795.00/8–1151: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Muccio) to the Secretary of State
150. Anti-cease-fire pro-unification activities continue about same tempo; certainly not on increasing scale. Actually campaign has never reached virulence of campaign vs. withdrawal US troops spring 1949. I have impression as time drags on and subject takes on aspect of old story that it more and more difficult for govt stir up enthusiasm. Koreans almost unanimous feelings they want undivided country have [Page 813] been well aired; but despite govt attitude that must have cake and eat it too, I suspect considerable number Koreans more realistic and prepared accept de facto division if armistice not on 38th is agreed.
Whether this more reasonable attitude will influence President Rhee remains to be seen. He has not as yet mentioned President Truman’s ltr to me altho he said to General Coulter yesterday he welcomed renewed assurances of US support and that he mainly concerned with preventing any temporary dividing line from being accepted as permanent. He also said he wondered how President Truman got idea that cease-fire demonstrations, rallies, etc., were govt-inspired.1 I shall discuss Rhee’s position further separate msg.2
While I do not want underplay significance ROK campaign against armistice and am fully aware Rhee playing wily game seeking sabotage it, there one aspect on psychological warfare and propaganda side which I have not mentioned and which I think deserves attention as it on favorable side. I refer to fact Commie propaganda has been strangely silent on ROK attitudes and suggest this fact should be analyzed and exploited in some way to our advantage. Is admittedly tricky subject.
North Koreans aspirations for unified country just strong as South Koreans. In fact there danger that fol armistice or breakdown political talks full barrage of Commie propaganda will attempt convince South that North Koreans real champs unity. This wld be consistent with similar campaign from eastern Germany. ROK activities opposing cease-fire demanding unity thus have effect stealing thunder from North Koreans. Is noteworthy in any event that since Secretary issued strong statement troop withdrawal issue, neither Radio Peiping nor radio Pyongyang have mentioned ROK anti-cease-fire attitude nor have they picked up US press stories or rumors General Paik withdrawal from conference on 38th parallel issue. Inference we draw is that Commies seriously embarrassed by this aspect ROK policy. They may also believe ROK campaign clever propaganda move on part US-UN. Whatever reasons are, possibility exists for us to exploit situation to help give lie to Commie propaganda themes that (1) ROK Govt stooge of US; (2) North Korean Commies originators and leaders unification movement; (3) US solely responsible for tough position at Kaesong; and (4) all Koreans demanding peace, withdrawal troops.
I suggest Dept consider whether carefully prepared informational material citing demonstrations resolutions, etc., as evidence popular [Page 814] ROK opposition to return 38th parallel and popular desire for unification can be used for propaganda purposes outside ROK as means strengthening our stand especially amongst Asians. Obviously great care must be exercised to avoid giving impression ROKs opposing UN. Possibly should be handled covert basis.
Sent Dept 150. Repeated info Tokyo 59.