Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 75: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority
Tokyo, 12 November 1951—9:01 p. m.

C–57142. HNC–442. For info CINCUNC HNC 442.

“Sub-delegation reports as follows on meeting at Pan Mun Jom on 12 November.

[Page 1125]

“1. Morning session:

  • “a. Communists continued to attack UNC proposal of 10 November on ground that it does not adhere to agenda approved by both delegations and allege UNC attitude forecasts later UNC abandonment of other agreements. Also accuse UNC of being inconsistent since earlier proposals include demilitarized zones defined on a map.
  • “b. UNC repeatedly pointed out that its current proposal fixed the line of demarcation and demilitarized zone completely; that all that remained was determination of final line of contact; that it carried out full intent of item 2; and that it differed from former UNC proposals in that it did not require correlation of adjustments other than administrative adjustments. UNC offered to delete, if objectionable, provision for administrative adjustments.
  • “c. Hsieh attacked motives behind our proposal and alleged UNC making cunning and vicious attempts to set up a situation so that we could break down conference in last steps of proceedings. This line of reasoning on his part is believed by sub-delegation to be significant in regard to his own intentions.

“2. Afternoon session:

  • “a. UNC outlined again at great length the absurdity of Communist proposal which calls for first the creation and later the abandonment of a provisional demarcation line and provisional demilitarized zone and compared in detail the 2 proposals of 10 November being considered. Communist rebuttal repeated arguments made during morning session and on previous day, and in addition accused the UNC of being afraid of the peace loving peoples of the world and of having a nature which loves the smell of gunpowder. Hsieh’s attitude in afternoon was more conciliatory and advocated patience in dealing with armistice problem, but as usual distorted UNC statements in effort to make his points.
  • “b. The UNC sub-delegation feel from today’s discussions that Communists hope that settlement of item 2 alone will accomplish in effect a de facto cease fire now. This impression created by Communist refusal to admit that the revision at the time of the signing of the armistice of their provisional line and zone would make their proposal similar to that of the UNC and also by their repeated insistence that their provisional line and zone were prerequisites to settlement of item 2, even though their proposal envisages changes occasioned by subsequent changes in the line of contact.

“3. The UNC sub-delegation believe it imperative, in view of the above and of attitude of Commie sub-delegation during past 2 days, that insistence on acceptance of our present proposal be continued. Further, the UNC sub-delegation believe it would be extremely dangerous to accept Commie proposal. It is believed there is no danger of their breaking off conference because they profit by delays.

“4. Sub-delegations meet again tomorrow at 1100.

“Signed Joy.”