Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 118: Telegram
The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff
C–67877. This msg in 5 parts. Subj: Armistice Conf at Kaesong, 28 Jul 1951.
Part 1: Summary:
Entire day spent in debate over loc of demilitarized zone. Nam Il delivered atk on United Nations Command proposed zone reiterated 38 parallel as only basis of zone. United Nations Command Delegation gave rebuttal in afternoon, atk 38 parallel as basis for zone and reaffirming psn on zone as described in our msg of 27 Jul. Meetings to continue tomorrow at 1100K.
Part 2. Progress:
No progress other than further elaboration of respective psns.
Part 3. Attitude:
Enemy delegation attempted to exhibit righteous indignation over [Page 748] United Nations Command proposed zone. Considerable bluster indulged in by Nam Il in his morning speech, but toned down noticeably after Admiral Joy’s response in afternoon.
Part 4. Sequence of events:
Conference reconvened at 1000K. Nam Il, having given Admiral Joy an opportunity to open, opened with a rebuttal of United Nations Command Delegations psn on loc of demilitarized zone. This follows in full.
“Now we will speak. Yesterday I heard with surprise your incredible statement and had a glance at that map of yours on which were 3 lines which anybody with red, blue and black pencils could have drawn. One of the 3 lines was apparently advocated by you to be fixed as the military demarcation line. At the time I already felt that such lines drawn at random were not worthy of attention and when I had heard the arguments you raised in support of these lines I was even more convinced that they were not worthy of attention, because your arguments were naive and illogical. What did you say actually in support of the lines you had drawn? You maintained that the fixing of this military demarcation line and the delineation of a demilitarized zone must start from the consideration of the existing military realities and be free from the influence of any political or territorial considerations. Now among the so-called military considerations, you advocated the doctrine of military effectiveness. You contended that you held Air and Naval superiority and that therefore, the demarcation line drawn across the land must enable the area occupied by your ground forces to be pushed forward a great step into our area so as to reflect the present military situation. We consider that this theory of yours is based on a one-sided, simple and incorrect military point of view. We consider that in fixing a military demarcation line, due attention should indeed be paid to the military realities on the battlefront. Yet the armistice we seek is the first step toward the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, and is not intended for the resumption of fighting. Therefore, in fixing this military demarcation line, apart from giving due consideration to the military realities on the battlefield, we must also give consideration to the creation of favorable conditions for the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Judging by this criterion, the entire tenor of your statement was to boast about the so-called military power and effectiveness on your side in an attempt to intimidate. You should be aware that such a gesture can intimidate nobody but, what is more important, such a gesture can only have a harmful effect on the armistice negotiations as the first step towards the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. You asserted that the advantages we would gain by the cessation of Air and Naval attacks [Page 749] by the United Nations Forces would be greater than the advantages given up by us in the withdrawal by our ground forces to the line running through Pyongyang and Wonsan. I would like to know, since the situation is so preponderantly favorable on your side, why did you not hold your ground in the Pyongyang-Wonsan line you had reached instead of withdrawing all the way to Suwon Area, the Han River, under the cover and support of your Naval and Air Forces? May I advise you sincerely that these naive remarks you have made can have no good purpose for our negotiations while they can intimidate nobody. The less there are of such remarks, the better it would be.
With regards to the military realities on the present battlefront, naturally we cannot ignore the comparison of military power of both sides, which is primarily constituted by the effectiveness of the various arms of the forces employed by both sides.
Yet it would be a gross mistake to think that this constitutes all the factors of the war powers of the two sides. Have you never lent a thought to the following question? Can it be explained purely by the so-called effectiveness of the various arms of the forces that, in spite of the wanton bombing and bombardment by your Air and Naval Forces your battle lines rolled back from the Yalu River to the vicinity of the 38 parallel? No.
The factors constituting war power in fact are much more complicated than the effectiveness of the various arms of the forces. We have repeatedly stressed other factors as manpower, morale, political conditions, etc. Of course, I have not sufficient time to discuss military theories at present. I will only make a few remarks about the ridiculous theory about the 3 zones; land, air and sea.
