Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/10–1251

Position Paper, Prepared in the Department of State, for the United States Delegation to the United Nations General Assembly

secret
SD/A/C.1/369

[Washington,] October 12, 1951.

The Problem of the Independence of Korea: Report of UNCURK (Alternative I—If There Is No Armistice)

the problem

To determine the position which the United States should take at the Sixth Session in regard to (a) the report of UNCURK; and (b) United Nations Machinery for continuing efforts to bring about a unified, independent and democratic Korea, and in particular, the future of UNCURK.

recommendations

1. While the UNCURK report has not yet been circulated, it may be assumed that the report will be unobjectionable, and the United States Delegation will be able to vote to approve it.

2. The United States should support a resolution reaffirming the determination of the United Nations to bring about a unified, independent and democratic Korea. It should specifically reaffirm the objectives and principles of the resolution of October 7, 1950 and particularly the recommendations contained in Section I of that resolution.

3. The United States Delegation should seek the support of other delegations for provisions in the resolution which while expressing the appreciation of the services of UNCURK in the past year would determine that in the light of experience and new circumstances, United Nations political objectives in Korea could better be achieved by a single United Nations Political Representative to be designated by the General Assembly. The United States Delegation may also, if other delegations prefer such an arrangement, support the appointment of a commission to advise the Political Representative; the Advisory Commission would have headquarters in New York and consist of the same membership as UNCURK, possibly with the addition of the United States. UNCURK should continue to operate until the new Representative is prepared to take over its functions.

4. The United States Delegation should also seek the support of other delegations for narrower terms of reference for the political representative of the United Nations in Korea so far as relations with UNKRA are concerned. The proposed Political Representative [with the advice and assistance of the Advisory Commission] should

(a) represent the United Nations in bringing about the achievement of a unified, independent and democratic government of all Korea;

(b) assume all the functions exercised by UNCURK under the resolution of October 7; and

(c) with respect to relations with UNKRA,

1. determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographical areas within which UNKRA shall operate at any time,

2. designate authorities in Korea with which the Agent General may establish relations, after consultation with the Agent General, and advise him on the nature of such relations,

3. act in closest cooperation with the Agent General in regard to their respective areas of responsibility.

5. The position indicated in Recommendations 3 and 4 above is the preferred position of the United States. However, the delegation may agree to one of the following alternatives, in the order of preference.

(a) Replacing UNCURK with a UN Representative, as in recommendation 3, but maintaining for him the terms of reference which UNCURK now has under the October 7 and December 1 resolutions.

(b) Continuing UNCURK, but restricting its terms of reference in regard to its relations to UNKRA to those set forth in subparagraph (c) of recommendation 4.

(c) Continuing UNCURK and its terms of reference as at present.

discussion

The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea (UNCURK) was created by the General Assembly in its resolution of October 7, 1950. Its chief purpose was to “represent the United Nations in bringing about the establishment of a unified, independent and democratic Government of all Korea”. It was to assume the functions previously exercised by the United Nations Commission for Korea (UNCOK) and also to exercise responsibilities in connection with relief and rehabilitation to be subsequently determined by the Assembly. The responsibilities of UNCURK in this area were defined in the General Assembly resolution of December 1.

The October 7 resolution was adopted at a time when it seemed likely that United Nations forces would soon gain control of all Korea. Chinese Communist intervention and the history of military operations since that time make it appear highly unlikely that United Nations forces will succeed by force of arms in driving the Chinese Communists out of Korea. Nevertheless, the passage of time and intervening events do not necessitate any change in the terms of that resolution, and it applies as well in the present circumstances. The unsuccessful attempt to achieve an armistice in Korea also would not affect the objectives of the United Nations in regard to unification or the principles set forth in the October 7 resolution to govern efforts to achieve unification. As for years past, it continues to be the desire of the United Nations to bring about a unified Korea and to maintain machinery for that purpose.

