694.95B1/12–1251
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Officer in Charge of Korean Affairs (Emmons)
Subject: Korean-Japanese Treaty Negotiations and Questions Relating to Armistice Talks.
| Participants: | Dr. You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador |
| Mr. Pyo Wook Han, Political Counselor, Korean Embassy | |
| Mr. John M. Allison, Acting Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs | |
| Mr. A. B. Emmons, 3rd, Officer in Charge, Korean Affairs |
The Korean Ambassador called on Mr. Allison at 3:00 this afternoon at the latter’s request. Mr. Allison explained that he has been anxious to have an opportunity to exchange impressions with Dr. Yang following the Ambassador’s return from his two month’s visit to Korea and Japan.
Korean-Japanese Negotiations
The Ambassador then gave a lengthy resume of his experience as chief Korean delegate in the negotiations with the Japanese Government on various outstanding problems between the two countries.1 As background, the Ambassador stated that in conversations with the President and General MacArthur and, subsequently in Tokyo, with Senator Alexander Smith the importance had been urged upon him of Korea’s obtaining a satisfactory settlement of differences with Japan prior to the conclusion of the Japanese Peace Treaty, in order that the future relations of the two countries could be placed on a sound and friendly basis. He said that in conversations with Mr. Yoshida, the Prime Minister had also expressed agreement with the desirability of reaching an understanding with a minimum of delay.
The Ambassador further explained that he had entered the negotiations in the spirit of friendliness and frankness in the hope that the Japanese would reciprocate and that a satisfactory treaty to both parties could be quickly concluded. He had, however, been quickly disillusioned as to the true Japanese attitude when it came to the actual day-to-day conduct of the negotiations. He pointed out that the Japanese Government evidently felt that, from its point of view, there was little to be gained through the negotiations and that the Koreans would be the principal beneficiaries. For this reason the Japanese working-level delegates continually stalled in coming to any agreements, stating at frequent intervals and on most issues that they were unprepared to put forward a position and even suggested delays in the discussion of some of the major issues to the Spring of 1952 when the Japanese Peace Treaty presumably will have come into effect. The Ambassador also referred to the fact that the Japanese delegation had initially suggested that the talks be conducted on a strictly bilateral basis without the presence or influence of a SCAP observer. The Ambassador, however, had succeeded in persuading his Japanese counterparts to accept the presence of such an observer.
The Ambassador stated that he had emphasized in the discussions the great importance both for Japan and Korea of healing old wounds [Page 1313] through the working out of mutual problems and the negotiation of a fair and equitable treaty; he had endeavored in every way possible to influence the Japanese delegation to move ahead as fast as possible. He referred to the fact that he had also called to the attention of Japanese officials the importance of the negotiations with Korea as a symbol to other Asiatic nations, which were watching the Japanese attitude toward the negotiations with great interest, and that he had emphasized to the Japanese that the opinion of these nations in relation to future Japanese leadership in Asia would undoubtedly be influenced thereby.
The Ambassador then went on to describe in some detail the course of the negotiations with respect to certain specific issues. In connection with the status of Korean residents in Japan, he pointed out that the Korean contention was that such residents should be given alien rights dating from August 8, 1945, whereas the Japanese insisted that this status should not be conferred until after the effective date of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
With regard to the question of fisheries, the Ambassador felt that the attitude of the Japanese delegates had been evasive; they had refused the Korean proposal that the MacArthur Line2 continue in effect until a formal Korean-Japanese fisheries agreement had been reached. The Japanese had gone on to state that they were already engaged in negotiating fishing conventions with many other nations, which must take precedence, and that their fishery experts were so tied up in these negotiations that they did not now have time to discuss this question with Korea.
Dr. Yang indicated that after much persuasion the Japanese delegation had finally agreed to reopen, by the middle of February, further plenary discussions with Korean representatives on the major outstanding issues, and that in the interim a working-level group had been established in Japan to prepare fully for such discussions. The Ambassador explained that he had insisted that the Japanese should come fully prepared to undertake substantive discussions on all outstanding issues. To this effect an agenda had been agreed upon and he had obtained from the Japanese Government a written undertaking that every effort would be made to conclude a satisfactory understanding before the Japanese Peace Treaty came into force. Dr. Yang added that he had taken the precaution of making this undertaking public in Korea.