It mentions in any military manual worthy of its name that military power is the sum total of the power of all arms of the forces. The position gained by any one of the arms is dependent upon the coordination of the other arms. That is to say, the position occupied by your ground forces for the time being is inseparable from the support of your Air and Naval Forces. In other words, your battle lines on the ground are the concentrated expression of the military effectiveness of your land, air and sea forces.
I must further point out that the indiscriminate bombing and bombardment by your Naval and Air Forces have in the past year only destroyed a large number of peaceful towns and villages, killed and wounded innocent civilians of our country without being able to intimidate the Korean Peoples Army and the Chinese Peoples Volunteers. In fact, we are steadily overcoming the difficulties caused by your bombing and bombardment and are progressing in large strides. This is a fact known to all, yet you are still boasting that there are [Page 750] three isolated battle zones, that you have forced us to withdraw on the ground, and you have established a separate royal domain in the air and on the sea. You maintain that once all hostilities cease, you will be at a disadvantage and hence you propose that the military demarcation line must be deep in our side so that it will be no loss to you. Such logic of yours can only deceive those who are neurotic and muddle headed. Therefore the military demarcation line which you have proposed on such a fallacious theory is completely groundless and hence unworthy of consideration and cannot be considered. On the other hand, our proposal of fixing the 38 parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides reflects from the viewpoint of military consideration the relative war power of both sides at the present state. From the viewpoint that our negotiation should be the first step towards peaceful settlement of the Korean question, our proposal is also one which is recognized by the whole world and one that is reasonable, realistic and practicable. What are the characteristics of the battlefront at the present stage? Since this year the situation of the battlefront has been changing all the time. In January the troops of our side advanced to the Suwon region South of the 38 parallel. Since then the battleline of contact between both sides has been shifting South and North of the 38 parallel all the time. You are aware and I am also aware that the present positions occupied by both sides are similarly changing all the time.
This kind of situation will continue until agreement is reached through our negotiations and implemented. Therefore the present situation of the battlefront cannot be taken as reflecting the military realities of the battlefront. Thus all attempts to take the present military situation as the basis of the military demarcation line cannot reflect the military realities and consequently cannot be subject for consideration. This the necessary conclusion drawn from one of the characteristics of the Korean battlefront.
Secondly, another characteristic of the battlefront is that the battlelines are changing all the time, while on the whole, remaining within the sphere of the region of the 38 parallel. Obviously any clear-headed military observer or military commander has to admit this powerful fact. From this characteristic we cannot avoid the following conclusion that is, at the present state the 38 parallel approximately reflects the situation of both sides on the battle front. Therefore, proceeding purely from the military viewpoint alone, we deem that the 38 parallel as a military demarcation line is reasonable, realistic, and practicable. Therefore we specifically propose the following proposal for the second item on the agenda:
“1. Fix the 38 parallel as the demarcation line between both sides.
[Page 751]“2. Withdrawal of the armed forces of both sides 10 kilometers from the 38 parallel.
“3. Taking the area 20 kilometers in depth from which the armed forces are withdrawn as the demilitarized zone.
“After giving you my deliberating criticism of your statement of yesterday, I would like to put to you a question. Seeing that you make such a completely absurd and arrogant statement for what actually have you come here? Have you come here to negotiate for peace or just to look for an excuse for extending the war? I formally ask you to give us your answer to this question.”
At 1047K Admiral Joy requested a recess until 1330K to consider these remarks.
Conference reconvened at 1330K. Nam Il opened with following statement:
“I left out something in my translation this morning. I am going to correct it now. In fact, I left out following statement in my English version: In fact it is only by relying on indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your Air and Naval Forces in violation of the international law that the present position of your ground forces are barely and temporarily maintained. Without such cover and support of indiscriminate bombing and bombardment the ground forces would long since have withdrawn to no one knows where”.
