Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/10–1251

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret
SD/A/C.1/368

[Washington,] October 12, 1951.

United Nations Action in Korea (Alternative II—If an Armistice Is Achieved)

the problem

To determine the position of the United States as to the steps to be taken by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly after an armistice in Korea.

recommendations

1. The United States should continue to play a leading role in General Assembly consideration of the Korean question and should direct the efforts of the Assembly towards the achievement of a satisfactory political settlement of the Korean problem.

2. The United States should support a resolution which would reaffirm that it remains the purpose of the United Nations to seek to bring about by peaceful means a unified, independent and democratic government in Korea. To that end, the resolution should appoint a United Nations delegation with broad terms of reference which would enter into discussions with interested parties designed to achieve agreement on a political settlement for Korea. The delegation would not be authorized to discuss problems other than Korea. Any agreement which it reaches would be subject to approval by the General Assembly.

3. In the first instance, we should prefer a small delegation consisting of the representatives of the United States and two other countries from among those which have participated in the fighting in Korea, e.g., Thailand and Australia. If informal discussions indicate that the United Kingdom and France strongly desire a place on the delegation, the delegation is authorized to agree to including them.

4. The resolution should call on UNCURK a) to advise the new United Nations Delegation as requested, and b) to continue to exercise its functions under the General Assembly resolution of October 7, 1950 in such a manner as to support the efforts of the United Nations Delegation. Except in this regard, the composition and character of UNCURK would not be changed at this time but the future of UNCURK would be reviewed in the light of the report to be submitted by the United Nations Delegation on its efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement in Korea.

5. The proposed resolutions should also refer to past resolutions by the Security Council and General Assembly on the United Nations action in Korea, note the approval of the armistice by the Security Council, express the Assembly’s own satisfaction over the conclusion of the armistice and the successful accomplishment by United Nations forces of their mission in Korea. Friendly delegations may feel, however, that such provisions will antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of a political settlement, and the delegation is authorized to omit or reverse these provisions if consultations indicate strong opposition. In that event, we should reach an understanding with other delegations that a stronger General Assembly resolution leaving the record clear as to the character and purpose of the United Nations action in Korea would be introduced at a later date, if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down.

discussion

A. Political Settlement for Korea.

The Objective is Unification. An armistice in Korea will bring about a cessation of the fighting and make provisions against its resumption. It will constitute only the first step towards the achievement of a permanent peace in Korea and a political solution of the Korean problem by peaceful means.

The United Nations is committed to seeking the establishment in Korea of a unified, independent and democratic government. Such unification has also been the policy of the United States, and represents the desires of the Korean people. Every effort should be made, therefore, after an armistice, to bring about such unification under United Nations auspices, in accordance with United Nations principles, and under conditions which would provide maximum assurance against Communist aggression and subversion. At the same time it is the United States position that it is preferable to have Korea divided on an indefinite basis under an armistice agreement than to have a unification under conditions which would not give maximum assurance against Communist domination.

The Communists have also taken the position that the armistice is only the first step and a political settlement must follow. They have also championed the unification of Korea. It is extremely unlikely, however, that the Communists would agree to a truly independent and democratic Korea to free elections under United Nations auspices, and a process of unification under the guidance of a United Nations commission. More likely they will seek a political settlement on terms which would permit them to gain control of all Korea. Failing that, as they have already indicated, they may seek an agreement for the mutual withdrawal of non-Korean troops. At the same time, the United States could not support any political settlement which gives up the goal of unification and accepts the division of the country as permanent. It would be better to have the armistice continue in effect as an armistice only. The United Nations troops would stay as long as was necessary in order to ensure the defense of the Republic of Korea against renewed aggression. The United Nations would keep alive the principle of unification and continue its efforts through appropriate machinery to achieve it.

Whatever the prospects of success, the General Assembly should, after an armistice, reaffirm unification as the only acceptable solution for Korea and extend every effort to achieve a unified Korea on a United Nations basis. It is important also that the United States take the initiative in this regard and not allow the Communists the propaganda advantage of posing as the principal proponents of a unified Korea.

Participants in a Korean Conference. The United Kingdom has indicated its view that following an armistice, a political solution of the Korean problem should be sought at a Five-Power Conference (United States, United Kingdom, USSR, France, Communist China) or Seven-Power Conference (the same powers plus, presumably, India and Egypt), with some kind of “associate” participation by the Republic of Korea and the North Koreans. (After agreement is reached on a Korean settlement, the United Kingdom has in mind that the same conference might also deal with other Far Eastern problems). We have informed the United Kingdom that we do not accept this approach which contemplates a solution of the Korean problem by the Great Powers without any participation by the United Nations or by other countries vitally interested in the Pacific (e.g., Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines) and only a secondary participation for the Koreans, the real parties in interest. We also indicated that we could not agree to any arrangement which might give the impression that we were treating Peiping as the Government of China. (With regard to a discussion of other Far Eastern questions, we informed the United Kingdom that neither the Five- nor the Seven-Power conference would be representative of the United Nations membership on such questions as Chinese representation and Formosa, but that after a Korean settlement, we would be prepared to discuss other Far Eastern questions in an appropriate forum which would include all the parties with interests in the questions to be discussed).

As the United Kingdom was informed, it is our position that the Korean problem should be solved by the parties in interest. Strictly, this would mean that the question should be discussed by representatives of the Republic of Korea and of the North Koreans; the United Nations should participate also in view of its continuing interest in the Korean problem and the role it must play both in achieving a settlement and in supervising its implementation. It is foreseeable, however, that the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communists might both claim a voice in the solution of the Korean problem basing their claim on their interests as neighbors and a long history of relations with Korea. Since, as a realistic matter, no agreement for a Korean settlement could be achieved without their consent or acquiescence, particularly with Chinese Communist and perhaps some Soviet troops remaining in Korea even after an armistice, the United States is prepared to agree to their participation in a conference to discuss a Korean settlement.

