Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 22: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
flash

C–68672. “There follows in 5 parts the report of the UNC Delegation. Subject: Armistice conference at Kaesong 10 August 51.

Part 1. Summary: Joy delivered firm speech rejecting 38 parallel, announcing willingness of United Nations command delegation to discuss at any time a line of demarcation based on military realities, and stating United Nations Command delegation would no longer be responsive to enemy efforts to engage United Nations Command delegation in discussion of 38 parallel as line of demarcation. Nam Il delivered speech repeating well worn arguments for 38 parallel, against United Nations Command bombing. Joy stated he had nothing further to add. An unbroken silence of 2 hours and 11 minutes followed. Joy then asked Nam Il if he had anything further to say and when answer was in negative proposed to shift to item 3 in order to make progress. Nam Il refused. Meetings continue tomorrow.

Part 2: Progress: None.

Part 3: Attitudes: No change.

Part 4: Sequence of events: Conference reconvened 1331K hours. [Page 802] Nam Il opened as follows: It is very regrettable that our conference has been adjourned for 5½ days on account [of] a question unrelated to the main topic under discussion. The conference is now resumed. I would like to know if you have given up your previous proposal concerning the military demarcation line and are prepared to accept our fair and reasonable proposal. I am waiting for your answer.

Adm Joy: Is that all you have to say?

Nam Il: At present that is all. I am waiting for your answer to this question.

Adm Joy: For days these meetings have made no progress. I will briefly review the sequence of events which have resulted in lack of progress. When the question of location of a demilitarized zone was taken up by the delegations, you proposed a zone based on the 38 parallel. You offered no valid military reasons for that proposal. You did not because you cannot cause the 38 parallel to reflect the present military situation. You asserted that the 38 parallel would be a bridge to peace, despite the fact that it has proven to be an invitation to war. You did not show that there are defensible positions for either side adjacent to the zone you proposed. You did not because you cannot. At no time in the Korean war has either side been able to hold defensible positions near that zone. In attempting to support your proposed 38 parallel zone, you denied the total effect of the air and naval forces of the United Nations Command. Yet, you irrationally and erroneously claimed that but for these same United Nations Command air and sea forces, your ground forces would have driven ours from Korea. By your own illogical statements, you revealed your true motive in seeking the 38 parallel zone. We are left no recourse but to believe that your current objective is a face-saving return to the 38 parallel from which this unprovoked war of aggression began. You confirmed that your only purpose is the political division of Korea.

In our turn, the United Nations Command Delegation presented a proposed demilitarized zone. This zone is based on a fair assessment of the present overall military situation. It provides defensible positions for both sides. It recognizes the changed military capabilities of both forces resulting from any period of armistice. It has no political connotation whatever. It adheres strictly to military realities.

You refused to consider seriously the equitable zone proposed by the United Nations Command delegation. You refused to discuss this zone with the aid of a map so that at least a clear understanding of it could be assured. You rejected the offer of the United Nations Command Delegation to discuss possible adjustments of the proposed zone. You stated you have absolutely no proposal to offer other than that the 38 parallel be fixed as the military line of demarcation. Your attitude [Page 803] has been inflexible, and without any reason so far stated to justify that attitude.

It seems clear to us that you seek to gain, through negotiation of a military armistice, a political division of Korea. The fundamental incompatibility of your political objectives with the strictly military nature of a military armistice renders your case for the 38 parallel zone illogical, unrealistic, and totally unacceptable to us. It can only raise doubts in the minds of the peoples of the world who have access to the truth and who recognize it when presented, that you have any honest intention of seeking an honorable end to hostilities.

Whenever you are willing to discuss strictly military matters connected with a military armistice, we are of the opinion that an equitable arrangement can be worked out.

As long as you continue to cling to your discredited 38 parallel zone with its impossible conditions this conference cannot make progress. For that reason, the United Nations Command Delegation now informs you that it is through discussing the 38 parallel. It is through considering your flimsy arguments related to the 38 parallel.

We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. We will not discuss further the 38 parallel as a military demarcation line. We trust this is quite clear.

Nam Il: I have one thing to ask which I don’t understand in your statement. In your statement as a reason for your opposition against our stand—our fair and reasonable stand that the 38 parallel should be made the military demarcation line, you said that we said we want to go back to the 38 parallel where the aggressive war was broken out. What is meant by the ‘aggressive war’ which you say, and whom do you mean is the aggressor? Whom do you mean—who has provoked the aggressive war?

Adm Joy: I will reread the statement. ‘We are left no recourse but to believe that your current objective is a face-saving return to the 38 parallel, from which this unprovoked war of aggression began’. That statement does not say anything about who provoked the war. My statement had no implications unless you take it as such.

Nam Il: It is not quite reasonable to say that the aggressive war was broken out, and say that nobody provoked the aggressive war. The fact itself that the aggressive war broke out means that there was an aggressor. Therefore, I request a clear explanation of your statement.

