S/P Files: Lot 64D563, Box 728
Memorandum on the Substance of Discussions at a Department of State–Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Here follows a list of the 22 persons present. Messrs. Matthews, Nitze, McGhee, and Johnson were the principal Department of State representatives.
[The opening portion of the meeting dealt with a brief discussion on Yugoslavia.]
General Bradley: I thought we might start on Korea. The position the Commies want to stick on is agreement to a line now. We told Ridgway the other day to agree on the present line as a final line if we can get the rest of the points agreed to in a short time. I am damned if I understand why they refuse to put that forward on the basis of say ten days in which to settle the other points.
Mr. Matthews: We agree that the situation is getting dangerous.
General Collins: Why don’t we send a directive to them out there to do it?
Mr. Matthews: That would be fine from our point of view.
[Page 1123]General Bradley: Why can’t we accept the present line of battle as the line as long as we get the rest of the points settled in a short space of time. We are not going anywhere on the ground.
Mr. Johnson: We agree.
Admiral Fechteler: Let’s tell him so.
General Bradley: I don’t know why we were arguing about Kaesong. It didn’t mean anything to us.
General Collins: Well, it was worth something in the form of security to Seoul.
General Bradley: It certainly was not worth taking a chance of a breakdown in the talks. It seems to me that someone ought to go over all the telegrams and tell General Ridgway, or give him a directive to accept a line and agree on it now if the rest of the points are settled in a reasonable length of time. If they are not, you will have to make adjustments in the line thereafter. The line the Commies are putting forward is better than the one we wanted in October in most respects.
Mr. Nitze: It is really a question of time. How long should we set the time period for in which the other points must be agreed? If it is a month and then there are minor adjustments in the line that we could both agree to, that would be all right, but we won’t be committed to a line after the month is up. You would want an adequate period of time in which to work out the other points.
General Bradley: I don’t think a month is too long. What do you think Joe?
General Collins: It is all right with me.
Admiral Fechteler: It’s all right.
General Collins: I don’t believe Ridgway ever did what we suggested.
Mr. Johnson: No, I don’t think he did.
General Bradley: He said it would amount to a de facto cease fire.
Mr. Matthews: It would not stop air action.
Mr. Collins: He takes the point of view that if we agree to a line we would impose on ourselves a limitation of no attack, since we would not send our men out to get killed and then give up territory we had gained.
General Bradley: What would have happened on the green line we proposed? It was the same thing, wasn’t it?
General Collins: Can’t we have some one get on this right away with the State Department and get something cleared this afternoon?
General Bradley: Charlie (Bolte) you have the messages. Have you enough guidance? We all think this is as good for a period of time as the green line we proposed, or better.
General Collins: I think we should say the President directs him or desires to have it done.
[Page 1124]General Bolte: I’ll have a draft down here before you leave this meeting.
General Twining: If you agree on a line, your interdiction won’t mean too much since little will be coming in toward the front.
General Collins: You will have artillery fire.
Mr. Nitze: Also, if you have a thirty-day period they wouldn’t know that you weren’t going to start the fighting again.
General Collins: The thing to do is to send a directive. The question is whether you need to use the President’s name.
Admiral Lalor: We can clear it with the President by a despatch.
General Collins: O.K.
Mr. Matthews: We cleared the new date of January 3 for the Churchill meeting by that channel to the President.
General Collins: General Ridgway is a long way from home and carrying a great responsibility and I think we ought to say the President directs it.
Admiral Duncan: I think there ought to be a little more latitude than a directive from the President would give.
General Bradley: If you put the President in you really suggest that the President has stepped in and the Joint Chiefs of Staff do not agree. He knows that every one of our directives is cleared with the President.
General Collins: I think we ought to be strong. We ought to accept some of the responsibility back here. That is what I am trying to do.
Admiral Fechteler: We can do that without dragging the President in.
General Collins: I agree.
General Bradley: Well, we will get that drafted.2
[Here follows discussion of other subjects.]
- The source text represents a State Department draft, not cleared with any of the participants.↩
- The message from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to General Ridgway was drafted and sent to Key West, Fla., on the evening of November 12 for the consideration of President Truman who approved it without change (Black Book, Tabs 79 and 80); it was then sent to Tokyo in telegram JCS 86804, November 13, p. 1126.↩