Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 77
Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affiairs (Johnson)
Notes for Discussion with JCS Nov. 121
background
- 1.
- Opinion in US and elsewhere is confused as Commies have made major concession on demarcation line and remaining differences are too subtle for general understanding.
- 2.
- Participating UN nations have thus far fully supported our position in negotiations and free world opinion has, in general, been behind us.
- 3.
- However, present situation has elements capable of exploitation by Commies to our disadvantage by reversion to 38th parallel or other such proposal which would be simple and readily understandable, and might appear reasonable in face of inability to reach agreement apparent details of present proposals. Vishinski speech may have presaged such a reversion in event no early agreement item 2. It may, of course, merely have been bluff to hurry us into an agreement less favorable to us.
- 4.
- Understanding of Department in [is] that, apart from Kaesong question, essential difference between present Commie and UNC proposals is that UNC proposals leave to later agreement adjustments in line of demarcation based upon present line of contact, while under Commie proposals line demarcation would be unchanged in absence subsequent agreement by both sides to adjustments.
- 5.
- Ridgway has now proposed and we have concurred in simply proposing reaching agreement now line demarcation will be line contact effective date armistice (presumably without adjustments unless agreed to by both sides.) Question whether Commies will accept as in view importance they have attached to Kaesong may suspect that UNC intention is to outflank or cut off Kaesong.
- 6.
- If this correct, appears only basis for agreement is agreeing line demarcation will be approximately present line of contact with only such subsequent adjustments as agreed upon by both sides.
- 7.
- We are therefore faced with the two alternatives of standing firm on our proposal and accepting the risk of a break-down or of accepting the Commie proposal. If we follow latter alternative, we should do so as soon as possible from standpoint public opinion and prestige and our position on other items on agenda.
- 8.
- If second alternative would in fact tend to establish conditions
de facto cease-fire on ground, advantages
or disadvantages to UNC must be
fully explored.
- (a)
- Advantages:
- 1.
- Continuation armistice talks.
- 2.
- Full support allies.
- 3.
- Some assurance of line considerably in advance of line Kansas in event of forced withdrawal of UNC forces as a result successful Commie attack.
- 4.
- Giving our ground forces respite while air and naval war (in which we have advantage) continues in full force.
- 5.
- Commies are, in effect, giving up ground force arm which is only arm they can presently use to bring effective pressure on us while we retain full use of air and navy arms.
- (b)
- Disadvantages:
- 1.
- Guaranty of line to Commies who have been gradually forced to withdraw as result continued UN offensive and then possibly a lessening of pressure on Commies to agree to other agenda items.
- 2.
- Morale UN forces.
- 3.
- Propaganda advantage to Commies (bargaining victory).
- 4.
- Certain freedom of movement of Commie forces. Commies could weaken their own forces somewhat if they so desired.
- 5.
- US public opinion event Commie bad faith.
While disadvantages appear outweigh advantages these can be minimized by the placing of a time limit upon completion of other agenda items as suggested in paragraph 7 JCS 86291.2 Ridgway objects to this on ground that we would inevitably be compelled to accept extensions of the period. This is not necessarily true and as it appears best alternative we should urge its reconsideration by Ridgway. Such a formula would be readily understood and accepted by public opinion and it would be difficult for the Communists to show that it is not reasonable.