795.00/11–2151
Memorandum by the Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Johnson) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State (Matthews)
Subject: Discussion with UK Ambassador on “Greater Sanction” in Korea
The following suggestions are offered for your consideration in connection with your proposed discussion with the British Ambassador on the above subject:1
(1) Although the JCS indicated that they might be willing to dispense with inspection other than that of the demilitarized zone in the event we were able to reach a satisfactory agreement on retaliatory action to be taken against China in the event of renewal of the aggression against the ROK, I do not think that we should at this time present the question to the British in such a categorical manner, that is, I think that we should leave the door open for both obtaining inspection of some kind if it proves possible and a political agreement such as [Page 1155] that mentioned above. The principal point of an agreement with the UK should be acceptance by the British of the necessity of military action against China in such circumstances. The actual decision to take such action would not be made by us except in the light of the over-all situation existing at the time, but we desire UK agreement that they would support our decisions on these points. While it would be desirable from our point of view to secure the advance support of the British for any action we might decide to take in the future, this is clearly impossible. Therefore, we should not seek to cover specifically in an agreement with the UK action beyond that presently foreseen as likely to be required. However, the British would realize, as we do, that direct military action against China might well lead to general hostilities involving the USSR.
(2) The essential elements of any such agreement should be:
- (a)
- Complete economic blockade of China, including necessary measures to prevent vessels of participating countries from entering Chinese ports or carrying any goods destined for China to any transshipment points.
- (b)
- Subject to further study of the legal and practical problems involved, agreement in principle on a UN naval blockade of China which would assist participating nations in enforcing measures which they have individually adopted, as well as prevent the entry into Chinese ports of vessels of non-participating countries.
- (c)
- Other military action against China short of commitment to major land operations on the Chinese mainland, but including such operations as air bombardment of military targets and harassing amphibious raids, including assistance to Chinese Nationalist forces engaging in such raids.
- (d)
- No consideration whatever to be given to the entry of the Peking regime into the UN or affiliated organizations.
- (e)
- Withdrawal of recognition of the Peking regime.
- (f)
- UK agreement should also be sought to maintain at least its present level of forces in Korea following an armistice until there has been a clarification of the situation that will then exist in Korea—that is, as long as it is considered necessary to maintain UN forces in Korea we would hope that there would be substantial participation by the UK and other contributing countries so that any reduction which might be possible in U.S. forces would operate so as to increase the proportion of other UN forces stationed in Korea.
(3) The objective of the foregoing would not be necessarily the infliction of a complete military defeat on the Peking regime but the creation of such military pressure as would cause the Peking regime to withdraw all Chinese forces from Korea and to cease all support of the North Korean regime so that, short of overt Soviet intervention, the result might be the accomplishment of a unified non-Communist Korea.
(4) We must recognize that the foregoing policy may gravely endanger [Page 1156] the British position in Hong Kong and that the British will probably counter with a request for a commitment as to the assistance we will be prepared to give them in Hong Kong in the event they agree to cooperate with the foregoing policies. We are, of course, not now in a position to give them any commitment in this regard but should hear what they have to say then discuss the matter further with the JCS.
(5) In the event a satisfactory political agreement along the foregoing lines can be reached with the UK and other key countries, I would envisage a procedure somewhat as follows:
- (a)
- A firm, strictly confidential understanding between the U.S. and the UK and certain other key nations, such as France, Australia and Canada concerning the measures that would be taken against China in the event an armistice agreement is reached and there is subsequently a renewal of the aggression against the ROK.
- (b)
- A formal statement to the Communists by the UNC delegation or General Ridgway consistent with the above-mentioned agreement to be made at the time item 3 of the agenda is under discussion or possibly at the close of the armistice negotiations.
- (c)
- Immediately following a successful conclusion of the armistice negotiations a public statement couched in general terms, consistent with the confidential understanding between the key countries, to be issued by all of the countries participating in the military action in Korea.
- (d)
- Possibly, action in the UN, such as a Security Council or GA resolution, consistent with the foregoing statement by the participating countries. This step might be designed so as to force the Russians to choose between acceptance or rejection of a share of responsibility for guaranteeing observance of an armistice agreed to by the Chinese and North Korean Communists.
(6) All of the foregoing will require difficult and extensive negotiations, during which it will be of the utmost importance that the strictest secrecy be observed.
- See infra.↩