UNCURK, however, has had a history of ineffectiveness and incompetence. In large measure, its failure of achievement was due to circumstances beyond its control since the change of military fortunes shortly after its creation made it seem unlikely that unification would be achieved and left the Commission with little to do. There has been a feeling, however, that even within these limitations UNCURK, as the political representative of the United Nations in Korea, could have achieved much more than it has. In any event, experience has shown the desirability of attempting to streamline the Commission. Further, with no immediate prospect of achieving unification, and with hostilities continuing and requiring the United Nations Command to maintain full control, it is not desirable to have in Korea a Commission of representatives of seven nations with alternates and staff.

The United States Delegation should, therefore, discuss with other delegations the desirability of substituting for the present UNCURK, a single United Nations political representative for Korea. If other delegations prefer the General Assembly could also create an advisory commission which would have its headquarters in New York but could go to Korea as appropriate. While the advisory Commission might be more effective if it were kept smaller, we might avoid delicate political questions, and would increase support for the proposed change, if the Advisory Commission consisted of the countries represented on UNCURK (Australia, Thailand, Philippines, Pakistan, Turkey, Chile, Netherlands). If it can be achieved without complication or difficulty and without impelling other countries (e.g., United Kingdom, France) also to seek membership, the addition of the United States to such an advisory commission would be desirable.

The advisory commission, if established, would advise and assist the Political Representative in the exercise of his functions.

Relief and Rehabilitation

Under the resolution of December 1, 1950, UNCURK was expected to play an important role also in relation to the reconstruction and rehabilitation of Korea. The Agent General and UNKRA established by that resolution were to carry out their responsibilities “in closest cooperation” with UNCURK. The Commission was to make such recommendations to UNKRA as it considered necessary for the effective discharge of its responsibilities in relation to unification; determine, after consultation with the Agent General, the geographic areas within which UNKRA was to operate; designate the authorities with which the Agent General was to establish relationships; take steps needed to support the Agent General in fulfilling his task; consider the reports of the Agent General and transmit comments upon them to ECOSOC and the General Assembly; call on the Agent General for information which UNCURK considered necessary for its work. The Assembly also authorized the Commission to consult with the Agent General in regard to the entire relief program and its adequacies and to make recommendations thereon to ECOSOC.

Experience to date has indicated the difficulties inherent in these arrangements. Partly because of the ineffectiveness of UNCURK, and partly because of personalities involved, the relationship between UNCURK and UNKRA contemplated by the General Assembly does not in fact prevail. The Agent General apparently resents the “subordination” of UNKRA to UNCURK, particularly the provisions subjecting his work and reports to the Commission’s scrutiny. He has sought to assert his independence of UNCURK by refraining from informing UNCURK regarding his operations in Korea. The difficulties and potential friction will be aggravated, if as the United States will propose, the General Assembly replaces UNCURK by a single Political Representative.

The United States should, therefore propose that in relation to UNKRA, the new Political Representative, or even UNCURK, if it is retained, should play a lesser role. The Political Representative should have the authority to tell the Agent General what areas the latter is authorized to work in and what authorities he may deal with. These involve delicate political considerations on which the United Nations must speak with one voice and in which the Agent General follow the lead of the political body. Apart from these aspects, however, the General Assembly should merely, in general terms, enjoin on the Political Representative and the Agent General “the closest cooperation”.

In the light of the negotiations leading up to the December 1 resolution, it may be expected that some delegations may object to granting the Agent General virtual independence of the United Nations Political Representative. The Australian Government in particular, whose representative¹ has been the mainstay of UNCURK and who may be a candidate for United Nations Commissioner, may insist that the relief program must be kept subordinate to the political program and that the machinery should reflect this subordination. It may cite difficulties which arose when UNRRA sought to act independently of political supervision and guidance in a number of countries. In meeting these objections, the United States Delegation may be able to enlist the aid of the United Kingdom; the United Kingdom might support our position particularly since the Deputy Agent General is Sir Arthur Rucker, a United Kingdom national.

If the Delegation is unable to obtain general support for these changes in the relationship between the Political Representative of the United Nations and the Agent General, the Delegation may agree to leave the relationship theoretically unchanged. In that case, the resolution creating the new Political Representative could merely provide that he shall assume all the functions exercised by UNCURK under the resolution of October 7 and December 1. Presumably, the exact relationship between the new Representative and the Agent General would be settled in practice between them.

1. James Plimsoll.