Office of the Historian

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 27: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

secret
operational immediate
Washington, 11 August 1951—12:56 p. m.

JCS–98713. From JCS.1 Reur C 68672 and JCS 98637.

1. Conduct of negotiations by you and Admiral Joy fully approved. Persistence and patience with which UN position has been set forth, despite provocative action and attitude Communist delegation, have strengthened our position.

2. It is basic to your present directives that you not break off armistice discussions without specific instructions to do so (see Para 7, JCS 96802);2 also that you should not, without further instructions, recess talks indefinitely, to be reconvened on condition of Communist concession (see Para 9, JCS 96930).3

3. In view of possibility of communications delays and of necessity for highest level consideration, you should not set in motion any action contrary to above directives without prior JCS authorization. Termination of discussions is of such governmental importance as not to be left to exigencies of clearances or communications by some deadline hour.

4. For your background, follg are basic considerations underlying United States attitude on termination of armistice discussions:

A.
It is the United States objective to accomplish an armistice in accordance with the terms furnished you as basis for your negotiation.
B.
If armistice discussions fail, it is of the greatest importance that clear responsibility for failure rest upon Communists and that issues be such as to engage fullest possible support for our position. It will not be enough for us to say that Communists are at fault because they do not agree with us; it must be abundantly clear that we have used persistence and patience to obtain agreement on terms which will appeal to world opinion as reasonable and just.
C.
It was to be expected that a period of deadlock would be reached in armistice talks after adoption of agenda when opposing views on essential points of substance confronted each other. There is reason to believe that Communists expected us to agree on 38th Parallel, based upon Malik statement and public discussion here and elsewhere prior to Malik’s statement. It will take time for Moscow and Peiping to amend their position; we can not yet assume that difference between your proposals and 38th Parallel is breaking point for Communists. Underlying Korea are world-wide issues of most fundamental importance. If an acceptable settlement is to be reached, it can be expected to take time. Protracted and difficult negotiations have been standard in dealings with Communists in post-war period; Berlin Blockade discussions extending over many weeks are typical example.
D.
If there is any difference between Moscow and Peiping as to what constitutes a breaking point, we should allow time for such differences to mature.
E.
Although we have full support for firm stand we are taking on location of armistice line, we could not expect to have such support if talks were terminated now on ground that Communists have not accepted our proposals. Patient reiteration and explanation of position by UNC delegation and repeated indication of willingness to discuss minor adjustments in our proposed line or other items on agenda have made most favorable impression and are laying excellent groundwork for propaganda battle if talks fail.

5. In light of above, we believe UNC delegation attitude should continue to be characterized by calmness, firmness, patience and that briefing of press should reflect such attitude. We believe that as contrasted with crisis atmosphere, we thereby subject opponents to maximum strain and at same time maintain unity and strength of our own side.

6. UN position on rejection of 38th Parallel remains entirely firm and you should anticipate no change in your instructions on that point.4

  1. On the morning of August 11 a meeting had been held by General Bradley and representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with Messrs. Matthews, Rusk, Hickerson, Reinhardt, and Johnson of the Department of State for the purpose of discussing a full reply to the suggestion made by General Ridgway in Part 5 of his telegram C–68672, August 11 (supra), on terminating the talks in Korea. Mr. Johnson’s memorandum of conversation of that meeting read in part as follows:

    “The meeting discussed a full draft reply prepared in the Department of State. There was full agreement with the substance of State’s draft. The meeting was largely devoted to discussing relatively few verbal changes. At the suggestion of General White a paragraph was added to the effect that General Ridgway should anticipate no change in his instructions on the UN position rejecting the 38th parallel as a demarcation line. The approved message was transmitted to General Ridgway as JCS 98713, August 11.” (795.00/8–1151)

    ↩
  2. Dated July 19, p. 704.↩
  3. Dated July 21, p. 716.↩
  4. General Ridgway’s reply, contained in telegram C–68670, August 12, from Tokyo, read: “Urmsg JCS 98713 completely understood.” (Black Book, Tab 28)↩