At the request of the Acting Secretary of Defense, the enclosed
memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the subject is circulated
herewith for the information of the National Security Council with
[Page 1107]
reference to NSC Action No. 562–a, and is referred to the Senior NSC Staff for consideration in connection with NSC Action No. 562–b.
In transmitting the enclosure, the Acting Secretary of Defense stated
that he concurred with it and invited particular attention to paragraph
9 therein.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs
of Staff to the Secretary of
Defense
top secret
Washington, November 3,
1951.
Subject: United States Courses of Action in
Korea.
1. With reference to your memorandum of 2 October 1951 and the
enclosure thereto,4 the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reconsidered the
recommendations set forth in their memorandum to you, dated 13 July
1951, on the above subject. As a result thereof, they have
formulated the following views regarding the military actions
proposed in their previous memorandum.
2. In the event that the current armistice negotiations in Korea
fail, the Joint Chiefs of Staff still consider that it would be
necessary to increase military pressure on the enemy. They
recognize, however, that the scale of these operations must be
accommodated to the means available to the Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command (CINCUNC)
and be in consonance with the situation then prevailing. Further,
inasmuch as CINCUNC is in the
best position to evaluate the chances of success, he must be
accorded a wide latitude of discretion as to the timing, nature, and
extent of these operations.
3. The build-up of Communist fighter strength in Manchuria would, in
all probability, render pursuit by United States fighter aircraft
across the Korean-Manchurian border a costly operation at this time
without compensatory advantages. The Joint Chiefs of Staff,
therefore, recommend that the subject of pursuit by United States
aircraft across the Korean-Manchurian border (loosely termed “hot
pursuit”) receive no further consideration as an immediate course of
action in the event that the current armistice negotiations
fail.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider, however, that the growing
Communist air build-up in North China and Manchuria has reached a
stage where serious consequences to United Nations forces in the
Korean area might result from the employment of this enemy air
potential. Inasmuch as it is the responsibility of the United States
to maintain the security of its forces, it must be recognized that
it may be necessary for the United States to employ its air forces
unilaterally
[Page 1108]
and on
short notice to attack certain Chinese Communist air bases whenever
the scale of enemy air activity is such as seriously to jeopardize
the security of the United States forces in the Korean area.
5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff now reaffirm the recommendations
contained in their memorandum to you dated 13 July 1951, subject to
the following changes:
-
a.
- Change subparagraph 1 b to
read:
- “Direct CINCUNC to
increase the scale of his military operations in the Korean area
consistent with the capabilities of the forces available to him
whenever, in his judgment, such operations will contribute
materially toward the destruction of enemy forces and will not
result in disproportionate losses to the United Nations forces
under his command.”
-
b.
- Delete from subparagraph 1 c the phrase
“at least to the neck of the North Korean peninsula”;
-
c.
- Delete from subparagraph 1 d the word
“Rashin” and the comma which follows (this change is
necessitated by the governmental decision to bomb Rashin);
and
-
d.
- Change subparagraph 1 e to
read:
- “Employ United States air forces (unilaterally and on short
notice, if the situation so requires) to attack certain Chinese
Communist air bases whenever the scale of enemy air activity is
such as seriously to jeopardize the security of the United
States forces in the Korean area.”
6. Failure of the current armistice negotiations would indicate the
desire of the enemy to prolong the hostilities in Korea, possibly
for an indefinite period at approximately the same scale as
heretofore. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the measures
which they now recommend in that premise would, in all probability,
be sufficient to maintain military pressure on the Communist forces
in Korea but would not be adequate to achieve a conclusive military
decision in the Korean struggle.
7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered other military courses
of action for the attainment of a military decision which would
allow achievement of a political settlement of the Korean problem
satisfactory to the United States. They have concluded that any such
military courses of action would require the employment of
significant additional United States forces and means.
8. From the United States military point of view, the immobilization
of United States ground, air, and naval forces in inconclusive
operations in Korea over an indefinite period of time with the
attendant attrition of manpower and matériel may become
unacceptable. Moreover, it must be expected that, in the event
armistice negotiations fail, United States public opinion may demand
the adoption of military measures adequate to achieve a satisfactory
military conclusion
[Page 1109]
of
the Korean struggle. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are aware of the
implications involved in the intensification of military action in
Korea on a greatly increased scale. In any event, decision on this
matter would have to be preceded by a review of the United States
position with respect to its objectives in Korea as well as to
United States global strategy. Thereafter, determination would have
to be made, among other things, as to:
-
a.
- The extent to which United States military resources should be
committed to Korea to achieve United States objectives there;
and
-
b.
- Whether the concept of Chinese “volunteers” will continue to
be accepted and, if not, whether restrictions regarding the
expansion of the area of hostilities into Manchuria and China
will continue in effect.
In connection with subparagraph b above it is
axiomatic that it would be necessary for this matter at least to be
considered by those members of the United Nations actively
participating in the Korean conflict.
9. In view of all the foregoing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend
that the National Security Council now undertake a review of the
United States position with respect to the Korean question to
determine what objectives the United States should have for that
area in the event current armistice negotiations in Korea fail.
United States courses of action in the political and military field
for the accomplishment of such objectives can thereafter be
determined.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Omar N. Bradley
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
