795.00/11–2151
Memorandum of Conversation, by the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
Subject: “Greater Sanction” and its relationship to Korea armistice negotiations.
| Participants: | Sir Oliver Franks, British Ambassador |
| Mr. H. Freeman Matthews, Deputy Under Secretary | |
| Mr. Paul Nitze, Director, Policy Planning Staff | |
| Mr. U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs |
Sir Oliver Franks called today at 3:30 at my request.
I stated that we were considering the situation that would exist following the conclusion of an armistice in Korea and what could in fact be done to prevent a renewal of the attack by the Communists, and the relationship of this problem to that of the degree of inspection and acts which would be prohibited under the armistice to be discussed under item 3 of the agenda. I stated that as we envisaged the situation, we did not see any reasonable possibility of obtaining a satisfactory political settlement in Korea following an armistice, even though we would of course strive to achieve such a settlement, and therefore it appeared to us that it would be essential to keep some UN forces in Korea for some time, the strength of such UN forces being related to the progress made in the present program for strengthening the ROK forces, which is proceeding in an encouraging manner. I said that in looking at this situation it seemed to us that if following agreement on an armistice the Communists launched an attack against UN forces in Korea it would create a situation considerably different than that at the time of the original attack and that this situation might in some ways be compared to that of the allied forces in Berlin, where the deterrent to attack is not the strength of the forces themselves but the realization by the other side that they could not reasonably expect to localize hostilities and that the attack in fact would not be attack upon Berlin but an attack upon the allied armed forces stationed there. I stated that if there was an attack by Chinese Communist forces upon UN forces in Korea it could not be expected that it would be possible to continue to confine the hostilities to Korea and permit China itself to remain immune to the consequences of such action. I stated that it was our present thinking that in such an event we would want to consider imposing a naval blockade upon China and carrying out air attacks, at least upon Chinese air bases; that we therefore desired to discuss with the British the action that would be taken under these circumstances, and in particular to consult with them over the three questions of, (1) naval blockade of China, (2) air action against China; and, (3) retention of Commonwealth forces in Korea following an armistice.
In reply to Sir Oliver’s question, I stated that if an agreement on these points is reached with the UK, and subsequently other countries, we contemplated a public statement of some kind which would, of course, not necessarily detail the action upon which we had agreed but would make clear to the Chinese the serious consequences of any renewal of the attack. In reply to Sir Oliver’s question concerning the length of time we contemplated such a commitment would be effective or that UN forces would be retained in Korea, I stated that we did not feel that our decision or a public statement in this regard should contain any particular time limitation, nor should they necessarily [Page 1158] constitute an unlimited commitment into the future, regardless of circumstances elsewhere in the world.
Sir Oliver stated that he could, of course, give no official reaction or even personal indication of the view that the UK Government would adopt with respect to this matter. However, he felt that in many respects the UK might be more concerned over contemplated naval action and the effect such action would have on the relationship with the “friends” of the UK, such as India, than it would over air action against, for example, Chinese air bases, in which the reaction of the Soviets would be the principal factor. Sir Oliver recognized that an overt commitment of Soviet forces to action against UN forces in Korea represented an entirely different type of situation than that of Chinese attack and that the question being discussed involved only what he termed “regional” action. In reply to my specific question concerning the retention of Commonwealth forces in Korea, Sir Oliver stated that without being able to speak authoritatively on the subject, or expressing any opinion on the size of the forces to be retained, he felt the UK would recognize and accept the principle of retaining some Commonwealth forces in Korea. Mr. Nitze made it plain that while we hoped to reduce our forces in Korea, it was also hoped that the other UN forces would consist of a UK division and possibly an additional division of other participating nations so as to increase the proportion of UN forces other than those of the U.S.
Sir Oliver orally reviewed the discussion and promised urgently to seek the views of his government.