Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/11–951

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth A. Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

secret

[Washington,] November 9, 1951.

Subject: Briefing of Foreign Government Representatives on Korea

Participants:	Australia	—Mr. McNichol, Second Secretary
	Belgium	—Mr. Rothschild, Counselor
	Canada	—Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
	Colombia	—Dr. Pastrana, Minister Counselor
	Ethiopia	—Mr. Tesemma, First Secretary
	France	—Mr. Millet, Counselor
	Great Britain	—Mr. Tomlinson, Counselor
	Greece	—Mr. Kalergis, Minister Counselor
	Korea	—Mr. Han, First Secretary
	Luxembourg	—Absent
	Netherlands	—Baron van Boetzelaer, First Secretary
	New Zealand	—Mr. Wade, First Secretary
	Philippines	—Dr. Gamboa, Counselor
	Thailand	—Mr. Charat, Second Secretary
	Union of South Africa	—Mr. Jarvie, Counselor
	United States	—UNA, Mr. Hickerson
		UNP, Mr. Henkin
		UNP, Miss Brown
		UNA, Mr. Bloomfield
		EUR, Mr. Allen
		FE, Mr. Barbour
		FE, Mr. Johnson
		Army, Captain Hooks

Captain Hooks reviewed the enemy order of battle. The 12th Chinese Communist Army had been identified in the front lines; and the Far East Command believed it possible that this Army may be committed to relieve the 67th or 68th Chinese Communist Armies or the 2nd or 3rd North Korean Corps.

The Captain reported that heavy air operations had continued. Tuesday,¹ no enemy contact occurred. On Wednesday, 140 MIG’s had been encountered. There had been no damage reported. On Thursday, 350 MIG’s were seen, of which 113 were engaged. One MIG was destroyed and 4 damaged, while 1 F–86 was lost and 2 slightly damaged. 120 MIG’s were encountered on Friday, of which 3 were destroyed and 3 damaged. During the period under report, UN air flew a total of 718 sorties, of which 401 were combat.

Captain Hooks stated that a total of 1,721 enemy vehicles had been sighted during the past three days, of which 969 were southbound. An average of 91 vehicles per day had been destroyed by the UN.

On the ground, activity was limited to patrol action and occasional outpost clashes. There had been 18 enemy attacks in the Kumsong area on Wednesday and Thursday, all of which had been repulsed. The [First?] Cavalry Division artillery had fired on 15 enemy tanks 12 miles northwest of Yonchon, and one tank had been destroyed. The Thai battalion had repulsed several squad-strength attacks on Wednesday. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was reported in this area. In the 9th Corps area, probing attacks had been sucessfully repulsed. A tank patrol from the 6th ROK Division had destroyed 21 enemy bunkers. West of Kaejon, squad to battalion strength attacks had been repulsed. In the northeast, the Marines had successfully used a new tactic which the Communists previously employed. This was a series of night bugle calls which had drawn the enemy out and engaged it in a fire fight. South of Kosong, there had been patrol clashes.

Mr. McNichol inquired whether it would be correct to say that the enemy was taking the initiative in its probing attacks. The Captain replied in the affirmative and stated that this enemy action reflected sensitivity to our patrolling activities.

Mr. Hickerson gave the group the substance of the attached memorandum.² He pointed out that since these reports had been received, Mr. Vishinsky had made some proposals at Paris which appeared to be a step backward since they referred to a return to the 38th parallel.³ Vishinsky had proposed that the Assembly should recognize it as essential: (1) that countries taking part in the Korean war should immediately end military operations, conclude a truce and withdraw their forces to the 38th parallel within a period of ten days; and (2) that all foreign troops and also all foreign volunteer forces should be withdrawn from Korea within a period of three months. We did not know at this point whether he was just making a speech or whether this was a significant statement; moreover, only the press account of the speech was available. Our Soviet experts were inclined to think that Vishinsky was simply making a speech and did not mean to retreat from the position now being taken by the Communists in the truce negotiations. However, there was a ticker comment to the effect that perhaps the stalling of the Communist delegation at last night’s meeting meant the communists were awaiting instructions arising out of Vishinsky’s remarks. Mr. Hickerson referred to the reported strategy conference with Admiral Joy and General Ridgway at Munsan, the purpose of which according to General Nuckols⁴ was discussion of the latest Communist proposal. General Nuckols had pointed out that the effect of this proposal would mean a reduction of military pressure on the Communists.

Mr. Hickerson summarized the negotiating situation, noting that there were two outstanding UN proposals: (1) a line to be defined now, which would put Kaesong in the demarcation zone, but subject to revision in the light of changes in the battle line; (2) a demarcation line based on the battle line, as of the time of signing of the agreement, to be established after agreement on the other matters on the agenda. Then there was the Communist proposal for agreement now on the line, with future changes only if both sides agreed. The present issue boiled down to the question whether there would be any pressure on the communists to agree on other items if their proposal should be accepted. In his view, it would be almost impossible to maintain troop morale if the actual line were fixed now and it was known that no matter what advances might be made, unless the enemy agreed to adjustments taking them into account, the gains would have to be surrendered.

Mr. Hickerson mentioned that thought had also been given to the possibility of setting a time limit for agreement on the other items and tie that to our proposal for a demilitarized zone. No decision had been taken on this matter; he warned the group that the idea should be held in strict confidence.

Mr. McNichol inquired as to the basic difference between the Communist proposal and our first proposal. Mr. Hickerson replied that under our proposal the demarcation line would have to be reconsidered in the light of changes in the line of contact; if there is no agreement on the revisions, there is no line, and no armistice. Under the Communist proposal, if there is no agreement on the changes, the present line would remain in effect. Mr. Johnson added that under the Communist proposal we would commit ourselves to a line in advance of agreement on other items on the agenda. Mr. Tomlinson (UK) believed the UN position would be confusing to public opinion because we had been struggling for the past several months to reach agreement on a line such as the Communists proposed. Mr. Johnson replied that the present discussion constituted an attempt to smoke out the Communists. It was obvious that a line such as the communists proposed could be marked out in the field only if the shooting stopped. In response to a question from the Canadian representative as to the possible wisdom of asking the Communists directly whether they intended a cessation of fighting in connection with their proposal, it was noted that such a cease-fire was obviously implicit in their proposal. The British representative thought that it would appear to the public that we had changed our position, and it should be pointed out that our stand now was in response to the change in the Communist position.

Mr. McNichol pointed out that we had begun the truce negotiations with the idea that agreement should be reached on the entire agenda before the fighting stopped.

In response to several questions, Mr. Johnson observed that it would be extremely difficult under the Communist proposal to make any changes in the line based on future changes in the line of contact. The Communists, for example, did not consider that there had been any substantial changes in the line since June, although Captain Hooks remarked that the line had varied 10 to 15 miles, and though we had made certain important advances from the tactical and strategical standpoint. Mr. Johnson said that about ten enemy divisions had been used up during October and emphasized the importance to the UN of continuing to keep the enemy off balance.

Mr. Hickerson expressed the hope that the situation respecting the several proposals and the exact intent of the Communists would be clarified by the time of the next briefing meeting. The South African representative thought that public attention should be drawn to the fact that the new Communist proposal amounted to an immediate cease-fire.

1. November 6.
2. Not printed; it outlined developments at the subdelegation meetings of November 7 and 8.
3. Mr. Vyshinsky’s proposal was made in a statement before the U.N. General Assembly on November 8; for the text, see U.N. document A/PV.336.
4. Brig. Gen. William P. Nuckols was press spokesman for the U.N. Command Delegation to the talks at Panmunjom.