Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 91: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret
flash

Tokyo, 20 July 1951—11:05 p. m.³

CX–67390. This message in 4 parts.

Part 1. Your 96802 of 20 July delivered to me 2200 Tokyo time today.²

I discussed matter in detail with full United Nations Command Delegation at Munsan late yesterday afternoon and there made and announced my decisions as stated herein. I am now in Tokyo. Had weather not prevented our Delegation from reaching conference site today,³ Admiral Joy had my authority and instructions to make the following closing statement in event Communist Delegation continued to insist on inclusion in agenda of the item “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea”. The intended statement follows:

“We have listened long and patiently to your efforts to have included in the agenda an item entirely irrelevant to a military armistice in Korea. You have used arguments at complete variance with what you know to be facts. You have made accusations that you must know have no basis in fact. Either you intend to delay the substantive discussions and in turn an armistice agreement, or you hope to force us to deviate from the main purpose for which we are assembled. By this time you should be able to appreciate fully our position. We believe you do understand it. Furthermore, you should realize that the 4 agenda items mutually agreed upon adequately cover all the items necessary to permit discussions of the essential topics for negotiating a military armistice. Unless you are now prepared to accept the 4 agreed items as an agenda, we will recess this meeting and wait until such time as you have something new and constructive to offer. We are prepared to begin substantive discussion of the 4 item agenda whenever you accept it.”

I am leaving these instructions to Admiral Joy unchanged in anticipation that the conference will convene again at 211000 July Tokyo time.

Part 2. In order to clarify the situation in the minds of the Communist Delegation and to prepare public opinion both at home and abroad, I am prepared in the eventuality stated above to release to the press not only the above quoted instructions to Admiral Joy, but also simultaneously the following:

“The United Nations Command Delegation has today informed the Communist Delegation that it desires a recess in the current armistice negotiations.

“During the 8 meetings which have so far been held, an attempt has been made to reach an agreement on an agenda for the negotiations of a military armistice for the suspension of hostilities. The adoption of such an agenda would be the first step in the substantive discussions which must take place before hostilities can cease.

“On 3 July 51, the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, informed General Kim Il Sung and General Peng Teh Huai that agreement on armistice terms must precede cessation of hostilities. Until an agreement acceptable to the United Nations Command is reached, and until the supervisory machinery is set up and ready to function, and the armistice terms themselves enter into effect, the United Nations Command will continue, by any or all means at its disposal, its military operations against the Communist aggression in Korea.

“As a result of the meetings held so far, 4 agenda items have been agreed to by both Delegations. These are:

• “1. Adoption of agenda.
• “2. Fixing a military demarcation line between both sides so as to establish a demilitarized zone as the basic condition for the cessation of hostilities in Korea.
• “3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of cease fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority and function of a supervising organ for carrying out the terms of cease fire and armistice.
• “4. Arrangements pertaining to prisoners of war.

“An agenda composed of these items covers all the points essential for a full discussion of the problems pertaining to a military armistice. The United Nations Command Delegation is therefore prepared to begin these discussions.

“The Communist Delegation, on the other hand, refused to begin the discussions and has delayed the negotiations by attempting to introduce into the agenda items of a political and a propaganda nature. Although they agreed with the original proposal by the United Nations Command Delegation that these talks should be confined to military matters, they have informed the United Nations Delegation that they will not accept any agenda which does not include ‘the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea’. Thus, it has become apparent that the Communist Delegation, by its insistence on this item, is knowingly and persistently delaying the initiation of concrete steps to end the fighting in Korea, and is attempting to use these negotiations as a means for reaching a political settlement in Korea on its own terms.

“The United Nations Command Delegation is ready to resume the discussions whenever it is assured that the Communist Delegation is sincere and is acting in good faith in an attempt to reach a military armistice.”

Part 3. There are 3 basic factors as I see them in connection with the foregoing. First and of most vital importance is the maintenance unimpaired of the complete support by the United States Government and the United Nations here represented of the position taken and publicly announced by the United Nations Command Delegation. To undermine this in the slightest degree by any concession of any kind at this stage of our discussions would be instantly recognized and seized upon as a fundamental weakness and exploited to the fullest. It could, in my opinion, destroy all that the United Nations Command Delegation has so far accomplished, through its reasonable but unmistakable firm insistence on logic and its right.

Second is the distinction between “breaking off” and “recessing” the current discussions. In the 2 statements quoted herein and in fact on other prior occasions the United Nations Command Delegation has made clear and apparently has achieved acceptance by the Communist Delegation of the difference between “breaking off” and “recessing”. In the event the 2 proposed press releases quoted above should be made, I believe this distinction would continue to be accepted. I am convinced at this moment that the Communists would not “break off” our discussions on this issue as I propose to present it.

The third factor concerns the 4 agenda items already agreed to by both delegations. Proposed agenda item 3 provides an adequate opportunity for the Communist Delegation to air its views unilaterally on the subject of “withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea”.

Part 4. In the belief that the action planned, as stated above, best meets the current situation and in no substantial sense deviates from the spirit of the instructions and guidance contained in your 96802, I intend to proceed as indicated above unless your contrary instructions are received here prior to 210700 July Tokyo time.⁴

3. Due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, this telegram arrived in Washington on July 20 prior to the discussions recorded in Mr. Johnson’s memorandum, infra.
2. Telegram JCS 96802 (p. 704) was dispatched in the evening of July 19, EDT, by which time it was already July 20 in Tokyo.
3. General Ridgway, in his telegram HNC–120, July 20, not printed, had already informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that the scheduled meeting had been postponed until the following morning due to swollen streams which made road travel to Kaesong impossible and bad weather which prevented helicopter travel. (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 91)
4. A manuscript note in the source text indicated that this corresponded to 5 p. m., July 20, EDT; see infra.