Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 119: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Tokyo, 29 July 1951—8:55 p. m.

C–67939. This msg in 5 parts. Subj Armistice Conference at Kaesong 29 July 1951.

Part 1. Summary: In morning Nam Il reiterated his stand on 38th parallel, attacked United Nation Command proposal regarding zone. Joy delivered rebuttal on salient points of Nam Il’s speech, reaffirmed United Nations Command proposed zone. In afternoon Joy again explained United Nations Command position on zone, giving reasons and principles on which based. Military advantages of cease fire to Communists pointed out. Need for defensible position stressed. Nam Il repeated his position on 38th parallel as demarcation line. Joy ended meeting with firm statement holding to United Nations Command proposal, rejecting 38th parallel. Recess until tomorrow.

Part 2. Progress: None.

Part 3. Attitude: Nam Il very mild in presentation, carefully polite, sought to create impression of patient reasonableness.

Part 4. Sequence of Events: Conference opened at 1102K. Communists asked if United Nations Command Delegation had any opinion on the Communists position as stated 28th July. United Nations Command replied “nothing except propose that we adopt our demilitarized zone as a basis for continuing discussions”. Nam Il then spoke as follows: “I will make my statement. I have again made a careful study of the statement you made yesterday afternoon. I have to say frankly that it has caused us great disappointment. Your arguments show no improvement at all on what you said the day before yesterday. You say that your proposal is logical and tenable. Yet, I cannot but point out that the arguments you employ in support of your proposal are entirely illogical and therefore untenable. I would like to make some comment on the fundamental viewpoint you take with regards to the question of fixing a military demarcation line to establish a demilitarized zone. You have repeatedly stressed that only military considerations, pure and simple, should be considered in solving this question. These military considerations of yours are in fact an exaggeration of your own military strength and an attempt to secure through illogical reasoning an advantageous position which does not actually exist. Such considerations of yours make it difficult to believe that you have come to this Armistice Conference for the genuine conclusion of the Korean war, and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. As you have asserted, to exaggerate one’s own military strength in an attempt to secure more advantageous military position surely cannot but give people the impression that this is to prepare to fight again. Our position on this question is different from yours. We consider that this Armistice Conference itself is the first step of the peaceful settlement of the Korean question, while fixing the military demarcation line is the basic condition of an armistice. In view of your not foregoing to fix the military demarcation line, it is not only necessary to take into consideration the present situation on the battlefront, but also to make sure that the decision made on this should be reasonable and equitable to both sides, and beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. This position of ours can be made public to the world and is supported by all the peace-loving peoples of the world. But what is more incomprehensible are the so-called military considerations you have raised. Your considerations are directed toward attaining one result, that is the pushing the military demarcation line into our present positions. In seeking to achieve this apparent aim, you have resorted to a most illogical logic to support your viewpoint. You make the arbitrary assertion that you hold the superiority on the sea and in the air, that since the armistice has to be an armistice of the air, sea, and ground forces, this will be unfavorable to the superiority of your air and naval forces, and that therefore the front line on the ground should be pushed back into our side, and fixed as the military demarcation line so as to compensate for the advantages given up by your air and naval forces. Indeed, I cannot believe that you yourselves really believed in this theory because it is—excuse my saying it—too illogical. In my statement yesterday I have already made a thorough criticism on this theory of yours, which I am not going to repeat here. But then, you seem to be concerned over whether I understood what you meant and enumerated once again the 6 military roles played by your air force and of the power wielded by your navy. I appreciate your concern. But allow me to tell you sincerely that among the roles played by your naval and air forces, you have forgotten to mention the most important role, which has been and is still being played in Korea by your naval and air forces—that is the indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment of the civilians and cities and villages, in violation of International Law, a brutal action which should be regarded as the shame of 20th Century mankind. This is a most important fact. We believe any soldiers with a sense of honor should not take brutality as strength, much less pride themselves on it. Of course, you will ask, “do our naval and air operations really have no effect at all on your military action?” With the same sincerity, I would like to point out that they produce a certain amount of effect, but what is more important is that we have been steadily overcoming those effects, and are victoriously accomplishing our tasks in battle. You claim that you possess 3 forces—air, naval and ground—while we possess only a ground force. Even if to a certain extent this is true, would not the fact that our army by itself [off] setting your air and naval forces prove that our army is at least equivalent in valor to the total of your 3 forces, if not greater than [them]. What does this mean? I said yesterday that in fact it is only by the line of indiscriminate and inhuman bombing and bombardment by your air and naval forces in violation of International Law that the present position of your ground forces are barely and temporarily maintained. Without such cover and support of indiscriminate bombing and bombardment, your ground forces would have long been withdrawn to no one knows where. You stated that the situation of the ground forces of both sides approximately reflects the relative strength of the ground forces of both sides, but in fact, it is only under the support and cover of your air and naval forces that your ground forces barely and temporarily maintain their present positions. On the other hand, our ground forces have advanced from the Yalu River all the way to the region of the 38th parallel, by overcoming the difficulties of a certain extent that the wanton bombing and bombardment of your air and naval forces have been able to bring to our military actions. Hence, if the effectiveness of all of the armed forces is not taken into consideration, the existing situation of the ground forces cannot certainly be considered as reflecting the relative combat power of the ground forces of both sides. Military power is, of course, the sum total of the effectiveness of all the arms of the forces. The ground forces, however, play a decisive role. Considered from the viewpoint of winning the war, the air and naval forces can only support the arms of the forces and they in themselves alone cannot settle the battle. That is, in fact, no novel viewpoint. Anyone with some military knowledge knows this truth. For example, not long ago this was expressed by a person who is well acquainted with military affairs. He said that in his view, it is wholly untenable to think of waging wars with any special marvelous weapon without employing ground forces. We can and may very likely start from the air or the sea, but once it has started it will very quickly pass into land operations. Without ground activities, air bases cannot be occupied and maintained. No matter what gains have been made by the activities of the air or naval forces, they must be guarded by land forces. Excuse me, I made a mistake. “War can and may very likely start from the air or the sea, but once it has started, it will very quickly pass into land operations. Without ground operations, air bases cannot be occupied and maintained. No matter what gains have been made by the activities of the air or naval forces, they must be guarded by land forces.” Excuse me. This should be self-evident truth. But you refuse to recognize the decisive role of the ground forces and contend that the air and naval forces can wage war extensively and independently and even win victories. In doing this you have unknowingly committed a grave mistake. You said that in the last war Japan was defeated as a result of blows inflicted by your naval and air forces. You have forgotten that it was the Korean peoples liberation struggle and as a result of the Chinese peoples war of 8 years war and resistance by the Soviet Union, in addition to the operations of the other wartime allies, which defeated the forces of Japanese imperialism and that the decisive role was played by operations conducted mainly by the ground forces of China and the Soviet Union. Your naval and air forces fought Japan for nearly 3 years without being able to defeat them. It was only participation by the Soviet Army that a crushing blow was dealt that Japan was finally defeated. Can these historical facts be negated lightly? Your own action [tends?] to refute your own theory.

