693.0024/11–2351
The Acting Secretary of Defense (Foster) to the Secretary of State
top secret
Washington, 23 November
1951.
Dear Mr. Secretary: I refer to Mr. Lovett’s
letter of 14 August and your reply of 27 August 1951,1 regarding policy on the repatriation of Chinese and
North Korean prisoners of war. In your reply you suggested a
reexamination of the present instructions to General Ridgway on the
exchange of prisoners of war, to include the related subject of the
release of civilian internees.
[Page 1168]
The Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed this entire question. Their
views, in which I concur, and a proposed new directive to General
Ridgway on the subject are inclosed. I should appreciate an indication
of your concurrence in order that the proposed directive may be
submitted for the approval of the President at an early date. The
exchange of prisoners of war is Item 4 on the agenda of the current
armistice negotiations.
As part of any agreement for a general exchange of prisoners, some
provision will have to be made for the disposition of prisoners of war
who are accused of conventional war crimes. The UN forces now hold a
substantial number of prisoners against whom documented cases have been
prepared covering criminal acts committed prior to their capture. A
majority of these cases involve acts committed against South Koreans.
While the United Nations would be within its legal rights in withholding
such persons from a general exchange of prisoners, such action would
undoubtedly expose our own men who are prisoners of the Communists to
the threat of reprisal based on trumped-up charges. On the other hand,
to relinquish custody of war criminals without trial or punishment would
constitute abandonment of a principle of international law to which the
United States has heretofore given its support, and would undoubtedly
arouse public resentment both in the United States and in other affected
nations, particularly the Republic of Korea. Another group requiring
special consideration is prisoners who have been convicted or are
awaiting trial for post-capture offenses. The inclosed directive does
not contain specific instructions to General Ridgway on these questions.
Further study is now being given to the matter in the Department of
Defense, and I should welcome an expression of your views.
With reference to paragraph 4 of the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum, I
should be glad to receive from you a list of civilian internees in
Communist hands for use during the negotiations.
Sincerely yours,
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)
top secret
Washington, 15 November
1951.
Subject: Policy on Repatriation of Chinese and North
Korean Prisoners
1. In accordance with their memorandum for you of 15 October
1951,2 the Joint
Chiefs of Staff have formulated a proposed revision
[Page 1169]
of General Ridgway’s armistice
instructions concerning prisoners of war exchange. The views of
General Ridgway were considered in the formulation of this revision
to his directive.
2. There are presently in the custody of the United Nations Command
about 41,000 South Koreans, currently classified as prisoners of
war, whose release has been requested by the Republic of Korea
(ROK) Government on the basis
that these persons were in fact involuntarily impressed into
military service by the Communist forces. There is adequate moral
and legal justification for such release. Also held as prisoners of
war are approximately 350 North Korean civilian refugees. General
Ridgway is taking action to reclassify both of these groups from a
prisoner of war status to that of civilian internee. Representatives
of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), Geneva, are fully aware of and
concur in this reclassification action. Individuals of these two
groups, who desire release and who are acceptable to the ROK Government, will be gradually
paroled to local officials, remaining in their custody for about 12
months. General Ridgway does not intend to authorize the parole of
these internees until the situation indicates clearly that such
action will not prejudice the success of the armistice negotiations.
The foregoing program is in consonance with the suggestion made to
you by the Secretary of State in his memorandum [letter] of 27 August 1951.
3. With respect to the further suggestion by the Department of State
that, prior to the reaching of an armistice agreement, individual
prisoners of war in certain categories might be paroled as provided
for in the Geneva Convention, it is the conviction of General
Ridgway that such action would be regarded by the Communists as a
breach of faith, prejudicing the negotiating position of the United
Nations Delegation and jeopardizing the recovery of United Nations
prisoners of war in enemy custody. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
appreciate the desirability of achieving, where possible,
humanitarian and psychological warfare objectives, but feel that
this consideration must not be permitted to jeopardize the main
purpose of the negotiation, which is to obtain the early release by
the Communists of the maximum number of United Nations and ROK prisoners of war. In this
connection, the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command in his
psychological warfare programs has scrupulously avoided the subject
of non-repatriation and, further, has held forth no promise of
asylum to Chinese Communist forces or North Korean military
personnel which would involve radical departure from the provisions
of the Geneva Convention governing the classification and
disposition of prisoners of war. Further, it should be borne in mind
that the Communists know through United Nations reports to the
ICRC the individual
[Page 1170]
names and the total
number of prisoners of war held by the United Nations Command, and
it must be presumed that they will likewise become informed of any
change of status affecting such prisoners.
