Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 71: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
flash
CX–59188. This msg in 4 parts. Re JCS 891721 and my CX 59176.2
Part 1. Re part 1 (3) and (4). Present developments indicate that the discussion of release of non-Korean civilians concurrent with negotiations for POW exchange is very inadvisable now because it could not be done without raising the highly controversial overall issues [Page 1316] of civilian internees and refugees. The ROK Govt may be expected to protest any attempt to exclude ROK civilians if the release of non-Korean civilians was to be included in POW negotiations. Gen Lee of the UNC delegation has made strong representation of the views of his govt in this connection. He has requested that every effort be made to effect the release of more than 5,000 leading ROK civilians on the same basis as POWs and has indicated informally that, if this subject is not raised in the negotiations, he may be forced by his govt to withdraw from the UNC delegation. While I am fully appreciative of the desirability of securing the release of those non-Korean civilians already furnished by name in JCS 89189,3 and of the 5,000 civilians whose release is desired by ROK, I firmly believe the question is predominantly political in nature and as such should properly be disposed of only if the entire problem of civilian repatriation is discussed. In any case, I intend not to raise this issue until I have secured a decision on the POW question.
Part 2. Re para 3 (3) and (4). It is highly improbable that the Communists would agree to any formula for exchange which involves individual expressions of opinion from prisoners in UNC custody because of the extremely adverse affect that large scale defection would have on world-wide Communist prestige and the high propaganda potential that would be available for exploitation by UNC once the exchange had been completed. Furthermore, in discussion of agenda item 3, the Communists strongly opposed the entry of members of the UNC to their rear areas and show no indications of altering their stand on this issue. However, in accordance with your recommendations we shall examine the feasibility of approaching the Communists with alternate proposals at an appropriate time provided that we have secured the POW data discussed in JCS 89172, and if we have failed to come to an agreement on a one-for-one exchange. Our alternate proposals will be generally along these lines:
- a.
- Screening teams composed of military members of each side to be permitted entrance to POW camps for the purpose of determining the individuals by name, number and nationality who do not desire inclusion in an exchange.
- b.
- Screening teams composed of neutral observers to accomplish “a” above.
- c.
- Screening of POWs in the demilitarized zone by either military members of each side or by neutral observers before actual release and delivery to the military forces concerned. Obviously this will produce additional administrative and logistic problems and can be expected to slow the rate of exchange.
Part 3. I consider it advisable to point out that should some form of screening procedure be agreed to which would permit POWs to remain voluntarily under UNC jurisdiction, certain major problems would immediately confront us, including:
- a.
- The disposition of those Chinese Communists not desiring return to Communist control, who were not offered safe asylum in Formosa.
- b.
- Eventual disposition of those North Koreans not desiring return to Communist control and not considered acceptable to the ROK Govt for resettlement in South Korea.
- c.
- The difficulty of identifying those persons electing non exchange who are deliberate intelligence and/or subversive plants working in direct sympathy with the Communist cause.
- d.
- UNC would have a political and moral obligation to provide logistic support and security for an indefinite period to those persons who did not elect to be exchanged and were not offered opportunity for repatriation or resettlement by some nation or agency.
Part 4. I will follow my original planned procedure of seeking a one-for-one basis of exchange, of demanding that ICRC be permitted to visit all POW camps to render such assistance as they can, of expediting the exchange of prisoners generally, and of insisting on a group-for-group basis of exchange to insure return of the maximum number of UNC and ROK personnel. However, I am strongly of the opinion that the issue of one-for-one exchange will meet with strong Communist opposition and that I may find it necessary to request authority to agree as a final position to an all-for-all exchange to include the forced exchange of those POWs not desiring return to Communist control.