Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 93: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Far East (Ridgway)

top secret
operational immediate

Washington, 21 July 1951—11:15 a. m.

JCS 96930. From JCS. Reur CX 67390,¹ JCS 95354,² JCS 96802,³ JCS 96836⁴ and JCS 96421.⁵

1. You have complete backing of United States Govt in your position on discussion of withdrawal of Foreign troops and there is no intention here to depart from basic guidance contained in JCS 95354 which remains in effect.

2. It is important that, if and when breakdown of negotiations occurs, the onus for failure shall rest clearly and wholly upon the Communists. This is the basis for guidance you are currently receiving.

3. Technique by which you obtained success in connection with arrangements at Kaesong may not work as readily in dealing with major difference on such a fundamental policy matter as withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea. From what Communists have reportedly said in meeting thus far and from Moscow and Peiping propaganda line, this point may be breaking point with Communists as well as with us. In any event, most difficult prestige issue would be created by us if Communists are told at this stage that, in effect, the price of further meetings is concession by them on point to which they have publicly attached such importance.

4. A recess which developed into a break-up of talks on simple issue that UN Delegation would not attend the meetings unless Communists agree not to press for inclusion on agenda of item of withdrawal of troops would not present sufficiently clear and powerful issue before world public opinion, even though issue of withdrawal of troops itself is one on which we would have full support.

5. Although it may be that your estimate is correct that Communists would not break off discussions on this issue, position we take must also be entirely satisfactory as to issue, time and circumstances in the event Communists do in fact break. Precipitation of break must be accompanied by prior diplomatic and public opinion preparation which must be firmly based upon issues readily understood and generally supported by the free world. In addition, such a break might require additional mil measures, now under study here, which cannot be resolved for some days.

6. If, on other hand, Communists do concede on this agenda point, concession under what would appear to be an ultimatum would be widely interpreted as a major concession by them. In fact, they will have made no concession to our own essential demands, If Communists make concession under these circumstances, discussions would then presumably turn to consideration of the substance of an acceptable armistice. When we reach a predictable impasse on such points as Kansas line and adequate inspection, Communists would be in propaganda position of having made two major concessions in response to UN ultimata; this would enormously increase political pressure on UN to make some concession, but at that stage concession would be impossible since minimum UN terms for armistice would be involved.

7. In meetings as reported thus far, Communists have themselves attempted repeatedly to discuss substance of agenda items prior to formal agreement upon complete agenda. If Communists should be willing to discuss substance of agreed agenda items in full knowledge that we shall not discuss or come to any agreement on withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea, you could proceed on that basis. This would force Communists themselves to break talks if they insist upon agenda item or, alternatively, permit discussions to proceed to determine whether armistice acceptable to us is possible. There would be advantage, if talks break down later upon such issues as Kansas line and adequate inspection, to have withdrawal of troops issue also in the picture as still another reason why Communists position is totally unreasonable and unacceptable.

8. In light of the foregoing we suggest that you proceed as follows:

A. We believe that you should first present your view that your proposed agenda Item 3 provides an adequate opportunity for the Communist Delegation to air its views unilaterally on subj “Withdrawal of Foreign Troops from Korea”.

B. We believe that your next step, if it becomes apparent that no progress can otherwise be made, might be to suggest that further consideration of a complete agenda be suspended and that discussion proceed on Items 2, 3, and 4, as contained in your CX 67390; they must be left under no impression that we are thereby holding out possibility of later concession by us on withdrawal of troops.

C. If agreement can not be obtained to the above approach, you might then consider the approach set forth in Para 3 JCS 96802.

D. Hold in abeyance any action along lines suggested in Para 5 JCS 96802.

9. You are not authorized, without further instructions, to recess talks indefinitely, to be reconvened on condition of Communist concession.

10. If there are mil reasons arising from the developing situation in Korea which in your judgment will, unless a satisfactory armistice is promptly arranged, force us to a break-up of armistice talks, you are requested to furnish your estimate on such situation.⁶

1. Dated July 20, p. 711.
2. Dated June 30, p. 598.
3. Dated July 19, p. 704.
4. See footnote 2, supra.
5. Dated July 16, p. 687.
6. This message did not arrive in Korea in time for the armistice talks held on July 21, which are summarized in telegram C–67483, July 22, p. 719.