Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

795.00/7–2351

Memorandum by the Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs (Johnson) of Conversations Held on July 20

top secret

[Washington,] July 23, 1951.

Subject: Korean Armistice (Meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff)

Participants:	General Collins	Mr. Matthews
	Admiral McCormick	Mr. Hickerson
	General White	Mr. Rusk
	Vice Admiral Davis	Mr. Johnson

The foregoing persons met at the Pentagon at 3:00 p. m., July 20, to discuss a telegram received from General Ridgway concerning a proposed statement for Admiral Joy and a public statement to be issued by General Ridgway with regard to Communist insistence on the adding to the agenda an item with regard to withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea.¹

It was apparent that the Joint Chiefs were prepared to transmit a message to General Ridgway in general approving his proposed course of action.

Mr. Rusk pointed out that:

(1) We could not be sure that the action proposed by General Ridgway would not cause a break in the negotiations. Whereas the action previously taken with respect to neutralization of Kaesong and reciprocity of treatment for both delegations succeeded, the present situation involved quite different considerations and there could be no certainty that General Ridgway’s proposed action would succeed—in fact success in the previous case would make it more difficult for the Communists again to concede to what in effect would be an ultimatum.

(2) It is questionable whether General Ridgway’s action would not raise the prestige factor for the other side to such a degree as to make it more difficult for them to concede on this point. Additionally, the prestige factor would make it difficult for them again to pay a price so soon for continuation of negotiations.

(3) General Ridgway’s proposal would give the Communists an opportunity to make what would publicly appear to be another major concession when in fact it would constitute no substantive concession at all. Thus when it came to a discussion of the substantive issues the pressure would be upon the UN Command to make corresponding concessions at a time when it would be in fact impossible for us to make concessions upon our minimum position, such as the location of the demarcation line between the two forces.

General Collins stated that he believed our position was somewhat weak as it had not been made clear that we in fact desire to withdraw all UN forces as soon as it is possible to do so. He felt that the position would be considerably strengthened if a statement, possibly by the Secretary of State, in amplification of his statement of February [July] 19, could be made. Obviously we must have an armistice before withdrawal can be discussed. It should be made clear that we will discuss withdrawal or reduction of forces at an appropriate time and place if there is an armistice. After further general discussion, it was agreed that it would be impossible to arrive at a position on General Ridgway’s proposal in time for him to receive a reply by the deadline of 5:00 p. m. Washington time, July 20. Therefore, a short telegram to General Ridgway approving the issuance by him of certain portions of his proposed statement and the statement by Admiral Joy, but specifically instructing him not to take any action for the time being which would in effect be a UN request for an indefinite recess conditional upon concession by the Communists as the price of resuming the talks, was drafted and approved.²

Following the foregoing meeting a full reply to General Ridgway’s message was drafted in the Department, discussed with and approved by the Secretary.

This reply was discussed with the JCS at 6:30 p. m. The same persons were present with the addition of Mr. Paul Nitze. There was but little difference in the substance of the operative portions of a similar message which had been drafted by the JCS and the meeting was largely spent in combining the two messages into a single message to General Ridgway which was approved by the representatives of both departments. It was agreed that the JCS would accept responsibility for clearing the message with the President.³

At this meeting, General Collins again reiterated his conviction that a statement should be shortly issued by some political leader in the Government concerning our willingness to withdraw and/or reduce UN forces at an appropriate time. He also strongly urged that some type of statement be issued which would make it clear to the Communists that the United States is considering a tougher war if the armistice negotiations break down, in order that the other side will be under no illusions on this point.

1. See telegram CX–67390, supra.

2. The message under reference was sent to General Ridgway in telegram JCS 96836, July 20, which read as follows:

   “1. Cannot secure top clearance on full reply to proposals in your CX 67390 by deadline set by you. You should not, pending further instructions, propose a recess of indefinite duration or a recess under conditions which would make convening another meeting contingent upon Communist concession on deletion of agenda item on withdrawal of foreign troops. No objection to your making your own proposed statement minus first and last para and minus all but first sentence of penultimate para. Joy’s statement should be modified accordingly, at least by deleting last two sentences.

   “2. Will send you further instructions soon as possible.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 92)

3. See telegram JCS 96930, July 21, infra.