IO Files: Lot 71D440, Box 19247
Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly 1
SD/A/C.1/367
United Nations Action Against Aggression in Korea (Alternative I—If There Is No Armistice)
the problem
To determine the position of the United States as to possible action by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly in regard to the United Nations action against aggression in Korea.
recommendations
1. The United States should continue to play a leading role in General Assembly consideration of the Korean question, and should seek to maintain the maximum United Nations support for the United Nations action in Korea and for the measures necessary to achieve United Nations objectives there.
2. If armistice negotiations are definitely terminated, the United States should be prepared, together with other key delegations, to sponsor a resolution which would
- a.
- Take note of the report of the Commanding General on the failure of armistice discussions;
- b.
- Express concern that the aggressors have refused to agree to an honorable armistice in accordance with United Nations principles and that they are insisting on continuing their aggression in Korea;
- c.
- Call again on the aggressors to cease and desist from their aggression, and call upon the Chinese Communists to withdraw from Korea;
- d.
- Reaffirm the determination of the United Nations to continue its action in Korea to meet the aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area.
- e.
- Urge upon all States and authorities the need to increase and intensify assistance to the United Nations action in Korea; and in particular, urge all members to contribute additional forces to the Unified Command;
- f.
- Note the report of the Additional Measures Committee in regard to the embargo established by the resolution of May 18;2
- g.
- Note with satisfaction the favorable response of the large majority of States to its resolution of May 18 on additional measures to be employed to meet the aggression in Korea;
- h.
- Note with concern that certain States have rejected the recommendations of that resolution, and in violation thereof and of previous resolutions have been giving assistance and encouragement to the aggressor in Korea;
- i.
- Call upon these States to comply with the recommendations of the May 18 resolution, and call again upon all States and authorities to refrain from giving the aggressors any assistance or encouragement;
- j.
- Request the Additional Measures Committee to continue to consider and report on this embargo;
- k.
- Request the Additional Measures Committee to consider ways in which the measures recommended in the May 18 resolution could be strengthened and additional political and economic measures be employed to meet the aggression in Korea, and to report thereon further to the General Assembly;
- l.
- Reaffirm that it continues to be the policy of the United Nations to bring about a cessation of hostilities in Korea and the achievement of United Nations objectives in Korea by peaceful means, and
- m.
- Request the President of the General Assembly to make available his good offices to this end.
3. If negotiations are not definitely terminated and an ambiguous situation in regard to the possibility of an armistice continues to prevail, the Delegation should take up with other delegations the desirability of a resolution on the Korean action, which might incorporate appropriate provisions of those set forth in Recommendation 2 above.
comment
If efforts to achieve an armistice have definitely failed, the United Nations will, of course, continue the action in Korea to meet the aggression and restore international peace and security in the area. The purpose of any action in the Sixth Session will be to take the parliamentary measures necessary to maintain and intensify the material and moral support of the members for the Korean action.
The character and tone of any resolutions adopted by the Sixth Session of the General Assembly will depend in large measure on the circumstances surrounding the termination of negotiations and the intensity of renewed fighting. If negotiations are definitely terminated, if world opinion is satisfied that the United Nations Command had made honest efforts to reach agreement on an honorable armistice and that the Communists will not accept peace in Korea except on their terms, and the Communists have launched a major offensive, it should not be difficult to obtain general support for a strong resolution. The United States Delegation should request the delegations of a number of other countries with troops in Korea, to join in sponsoring a resolution along the lines set forth in the Recommendations. The provisions of the recommended resolution are generally self-explanatory. They [Page 1018] are for the most part adaptations of previous resolutions, particularly the General Assembly resolutions of February 1 and May 18.
On the other hand, if negotiations are still continuing, or have merely faded out with the ever-present possibility of their renewal, and especially if the Communists seem to be willing to acquiesce in a virtual stalemate in the field, it will be very difficult to persuade many delegations to support sweeping condemnatory provisions and drastic measures.
There may be a disposition on the part of friendly delegations to postpone consideration of the Korean item until the situation in Korea becomes more clearly defined and either an armistice is achieved, or there is a definite termination of negotiations and resumption of full-scale hostilities. If it appears, however, that the ambiguous situation will drag on indefinitely, the United States Delegation should raise with other friendly delegations the desirability of a General Assembly resolution in the Sixth Session, which might include appropriate provisions from among those set forth in Recommendation 2 above.
Good Offices Committee
The final provisions of the proposed resolution would in effect replace the present Good Offices Committee. The Members of the United Nations will again wish to reaffirm their belief in the principle of peaceful settlement and will undoubtedly want a specific designation of someone to review efforts to get Communist agreement for stopping the fighting. The present Committee was created by the February 1 resolution which requested “the President of the General Assembly to designate forthwith two persons who would meet with him at any suitable opportunity to use their good offices.” For psychological reasons, it would be desirable to replace the Good Offices Committee which has a record of failure, and which was declared illegal and its communications not even acknowledged by the enemy. In any event, with a new President of the General Assembly, it would be desirable to have him designated to continue the efforts of the Good Offices Committee. Designating the President of the General Assembly is preferable to creating some new ad hoc body, since the President of the General Assembly is the one person whose legal status the Communists recognize and with whom they have made contact in the past.
Extending Hostilities to China
It is the position of the United States that if the Chinese Communists should initiate massive air attacks against United Nations forces, the United Nations forces are free to take necessary steps to meet these attacks, and to safeguard the security of United Nations forces, even [Page 1019] if it involves disregarding the Manchurian frontier. These measures will, if circumstances permit, be discussed with our allies before they are instituted. In such circumstances, some of our allies might take the position that the Unified Command does not have the authority to carry the fighting outside of Korea. They may also argue, pointing to the six-power resolution of November 10 in the Security Council which was vetoed by the Soviet Union, and to the language in the General Assembly resolution of February 1 that it is United Nations policy to limit hostilities to Korea and that any deviation from this policy should be officially sanctioned by the United Nations before it is instituted.
The United States will not raise any question as to our authority to take these measures. If the issue arises, the United States Delegation should indicate that in the view of the United States, the Unified Command has the authority to take the steps necessary to achieve the mission of stopping aggression and restoring peace in the area. There is also an inherent and basic authority to take measures necessary to safeguard the security of the forces entrusted to the Unified Command. It should also be pointed out that discussion of the question in the United Nations can only subject the United States and its allies to propaganda attacks, and raise doubt and engender disagreement among Members of the United Nations, especially among these who do not have troops in Korea.
Additional Measures
If armistice talks break down, there will presumably be a report from the Additional Measures Committee on the operation of the selective embargo, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution of May 18. Such a report may merely indicate the extent of compliance and the probable effects of the embargo; it may, however, also recommend changes in the embargo. If there are to be changes in the embargo, it would seem preferable to make the Additional Measures Committee report the subject of a separate resolution. Any other measures which the Committee might recommend might also be included in that resolution.
If the Additional Measures Committee report is simply a factual presentation of the responses to the May 18 resolution and does not contain suggestions for changes in the embargo or for other additional measures, a provision to note the report could be included in the resolution suggested above. As indicated in the Recommendations, the General Assembly would also note with approval the extent of compliance with the May 18 resolution, express concern that some States have not complied, and again call on them to implement the recommendations of the May 18 resolution.