357.AD/11–2351
Memorandum by Robert E. Asher, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Thorp), to Mr. Thorp
Subject: Korean Reconstruction
As far as I can see, the UN program for Korean reconstruction is on dead center. This is a personal opinion and I pass it on to you for information rather than action, since I doubt whether there are any useful moves that you ought to make at this juncture. However, I feel that the delay in getting an UNKRA program under way will mean attacks in the GA and ECOSOC both against Kingsley, an American citizen, as the UNKRA Agent-General, and against the U.S. Government. Both are vulnerable, but the major fault seems to be Kingsley’s for not pushing harder to get his agency into operation.
1. There is no UNKRA Reconstruction Program under consideration at this time. Before Kingsley’s arrival in Washington we had received an advance copy of the fifty-page mimeographed document, UNKRA/AG/1 of October 20,1 that I mentioned at a recent E staff meeting. From the point of view of presentation, etc. it was a feeble effort, but it was better than no program. It assumed that the military authorities would be responsible for relief and rehabilitation until military security had been assured (Phase I). Even during this phase, however, UNKRA, by agreement with the Unified Command, would undertake longer-range projects to the maximum extent feasible. Various projects, especially in the field of housing, were outlined. The proposed program further assumed March 31, 1952 as the date on which UNKRA would take over full responsibility from the military authorities (Phase II).
2. The program drafted by UNKRA was withdrawn before being discussed. Kingsley made it clear to the Department as soon as he [Page 1166] arrived that he was not prepared to talk about economic questions, that he was not really familiar with the program, and that he was now thinking along more political lines. The impression given to people outside of the Department, however, appears to be that the program was withdrawn because there wasn’t enough desire on the part of the State Department to press the Defense Department for its implementation.
3. The fact is that Kingsley isn’t in any hurry for the program to begin. He already holds two jobs (he is still IRO Director) and may be negotiating for a third. If he goes to Korea, he wants to go as UN Political as well as Economic Representative, though it would be bad to consolidate the two functions and doubly bad to consolidate them in an American. In reality, Kingsley doesn’t want to forsake his family and the comforts of civilization for the hardships of Korea, and has threatened to resign if pushed into going before he is ready. He brings no idealism or enthusiasm to the reconstruction job.
4. The Defense Department is much happier running the relief program itself. It has more money than UNKRA and more freedom without UNKRA around. It has built up its own relief machinery, included non-American civilians on the UNCACK teams, and broadened its World War II concept of “disease and unrest” supplies to include some industrial goods. The U.S. foots a larger proportion of the relief bill while the military are in charge than it will thereafter. The State Department, thanks in part to appropriation complications, and in part to excessive caution and concern with short-range difficulties, has been reluctant to exert pressure on either UNKRA or the Defense Department to hasten the transfer of relief and rehabilitation responsibility from U.S. Army to UN civilian hands.
5. The upshot is the supplementary UNKRA-Unified Command Agreement that now awaits only final concurrence from the Defense Department. It provides that Phase II, the takeover by UNKRA, will not begin until at least 180 days after the date on which a cease-fire agreement comes into effect. Planning for Phase II will be undertaken by Joint Committees to be established in the near future in Washington, Tokyo and Korea. In addition, during Phase I, UNKRA is authorized to undertake special projects additional to the relief and rehabilitation program of the military authorities; it may maintain certain UNKRA personnel in Korea; and it will employ and pay the salaries of some technical personnel to serve under military direction. Kingsley does not appear to have in mind, however, a coordinated set of supplemental projects but only two or three useful but unrelated projects designed in part to give the illusion of greater UNKRA activity than there will really be.
6. The U.S. pledged $162.5 million to UNKRA. Fifty million dollars has been appropriated, primarily for financing the takeover of [Page 1167] supplies in the pipeline at the time UNKRA assumes full relief responsibility. There is enabling legislation for a further $45 million, but no appropriation. No U.S. cash has yet been made available to UNKRA, and MSA is making it difficult for the U.S. to contribute anything now. The U.S. action has complicated the job of getting contributions from other free world nations. Meanwhile, UNKRA operates on the Canadian contribution of $7.2 million.
7. The Canadians are worried about the absence of a U.S. contribution and the dissipation of their contribution without tangible results in Korea. The Report to the GA of the UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is likewise critical of UNKRA.2 The Koreans themselves are threatening to raise serious questions about the delay in getting UNKRA under way, though there is no proof that they would be better off if UNKRA began its operations earlier. UNKRA, however, is extremely important as a symbol of international concern for their reconstruction. The Korean needs are desperate and extend well beyond the military relief program.
8. Having failed to push harder for an earlier takeover by UNKRA, I suppose the least the Department can do now is to make sure that some real projects are initiated during the remainder of Phase I. I can plug away at this angle on behalf of E. There is no compelling reason why an arrangement cannot be worked out whereby, within an agreed import tonnage, UNKRA could obtain immediately a fair amount of autonomy for its project operations and technical assistance work. E can also keep pressing for a draft long-range reconstruction program to replace the October 20th version. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the odds are good that UNKRA’s prestige will sink to a dangerous low before the period of so-called full responsibility is under way.3