4. You will note that the proposed directive to General Ridgway,
enclosed herewith, instructs him to attempt to secure agreement on
the release of certain specifically named United States civilian
internees, if a favorable opportunity presents itself during the
course of the negotiation, and if this can be accomplished without
raising the larger issue of exchange or return of all civilian
internees who number many thousands. The Joint Chiefs of Staff
suggest that you request the Secretary of State to furnish for
inclusion in this United States list the names of individuals which
may additionally have become available. If corresponding lists of
British and French civilian internees are available, as well as
those for other nationals of United Nations members, these should
likewise be furnished. Finally, the ROK Government should be asked to furnish General
Ridgway a specific list of leading ROK civilians believed to be in Communist hands for
similar use during the negotiation.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that you submit the attached
proposed revision of General Ridgway’s directive to the President
for approval. Upon receipt of Presidential approval, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff will transmit the revision to General Ridgway.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
J. Lawton Collins
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
[Subenclosure]
Draft Proposed Message by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief,
Far East (Ridgway)
top secret
[Washington, undated.]
Reur CX 559933 and JCS 95354, 30 Jun 514 noforn.
Personal for General Ridgway eyes only from JCS.
1. Subject is revision of JCS
directive regarding armistice terms as they pertain to exchange of
prisoners of war.
2. Subparagraph 5 h of JCS 95354 is rescinded and the following substituted in
lieu thereof:
“h. Prisoners of war exchange on a one-for-one
basis should be sought initially for purposes of negotiation. Your
present planned
[Page 1171]
procedure to attempt to obtain the disclosure of names and numbers,
by nationality, of prisoners of war held by the Communists should
assist in this respect. However, if it appears necessary in order to
secure the release of all, or a maximum number of, UN and ROK prisoners of war, or to avoid
unacceptable delay in their recovery, or to prevent a breakdown of
the armistice negotiations, you are authorized to agree to an
all-for-all exchange.
(1) Generally, prisoners of war should be exchanged as expeditiously
as possible. Until the exchange of prisoners is completed,
representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross
shall be permitted to visit all POW
camps to render such assistance as they can.
(2) In implementation of any agreed exchange, it is recognized that
the Communist authorities may attempt to exchange ROK prisoners, withholding other
personnel temporarily or indefinitely. It is suggested, therefore,
you insist that the exchange of prisoners be carried out on the
basis of group-for-group, composed of mixed CCF* and NKPA† for
mixed US/UN and ROK groups.
(3) During your negotiations for the exchange of prisoners of war, it
may become possible to secure agreement on the release of certain
specifically named civilian internees without raising the larger
issue of exchange or return of: (a) the
civilian captives taken from South to North Korea by NK forces, and (b) NK refugees. In pursuing
this matter, however, you should not jeopardize the main purpose of
the negotiation which is to achieve the early release by the
Communists of the maximum number of UN and ROK prisoners of war.
(4) At least thirteen American civilians remained in the area of
conflict after the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. A list of these
civilians believed to be in the hands of the NK authorities, based on currently available but not
necessarily all-inclusive information, giving the name of the
individual, date and place of birth, profession, and where last
seen, is as follows:
[Here follows the list of 13 persons.]
(5) The Department of State will be requested to ask the ROK Government to furnish you with a
specific list of leading ROK
civilians believed to be in Communist hands for similar use by you
in negotiation. Comparable lists of British and French civilian
internees, as well as those for other nationals of United Nations
members, will also be sought and furnished you.”