Admiral Joy’s rebuttal of Nam Il consisted of (1) an answer to his rhetorical question (2) a comment on the tone of Nam Il’s statement (3) assertion that United Nations Command Delegation statement of position was not designed to intimidate but to depict the military realities of the situation (4) a rebuttal of Nam Il’s contention that the present battle line reflects fully the United Nations Command Air and Naval capabilities (5) a refutation of the contention that the 38 parallel represents the composite fluid battle line of the war and an assertion that the present battle position represents the most stable line of war since the breakout from the Naktong River line as there have been no major changes there since 15 June. Statements (1) and (2) above are quoted:
- “(1) You closed your statement this morning with a rhetorical question so inappropriate, so irrelevant and so discourteous as to be unworthy of a reply. But you compounded this rude and graceless act by a formal request for a formal reply. It is for that reason that I dignify your question with an answer. In making that reply I need only cite the presence of the United Nations Command Delegation in this Armistice Conference as evidence of our sincere intent to seek an honorable and equitable basis for the termination of hostilities. If it were, as you imply, our objective to prolong hostilities, we should not need to come to an armistice conference in search of an excuse.”
- “(2) I wish to comment briefly on the tone of your remarks this morning. In your statement this morning you expressed yourself in rude terms applied to the United Nations Command Delegation, including many discourteous adjectives. In your discourtesy, you have resorted to bluster directed at this delegation. All here are presumed to be military men. Those peoples whose military organizations are respected throughout the world are proud of the reputation for courtesy and for objective mental attitudes towards serious questions unfailingly demonstrated by the personnel of their armed services. Military men are expected to be sufficiently mature to realize that bluster and bombast phrased in intemperate language do not and cannot affect the facts of any military situation. No amount of such vituperation as was indulged in by you this morning will sway the concentration of the United Nations Command Delegation on the serious problems before this conference. No amt of discourtesy will tempt the United Nations Command Delegation to utilize similar tactics.
“You should understand, however, that rudeness such as you have displayed will lead to only one end if continued. That is, the United Nations Command Delegation will be compelled to conclude you have no serious or sincere purpose at this conference, and the prospect of peace in Korea will be greatly dimmed. With all the earnestness at my command I urge you to consider most seriously where your recent attitude may lead. I hope to note in your further remarks, tangible evidence that this conference will resume the high level of traditional courtesy between military men, which until this morning, it had enjoyed, so that progress in an atmosphere of logic and reason may go rapidly forward.
“I shall now proceed to more important business.”
At 1412 Nam Il replied saying he only criticized United Nations Command unclear and unilateral statement. Courtesy must be observed on both sides. United Nations Command Delegation cannot intimidate his delegation. Already commented on yesterday’s statement and its ridiculous and fallacious doctrines. He had also given a correct opinion but United Nations Command today gave the same old views. Extremely regretable. Minimized effects United Nations Command Naval and Air Forces. “If you are so powerful as you say why did you retreat to Taegu last summer and to the Han last winter?
“Since tenor of remarks is the same the less said the better. Yesterday you suggested cease fire on the ground without any in the air and on the sea and today you suggested the same. We are not here to vaunt our strength, but to reach an armistice. Hence we are fair and just. Our proposal of 38 parallel testifies to our attitude and standpoint.”
[Page 753]At 1430 Admiral Joy requested 30 minutes recess.
At 1500 Admiral Joy reopened with another statement to rebut Nam Il’s effect to minimize independent Air and Naval capabilities. Nam Il replied that he had already given his views on this and added some comments on effect of these operations on civil population. Admiral Joy asserted that Nam Il’s remarks contained nothing new and that he had only one more point. He corrected Nam Il’s remark that United Nations Command Delegation had proposed ground cease fire alone with continuation Air and Naval operations.
Nam Il asserted his position on 38 parallel had been clear from first day. His stand righteous and immovable. He had analyzed United Nations Command proposal and had nothing more to say.
Again Nam Il repeated present line of contact is not a fixed line. “That is, it can be changed even during the negotiations”. If so how can one think of starting from this line? Proposed again acceptance Communist position Item nbr 2.
In final statement for today Nam Il mentioned righteousness of his proposal, said he understood the United Nations Command proposal precisely and added that if United Nations Command had nothing more to say he proposed a recess until 291100K. Recessed at 281542K July 51.
Part 5. Conclusions.
Enemy delegation is either waiting for a compromise offer by United Nations Command Delegation on loc of zone, or has no authority to do other than hold for 38 parallel at this time. Although it is too early to predict the possibility exists that discussions may deadlock on the issue of the 38 parallel.