From statements made during the armistice negotiations, it would appear that a conference generally along these lines is the kind which the Communist would agree to. Most likely, the Chinese Communists would wish to participate, particularly since in the past, it has been indicated that they insist on a role in a political settlement for Korea. Whether the Soviet Union desires to participate is more questionable. They may prefer, as in other cases, to deal through a satellite so that while they are represented in fact they are not formally bound by the results of the conference. Nevertheless, they should be offered the opportunity to participate. It is contemplated that we would approach the Russians either at the United Nations or in Moscow to inform them of our proposed plan for a political conference and to ascertain their attitude on participation and on other aspects of the proposed resolution.

The United Nations Delegation. The proposed resolution would have the General Assembly appoint a delegation to represent the United Nations in discussions of a possible political settlement for Korea. The United Nations Delegation would have full freedom to discuss with anybody it wishes, arrange an appropriate conference, and attempt to reach an effective agreement.

The Delegation we envisage would consist of the United States, which has played a principal role in the recent history of Korea and in the United Nations action there, together with two other members of the United Nations from among those who have participated in the fighting in Korea, preferably from the Far East. Thailand and Australia appear to be logical choices, but the Delegation may agree to substitute others which are acceptable from the US point of view.

Every effort should be made to persuade other delegations, and particularly the French and the British to agree to such an arrangement. If they agree, we would, of course, keep them informed as to the progress of any moves or negotiations by the United Nations Delegation. The British and French, however, may insist that they participate, in view of their general Far Eastern interests and their role in the fighting in Korea. While we would seek a conference of the kind indicated including the concept of a United Nations Delegation, if the French and the British insist, we would have little choice but to agree to their participation in such a Delegation. In any event, it should be clear that the delegation represents the United Nations, that its purpose is to achieve a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and that it is not to deal with questions other than Korea. The Delegation would report to the General Assembly and any agreement it might reach for a Korean settlement would be subject to General Assembly approval.

Relation to UNCURK. Since the United Nations Delegation would be performing in effect one of the principal tasks assigned to UNCURK, the resolution should set forth the relationship of the delegation to UNCURK. UNCURK would be called upon to advise the delegation as requested. UNCURK would also continue to carry out its other functions under the October 7 resolution so far as consistent with the activities of the United Nations Delegation and in such a manner as not to interfere with the Delegation.

If the United Nations Delegation succeeds in achieving agreement for a political settlement in Korea, that settlement will undoubtedly include reference to the kind of United Nations body which would be agreeable for implementing the settlement. The future of UNCURK would, therefore, have to be reviewed at that time in the light of the agreement reached. If the United Nations Delegation reports failure, the Assembly will nevertheless wish to keep alive its objective of achieving a unified Korea and will want appropriate machinery to that end. Whether it should be UNCURK, in its present form and with its present terms of reference, is a question which the Assembly will want to consider in the light of the report of the United Nations Delegation on the failure of the settlement talks and of the history and record of UNCURK to date. See Position Paper SD/A/C.1/369.

B. Approval of the Armistice.

It is expected that if an armistice is reached, a resolution will be introduced in the Security Council noting the armistice with approval. Some of our allies would like to see a resolution which does that and no more. The United States would wish the resolution, as a minimum, to refer to and reaffirm past resolutions of the United Nations in regard to the action and objectives in Korea, in order to avoid the impression that we were giving up the United Nations version of what has happened in Korea and were willing to rewrite or forget that history. The United States would also like a provision which would explicitly refer the problem of the political settlement of Korea to the General Assembly.

The action in the General Assembly would, of course, have to take account of any resolution which might be adopted in the Security Council. The proposed resolution should refer to the Security Council resolution and also indicate the Assembly’s approval of the armistice. Particularly since some countries have already indicated a desire for a simple uncontroversial resolution in the Security Council in the hope of getting Soviet support for that resolution, the United States would like the subsequent action of the General Assembly to set the record straight on the whole Korean episode. We would not wish to leave the world confused and uncertain as to the real character and purpose of the action in Korea. It must remain clear that there was Communist aggression in Korea, that the United Nations action was designed solely to meet this aggression and that the United Nations has succeeded in this mission, and has not altered or abandoned its original objectives in Korea as a result of the conflict.

It may be anticipated that there will be objection to such provisions. It will be argued that such a resolution would antagonize the Communists and jeopardize the possibility of achieving a political settlement in Korea. If consultations reveal strong views to this effect, it may be necessary to omit or soften these provisions. In doing so, however, it should be made clear that we consider this only a postponement and that if efforts to achieve a political settlement break down, we will wish a stronger resolution along these lines.

In this regard, the delegation should warn other delegations against the dangers of assuming that the achievement of an armistice means a radical change in Soviet objectives. Such an attitude could have serious consequences going beyond the question of United Nations action in regard to Korea. The United States is always ready to welcome true Soviet cooperation in support of the United Nations Charter; we have no concern or desire to maintain cold war tension. We would have to have much more and stronger evidence of Soviet change of heart, however, before we were persuaded that the USSR had suddenly decided to give up all ideas of aggression and Communist imperialism and has started on the path of peaceful cooperation. The Soviet attitude to the armistice in Korea must not be allowed to engender false and dangerous impression that all will be sweetness and light on the international scene. Such an impression would lull us into a false security, and jeopardize all our efforts to build up the strength of the free world and to maintain free world unity against aggression in and out of the United Nations. Within the United Nations it might tend to paralyze action on almost any subject which some delegations might feel would antagonize the Russians.