When war broke out in Korea on June 25th, 1950, the United States Government imagined that it could interfere with the Korean Civil War successfully by dispatching air and naval forces alone, but such a calculation and course of action went bankrupt a few days later and in view of this also it was under those conditions that the United States Government decided to dispatch its ground forces to fight in Korea, hence we have the situation today. By this fact I think I have fully refuted your reasons that the air and naval forces can win victories independently and the naval and ground forces can be taken into consideration separately. We consider the lines you have drawn to be unworthy of attention as the arguments supporting them are unattainable. There is not necessity to give consideration to the lines themselves. You said yesterday that the present battle line [is] the most stable line since the battle of Naktong River. This is still more groundless. Leaving aside the cause of the war last year, for the time being, we can see that since this year alone the ground battle lines have never been stabilized during the 7 months. The contact line between the two sides has shifted twice along the 38th parallel. We pushed twice south and you pushed twice north of the 38th parallel. Isn’t this proof enough that the ground battle lines are very unstable?

What is more worthy of notice—during the last 7 months our troops stayed nearly 5 months south of the 38th parallel and the period during which your troops twice stayed north of the 38th parallel amounted to a little more than 2 months. The positions held by you at present are only less than 2 months old. How then can it be called as stable? When our troops advanced south of the 38th Parallel the first time this year and reached the Han River area, they stayed there 3½ months. That is nearly double the length of time your troops have stayed at the present positions. If the Han River lines are not said to be stable, what reasons can you bring forth to prove that the positions held by you for less than 2 months are stable? How then can the lines be considered stable? The present battle line is only a temporary military situation. They are not in consonance with the military realities. I made a mistake—temporary. I mentioned already yesterday that the present battle line is constantly changing. Before an agreement is reached and our Armistice Negotiations are implemented present military situation should not and cannot be taken as the primary military consideration in fixing a military demarcation line. For the past 7 months the battle line has been changing constantly but through out these changes, there is a definite tendency—that is the movement of both sides did not in the main get beyond the region of the 38th parallel although the length of time, width, depth of penetration of our troops south of the 38th parallel were far greater than the penetration of your troops north of the 38th parallel.

