all nations concerned, it is our present intention that it will be made unilaterally by our govt. Pending resolution here of that declaration, if you are approaching an impasse on item 3 we suggest you concentrate on item 4 which is vital in any case.
- See footnote 4, p. 1302.↩
- During the next few days, the Department of State contacted representatives of the three countries and received preliminary assurances in principle that the three governments would be willing to participate in the work of the neutral observer teams (795.00 file).↩
- Dated November 16, p. 1142.↩