Adm Joy: Aggression in Korea and the identity of the aggressor has been established by the vast majority of the nations of the world in councils assembled and after thorough investigation of the [Page 804] facts. It is not the purpose of this conference to determine who was the aggressor. That has already been determined.

Nam Il: As for this question you want—you tried to dodge a full-sided answer?

Adm Joy: I am not trying to dodge the answer. I told you the purpose of this conference was not to determine who was an aggressor in any war.

Nam Il: I don’t mean that the object of this meeting is to decide who the aggressor is, but as you say in your statement about the aggressive war, I want to clarify it—I want to have you clarify it. If we take your answer as the full-sided answer to my question, I would take it for thus: (United Nations interpreter: ‘I would understand it as follows’) I will take the side to be aggressor which all the freedom loving and peace-loving peoples of the world think aggressor. (United Nations interpreter: ‘I consider to be the aggressor the side which all freedom loving and peace-loving peoples of the world know to be the aggressor’). And now I further express my opinion—I would like to continue to give our view with regards to the question of the military demarcation line on which no agreement has so far been reached, as a result of your insistence on your unreasonable proposal. After I have repeatedly refuted clearly and completely the thoughtless basis of your proposal, I cannot understand how you can still insist upon your absurd and arrogant proposal. The correctness and reasonableness of my arguments should have long ago been perceived by anybody with an open mind, but I shall not be adverse to restating them once again in the hope that you will give up your absurd and arrogant proposal, and accept our fair and reasonable proposal of fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line. You have repeatedly vaunted the effectiveness of the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces, and insisted upon getting a compensation for it on the ground in the armistice agreement, attempting thereby to push your troops a great distance to the north of the 38 parallel, and within our positions, and demand our troops to withdraw from a large area of territory. I have pointed out again and again the indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of innocent inhabitants and peaceful cities by your air and naval forces, in violation of international law, should be regarded as a shame by any self-respecting military man. Furthermore, exaggeration of the military effectiveness of certain complementary armed services in isolation of the war as a whole, and contention that these services are sufficient to decide the outcome of the war and play an independent part, should not be the logic of anyone who is militarily minded. As a matter of fact, it is only under the support of the indiscriminate bombing and [Page 805] bombardment by your air and naval forces, in violation of international law, that your ground forces have barely and temporarily maintained the present situation on the battlefield. If there were no cover and support of such indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, your ground forces would have long ago been driven out of the Korean Peninsula. What is more, your naval and air forces certainly cannot dominate unchallenged the Korean sea and the Korean air. The naval and air forces of the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers are constantly growing and have dealt considerable blows to your naval and air forces. The serious losses of your naval and air forces admitted by yourselves, are a clear proof of this point. Your apparent belief, which appears persistently in your statements, that we have no naval and air forces at all, is therefore completely at variance with facts. You say that should your air and naval forces stop fighting, various advantages would accrue to us, and therefore you must be compensated. Has it occurred to you that according to your logic, should our Army, acknowledged as mighty and superior by the whole world, stop fighting so that your troops will escape the fate of annihilation, are we not entitled to an even greater compensation, and to propose a demarcation line and demilitarized zone to the neighborhood of the Naktong river? But you can rest assured that we shall not make such an illogical proposal because such a proposal would be as absurd as yours, and as incompatible with the spirit of settling problems in our negotiations. Again you have repeatedly emphasized the so-called necessity of defensible positions, and assurance of the security of troops, and insisted upon the establishment of your defensive positions north of the 38 parallel, above the present battleline, and within our positions. Regarding this, I have repeatedly pointed out that the establishment of defensible positions should not in any case be taken as the main and decisive questions in fixing the military demarcation line, and that it is even less justified to seek to fix the military demarcation line north of the 38 parallel, above the present battleline and within our positions under the excuse of establishing defensive positions. I have also pointed out again and again that the best measure to guarantee the security of troops of both sides is to fix the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line, and withdraw the armed forces of both sides 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel respectively, so as to establish a demilitarized zone. You say that you are not looking for defensible positions north of the present line of contact, and that you merely demand the stationing of certain guards along a certain boundary of your proposed demarcation zone. Has it never occurred to you that according to your logic, we could also demand the stationing of guards south of the Han River. We did not, [Page 806] and we shall not do so, for that would be as naive as your demand and just as incapable of deceiving anyone, and would indefinitely protract our armistice negotiations. On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line, with both sides withdrawing their armed forces 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone, does reflect the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. It is fair and reasonable to both sides, and is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I have repeatedly pointed out that the characteristics and trend of the Korean battlefront demonstrates clearly that our proposal reflects the military realities of the battlefront at the present stage. You say you are not interested in history, that the characteristics and trend of the Korean battlefront are all of no significance, but even your highest military men could not but repeatedly admit that the greatest military achievement you could attain would be to maintain your positions on the 38 parallel. Our proposal that the 38 parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line is fair and reasonable to both sides, because the 38 parallel is occupied today by both sides, and both sides occupy sectors similar in area on the 2 sides of the 38 parallel. The withdrawal by both sides 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel so as to establish a demilitarized zone is consistent with the principle of equality and reciprocity, and does not involve any loss to either side. Furthermore, our proposal that the 38 parallel be fixed as the demarcation line is unfavorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question—is favorable, excuse me! Our proposal that the 38 parallel be fixed as the military demarcation line is favorable to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, because this is recognized by the whole world as the basis of ending the Korean war. Without such a basis, not only would we be unable to settle the question of delineation of a demilitarized zone, or to discuss other questions of armistice, but we would also be unable to pave the way for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. I sincerely requested that you seriously consider and accept our proposal.

