Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 62: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
operational immediate
HNC–430. Re JCS 86291.1
1. Concur in your views in Paragraph 3 and 5, and providing further negotiations along line indicated in your Paragraph 6 appear fruitless, likewise concur.
2. a. Reference your Paragraph 4, new developments have occurred; please consult Paragraph 1c of my CX–568102 noting therein the Communist phrase “no major change occurs in the actual line of contact.” In today’s session, Thursday, 08 November, Hodes states Communists explained their concept of “major change” by stating that no major change had occurred in the battle lines since negotiations began at Kaesong last July.
b. On this basis it would be inaccurate to state that Communists have yet accepted the principle that the demarcation line should be generally along the battle line at the time armistice is signed.
3. I feel strongly the unwisdom of agreeing to the present line of contact as a permanent demarcation line subject to only minor adjustments [Page 1101] thereafter, with the provision that agreement is reached on all other agenda items within a definite period of time. To a certain extent this would constitute a de facto cease fire for the period specified. The period itself would be difficult to fix and doubtless difficult to agree upon. Furthermore, assuming that we failed to reach agreement on all other agenda items by the expiration of the period agreed upon, the Communist would inevitably demand and we feel that we would inevitably be compelled to accept extensions of this period to our further great disadvantage.
4. a. In our advocacy of the line of contact on the effective date of the armistice as a basis for fixing the line of demarcation, we have perhaps failed to make clear to you what the sub-delegation has frequently made clear to the Communists with respect to the line in the vicinity of Kaesong. Actually the line in the vicinity of Kaesong has been viewed by us in quite a different light than the rest of the line and for the following reasons.
b. The possession of Kaesong is of importance politically and psychologically to the Communists since it is south of the 38th Parallel. It is the ancient capitol of Korea and since Communists actions have sought to make its retention a symbol of military victory. Kaesong is of political and military importance to the UNC because of the continued insistence of the ROK Government that the UNC secure its retention; because to a certain extent its possession by the UNC or its demilitarization would be viewed in Asia as damaging to Communists prestige and enhancing our own; and because its retention would afford greater depth tactically in the defense of Seoul from future agression from the north.
c. Further, at the time armistice negotiations began, Kaesong was in effect in no man’s land. Just prior to that time the UNC had had ground forces up to battalion strength in Kaesong on more than one occasion. The UNC in an effort to facilitate the then forthcoming negotiations abstained from advancing its ground forces in strength into the Kaesong area, a move which at that time was well within its capability. Therefore, the UNC felt strongly that the line of contact in the Kaesong area should pass through the city where it was when that city was designated as a conference site.
d. For all of these reasons the UNC felt, in proposing the demilitarized zone outlined on the map presented the Communists on 25 October, that we were justified in considering that the Kaesong section of the line was in an entirely different status from that of the rest of the line proposed. We felt that we were entitled to assume that [Page 1102] if Kaesong had not been neutralized in early July by mutual agreement the line of contact would now pass through that area. In other words we felt that the Kaesong section might well be agreed upon now. Subsequent adjustments in the remainder of the demilitarized zone would reflect changes occurring in the line of contact from now until the armistice is signed.
5. The preceding paragraph will, I hope, explain what might otherwise appear to be at variance with the logic of the position we have taken in support of the principle that the line of demarcation should be based on the line of contact existing at the time of signing the armistice.
6. My views at this moment may be summarized as follows:
- a.
- Our sub-delegation has retained the initiative, having presented to the Communists on 5 and 8 November respectively 2 alternatives, acceptance of either of which would leave us on firm ground.
- b.
- These 2 alternatives are:
- (1).
- The course contained in my CX 56598 of 4 November.
- (2).
- On 8 November a predetermined zone based on the present line of contact with adjustments in such a manner that UNC withdrawals from Kosong and Kumsong areas would be compensated for by an equal Communist withdrawal in the Kaesong area, with the city of Kaesong in the demilitarized zone. The predetermined demilitarized zone is, of course, subject to revision based on changes in the line of contact occurring prior to the signing of the armistice.
- c.
- For the next day or two or until Communist action on these proposals is made known to us we retain the initiative and need not make any further proposals.
- d.
- We must be prepared, however, to make known our decision with respect to Kaesong before our concession of this city damages our prestige and prejudices our position on other agenda items.
- e.
- Feeling that public opinion in Asia accords far more importance to Communists retention of Kaesong than American and UN public opinion would accord to its loss, I am prepared to concede our Kaesong position at such time as I am satisfied there is no reasonable chance of our obtaining early Communist agreement to our possessing it or to its demilitarization. In doing this I would, of course, then stand inflexibly on the principle that the line of contact as of the effective date of the armistice must be the line of demarcation.
- f.
- Subject to your contrary instructions I shall follow the course outlined above making an intensive effort here to make our positions and the major supporting reasons for each, crystal clear to public opinion.
7. I would appreciate your comments soonest.