Dr. Yang noted that the Japanese Government had proposed to send Mr. Matsumoto to Korea to maintain liaison relative to the progress [Page 1314] of work on the outstanding problems to be negotiated. He had urged upon the Japanese Government that, in view of the present unsympathetic state of Korean opinion, it would be better if Mr. Matsumoto3 were to go to Korea in an informal capacity rather than as a high Japanese official on a goodwill tour, as had been suggested. The Ambassador was still hopeful that a satisfactory outcome to the negotiations could be achieved prior to the coming into force of the Japanese Peace Treaty.
In response to a question from Mr. Allison, Dr. Yang stated that he would remain the chief Korean delegate to the conference and that he expected to return to Japan in February to participate in the discussions. The Korean Minister to Japan, Mr. Kim, would be his alternate. He felt that the influence of SCAP representatives had been beneficial in the achievement of the progress made thus far and stated, without undue modesty, that if he (Dr. Yang) personally had not participated in the conference, little or no progress would have been made. He also mentioned that the presence of Mr. Rusk in Tokyo had, he thought, had a helpful effect on Japanese willingness to continue negotiations in a more satisfactory atmosphere.
In the course of the conversation the Ambassador spoke favorably of the attitude of Prime Minister Yoshida and Mr. Iguchi4 as having been helpful but added that this attitude was not reflected by the Japanese negotiators. … He also remarked that language difficulties had tended to impede progress and had led to delays and misunderstandings.
Armistice Negotiations
The Ambassador then referred to the great pre-occupation which the people and the Government of the Republic of Korea now were experiencing in relation to the course of the armistice negotiations. He spoke particularly of their great uneasiness over the possibility that the United States might withdraw its forces from Korea, leaving the Korean people exposed to further aggression and pointed out that this pre-occupation was particularly heightened by the absence of any firm guarantee of Korean security in the future.
Mr. Allison assured the Ambassador in emphatic terms that the United States Government and people were determined not to abandon Korea after hostilities had ceased and that the facts of our expenditure of lives, money and equipment in assisting the Koreans to repel Communist aggression spoke clearly and far louder than any mere paper guarantee could possibly do. He recalled Mr. Dulles’ statement [Page 1315] to the Korean National Assembly on June 19, 1950 when he had told the Koreans that as long as they would stand up and defend their freedom and democratic way of life they could count upon the United States, pointing out that the dramatic fulfillment of this promise had come only a week later, when the Communist invasion of south Korea began.
The Ambassador conceded this but said that since the United States had now negotiated security treaties with New Zealand, Australia, the Philippines and Japan, but had not done so with Korea, considerable apprehension persisted in the minds of the Korean people that the United States was not committed to their future defense. Mr. Allison stressed that the lesson given to the world by the immediate and overwhelming response of the United Nations and the United States in coming to the aid of Korea after June 25, 1950 would, of itself, be a strong deterrent to further aggression. He suggested that strong public emphasis of this might be made as a warning for the future.
Mr. Allison explained, furthermore, that it was not the intention of the United States to withdraw its forces from Korea immediately after a cessation of hostilities but that any such withdrawal would probably be accomplished gradually and be timed to coincide with a strengthening of the military forces of the Republic. He emphasized that, while the United Nations Command was endeavoring to bring hostilities to an end and thus stop further bloodshed, some of the most difficult and complex problems for Korea still lay ahead; the United States Government would be deeply concerned in working out their solution. He hoped that the Ambassador would reassure his Government on this score.
The Ambassador thanked Mr. Allison for these assurances and for the opportunity extended to him to discuss these various problems.
- These bilateral discussions had begun in October in Tokyo with the encouragement although not the direct participation of the United States Government, other than as an observer at the talks. Reports of the meetings were forwarded to the Department of State and may be found principally in decimal file 694.95B and related files. No agreements were reached prior to the end of 1951.↩
- Line established on September 27, 1945 setting forth the boundaries within which unrestricted fishing operations could be undertaken by Japanese fishing vessels; see Whiteman, Digest of International Law, vol. 4, pp. 1185–1186.↩
- Shun-ichi Matsumoto, Foreign Affairs Adviser to Mr. Yoshida who was both Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of Japan.↩
- Sadao Iguchi, Japanese Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs.↩