Nam Il: You say that you would not discuss any more about fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line. I would like to know what you mean by this information? Does it mean that you mean to deprive us of our sacred right to insist upon our stand in discussion of fixing the military demarcation line? We think that it is our right, which we cannot be deprived of, to insist on, as a fair and reasonable demarcation line, on having the 38 parallel as the demarcation line, and you have no reason whatever to deprive us of this right. That is all and we are waiting for your answer to the question.

[Page 807]

Adm Joy: We do not deprive you of the right to say what you please. I will read again what we say, what we mean. We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current military realities. We will not be responsive in any way to any further efforts on your part to engage us in discussion of the 38 parallel as a military line of demarcation. That is all.

Nam Il: At present we have nothing more to say.

Adm Joy: Neither do we. (Here ensued 2 hour and 11 minute period of silence).

Adm Joy: Would you like to say something?

Nam Il: At present I have nothing to say.

Adm Joy: We continue to make no progress. So far you have failed to offer any proposal for the location of a demilitarized zone based solely on current mil realities. We are left no recourse but to believe that your objective is only a face-saving one. You wish only to return to the conditions of 25 June 1950.

We have proposed to you the general loc of a reasonable demilitarized zone. It has been arrived at after long and careful study. It is in the general area of the battle line. It is based on a fair assessment of the current overall mil situation.

Your attitude is inflexible and unreasonable. We have offered to discuss adjustments to this demilitarized zone. We continue to remain flexible to reasonable, logical and pertinent discussion within the mil field but on no other grounds.

We are always willing to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current mil realities. For the second time I trust this is clear. We will not discuss further the 38 parallel as a mil demarcation line. It appears that we are temporarily deadlocked on item 2. How do you propose this deadlock be broken? That is all.

Nam Il: We oppose any scheme which fixes the mil demarcation line north of the 38 parallel. We oppose the scheme of fixing the demarcation line at the present battle line, that is, the scheme of armistice at present positions, but in particular what we cannot possibly tolerate is the absurd proposal that you make that the military demarcation line be fixed north of the 38 parallel above the present battle line and within our positions. We have repeatedly demonstrated that this proposal of yours is based on an argument which is illogical and contrary to the principle of logic and reasonableness but you have not given any answer to our refutations. I hope that you will seriously reconsider the fair and reasonable proposal we made that the 38 parallel be fixed as [Page 808] the mil demarcation line. The solution of the deadlock in our discussions on the second item is to have the 38 parallel as the mil demarcation line.

Adm Joy: I thought I made it clear that we will not, discuss further any line of demarcation or demilitarized zone based on the 38 parallel. You have not made a proposal yet as to how the deadlock may be broken.

Nam Il: I repeatedly stated that it is reasonable, fair, and in conformity with the present mil realities to make the 38 parallel the mil demarcation line. In spite of it, you said today that you are not going to discuss any more about the 38 parallel and I think it is not right. We make it clear that we will continue—we will always insist on having the 38 parallel as the mil demarcation line and we make it also clear that it must be accepted. And this stand of ours is unshakable.

Adm Joy: Since you have no proposal to offer there may be some merit in dropping agenda item 2 temporarily. By so doing we may find areas of mutual agreement in which some of our mutual problems could be quickly settled. In addition, by discussing other items, it is possible that agenda item 2 may be received later in a different light. By so doing we may save time in arriving at an over-all mil armistice agreement. I therefore propose we proceed to discussion of item 3 of the agenda. That is all.