We contend, therefore, that even from the exclusive viewpoint of military reality the 38th parallel reflects approximately the relative military strength of both sides at their present stage and should be made the military demarcation line between both sides. We have already mentioned in the foregoing that in fixing a military demarcation line we should take into account the present military realities before the armistice which we seek for [it?] is one which leads to the overall settlement of the Korean question. The first step in the peaceful settlement of the Korean question therefore at the same time we must take into account the military realities in fixing a military demarcation line, we must also take in account that fact that our decision must be beneficial to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question and must not be harmful or destructive to the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. Seen from this aspect, our stand of fixing the 38th parallel as the military demarcation line between both sides is clearly recognized by the whole world as just, equitable, reasonable, realistic and workable. Our position is real, considering the logic, and is therefore firm and unshakeable. I sincerely hope you will consider seriously and accept our proposal. Admiral Joy then presented a rebuttal to the charge of indiscriminate bombing, pointing out that while that charge has long been a favorite of the Communist propagandists, the enemy delegations are fully aware that the targets attacked by United Nations Command aircraft have had either real or apparent military significance. He further pointed out that if soldiers disguise themselves as civilians and hide military trucks, tanks, etc, in civilian houses that civilians will inevitably suffer, etc, etc. To leave propaganda for the propagandist and to concern ourselves here solely with military facts.

Admiral Joy followed this with an analysis of the preceding days meeting, pointing out that discussions had digressed from the subject of the establishment of a demilitarized zone and outlining the course discussion should take in order to confine the remarks to the subject.

The conference recessed at 1245K.

Reconvened at 1504K.

Admiral Joy opened with a reiteration of the United Nations Command position on the principles that must be considered in establishing a demilitarized zone which are briefly: a. The zone must be located geographically in relation to the existing overall military situation; b. The zone must be outlined by easily recognized terrain features; c. Suitable defensive positions must be available on both sides and in close proximity to the zone.

He followed with a statement outlining the advantages to the enemy of a cease fire prefaced with the remark that the advantages the enemy gains are not those that are necessarily reflected in the current situation both those which accrue to him in an armistice and which are, in turn, a distinct loss to United Nations troops; that his superiority is in numbers of ground forces, United Nations superiority in air and at sea. He pointed out that the enemy ground forces gained primarily in the logistic field during the armistice in that he would be able to repair at liberty his lines of communication and communications and industrial facilities, and would consequently be in a greatly improved position militarily should unforeseen events lead to a resumption of hostilities. He stated that it would take weeks for our air and naval power to again place the enemy in a logistic situation such as presently faces him. He reminded the enemy that no corresponding advantage could accrue to us through an armistice since our communications were not now subject to attack.

Admiral Joy then again pointed out that although we sincerely hoped that any armistice agreed here would be lasting, that it provides only a bridge for discussions and settlements at a higher level designed to bring about a permanent settlement; that the demilitarized zone should be so located tactically as to create a balance of military advantage and thus provide defensible positions to provide for the security of the forces of either side in case the armistice were violated. He pointed out that the United Nations Command is now in a defensible position and that it does not intend to jeopardize the security of its forces by relinquishing such a position during the period of the armistice and that a demilitarized zone based on the 38th parallel would provide no reasonable sound defensible position.

Nam Il referred to agenda item of demarcation line, and proposed that after the line was discussed, a return could be made to the demilitarized zone. Admiral Joy replied that United Nations Command delegation had reserved the right to present the demilitarized zone as it saw fit and the Commies had agreed. However, since they wanted a demarcation line they had been given one. Nam Il said this line is drawn with no basis whatever; for the United Nations military benefit and not for solution of armistice problem. 38th parallel as oft repeated is fair and must be demarcation line. Could not accept United Nations proposal.

Admiral Joy then concluded with the following remarks: We are disappointed in the remarks you have made thus far, inasmuch as you have made no move toward an area of possible agreement. We have told you before, and we tell you again, your proposal of the 38th parallel as the basis of a demilitarized zone is unsound, unrelated to the military situation, and unacceptable. The sooner you accept the fact that agreements reached at this conference are going to be confined to the military realities of the present situation, including the location of the military demarcation line and the demilitarized zone, the sooner we will be able to make progress. We are firmly convinced of the justice and equity of the demilitarized zone we have proposed. We leave that thought with you in the hope you will give it thorough consideration, and accordingly will drop further reference to non military lines.

Nam Il again proposed the 38th parallel and expressed hope United Nations Command Delegation would seriously consider and accept his stand. At 291610K meeting recessed until 301100K July.

Part 5. Conclusions: No new evidence upon which to base further conclusions.