Nam Il: It is indeed very regrettable that we have not been able to reach an agreement on agenda item 2 although many days have been taken for its discussion. This, however, does not mean that item 2 cannot, or should not, continue to be discussed. I consider that in order to solve the other questions in our agenda we must first and foremost solve the most crucial question in the agenda, that is, the question of fixing the mil demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone. Speaking in general, the agenda items of a conference are arranged in the order of the importance of questions to be dealt with. Once an agenda is formulated, the agreeing parties should proceed with discussion of items in accordance with the agenda order. The order should not be altered unless demanded by special important reasons. Our agreed agenda has been arranged correctly, according to the importance of the questions we are to settle. We consider that the question of fixing the 38 parallel as the mil demarcation line so as to establish a demilitarized zone is the prerequisite question in stopping the Korean war, that is to say, the basic condition of the Armistice. Once this fundamental question is solved, the various questions of concrete arrangements included in the following items are not difficult to be settled, that is, the questions of supervised organs and war [Page 809] prisoners. Conversely, if the fundamental question of fixing the mil demarcation line is not solved, all these questions of concrete arrangements will be impossible to discuss, that is, the questions of the supervised organ and prisoners of war. And even if discussed, it will be as baseless as castles in the air and a waste of time. In view of the above mentioned reasons, we would rather spend more time and energy on the continued discussion of this item. If you have good faith, I believe it should be possible to solve this question speedily. On the contrary, if you should continue to maintain your former attitude in discussing the questions, it would not be certain whether our work will make speedy progress, even if the order of the agenda items were reversed. We hope you will consider your stand and continue to discuss item 2 with us in good faith. And if we solve this question, the other questions can also be solved and the desire and the demand of the peoples of the world for peace can be realized. That is all.

Adm Joy: You have failed to offer any proposal for the location of demilitarized zone based solely on the overall mil situation. You have refused to discuss the adjustment of the demilitarized zone we proposed. This you have refused even though you know in general it is a fair representation of the overall mil situation. You have refused to proceed by temporarily passing to the discussion of item 3. It should have been perfectly clear that such action might have had the advantage of saving time and permitting some progress to be registered by this conference. In view of your unreasonable and so far inflexible stand it appears that nothing is to be gained by continuing the conference today. I propose that we recess until 1100 hours our time tomorrow. It is hoped that by so doing you will reconsider your position on the points I have mentioned above. It is further hoped that you will return tomorrow with 1 or more proposals designed to further, rather than hinder, these negotiations.

We are always willing at any time to discuss a demarcation line and a demilitarized zone based on the battle line and current mil realities. We will not be responsive in any way to any further efforts on your part to engage us in discussion of the 38 parallel as a mil line of demarcation.

My reply to your last msg concerning the alleged UNC air violations of 7 August, will be formally presented to your Senior Liaison Officer today.

He will also be given the formal report of the UNC investigation into the alleged 7 August incident of the patrols at Pan Mun Jom.

[Page 810]

We wish to thank you for the use of your transportation from the airfield today.

Nam Il: I have something which I must inform you. The information you gave us is completely absurd and arrogant and is in complete violation of the principle of equality and reciprocity between the 2 parties at the conference. We absolutely cannot agree to such an unreasonable information given by your side, I must also state again that our proposal of making the 38 parallel the mil demarcation line is absolutely unshakable. Tomorrow I shall continue to state our views in connection with this fair, reasonable and just proposal of ours.

We agree to your proposal to recess till 11 o’clock by your time and 10 o’clock by our time tomorrow.

Part 5. Conclusions:

a.
No evidence of change or of likely change in position of enemy reference 38 parallel.
b.
Delegation strongly believes that now is the time to intensify efforts to influence world opinion by pointing out the arbitrary, intransigent and unreasoning attitude of Communist delegation and their obvious desire to deadlock negotiations if UNC does not meet their original demand.”

This concludes the delegations report. My comments follow.

a.
The record to date is devoid of evidence of Communist good faith and is recently replete with evidence of intention to force as either to yield on issue of 38 parallel, or to break-off the conference.
b.
Accordingly, I am directing UNC delegation to meet once more Saturday, 11 Aug, and there to inform the Communists that the UNC delegation flatly, formally and finally refuses further discussion of the 38 parallel as a line of demarcation; that the UNC delegation remains ready to discuss a line of demarcation based on present military positions, as repeatedly explained in previous meetings; that the UNC delegation again states its willingness to put aside item 2 of the agenda and pass to the next item, returning later to item 2; that the UNC delegation will await notification of acceptance of 1 or the other of these proposals; and finally, that failing to receive such notification of acceptance within 72 hours will consider the conference terminated by the deliberate act of the Communists.
c.
Request your approval or other instructions by Flash message.
d.
Recommend that whatever action is taken be released to press in Wash at such time and in such language as will place the onus for this impasse squarely on the Communists where it belongs.1

  1. The reply from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contained in telegram JCS 98637, transmitted from Washington on August 10 at 5:02 p. m., read as follows:

    “Action proposed para b your comments following Part 5 your C–68672 not approved. Your instructions require that you not break off meetings without previous instructions from Wash. You should continue meetings until further guidance received.” (Black Book, Tab 23)