Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 83: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

secret   priority

Korea, 19 July 1951—5:45 p. m.

HNC–115. This message in 5 parts. Subject: Armistice conference in Kaesong, 19th July 1951.

Part 1.

Summary: Only 1 session of 2 hours 20 minutes during which each delegation held firm to its stand of the previous day. Communists are adamant that the item concerning “the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea” be included as a major item on the agenda. Communist initial speech may have been intended for propaganda purposes (see part 4). United Nations Command delegation held firm to the view that this problem could not be discussed at the Armistice conference and would not be accepted by United Nations Command as an item on the agenda. Next meeting scheduled for 1000K, 20 July 1951.

Part 2.

Progress made: None.

Part 3.

Attitudes: There was no apparent change in attitude of the Communist delegates during this conference session.

Part 4.

Sequence of events: A Communist delegation opened conference at 1100K. They asked United Nations Command delegation for its opinion of the Communist item 3, which concerns the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea and further asked if it were agreeable to include it on the agenda. United Nations Command replied that its position had been made clear during previous sessions that this item was not acceptable for the agenda and recommended that the 4 items now mutually agreed upon be accepted as the agenda for the Armistice conference (HNC 112, part 2). Communist spokesman replied with a prepared speech which appeared to be phrased for its propaganda value. Initial translation of this speech is:

“I would like to explain further our viewpoint. In order to reach speedily an agreement on an agenda and enter quickly into discussions of its substance, I shall not hesitate to repeat once again our firm and unchangeable stand on the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea. The aim of our conference is to reach an armistice in Korea on a just and reasonable basis. Furthermore, the aim of this armistice is to end the Korean war and restore peace in Korea. To achieve this aim, it is necessary that all foreign armed forces be withdrawn. It is only by doing this that the flames of war in Korea can be extinguished and resumption of war in Korea can be prevented. The appearance of foreign armed forces in Korea has been the source of the Korean war and the continuance of war in Korea. It is only by elimination of this source that the prevention of resumption of war in Korea can be definitely insured. It is therefore obvious that the delegates who are here for negotiation should discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of foreign armed forces as an assurance against the resumption of war in Korea. Repeatedly I emphasized against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed force. Thus we cannot assure ourselves on the good faith of the party which continues to insist on such refusal. I must further point out that there is no excuse for refusal to discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of all foreign armed forces from Korea. Since our conference is to settle the question of cease fire and armistice and since the aim of cease fire and armistice is to end war and restore peace, we must discuss this fundamental question of war in Korea and withdrawal of all foreign armed forces in Korea. The fact that you refuse to discuss and settle the question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea only demonstrates that you do not have yet a sincerity for peace to bring about the conclusion of the Korean war. War is not travel and troops are not tourists. Should the cease fire be ordered and armistice achieved, yet the foreign armed forces still stay where they are, it is clear that the intention is not possible to let them enjoy the scenic beauties of Korea and I must also point out with emphasis the attitude of any party toward the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea, is a test whether, it is sincerely for peace. We consider that the aim of the cease fire and armistice in Korea is the conclusion of the Korean war and restoration of peace in Korea. That is why we have maintained consistently and firmly that the question of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea should be placed in an important position on the agenda, as we have proposed.

“It is our unshakable stand. We hope that you will give it careful consideration and alter your firm opinion so that a proposed agenda will be agreed upon and we can proceed with the substance of its items without delay.”

It was clear that the above statement was made for propaganda purposes. A proposed answer to the statement will follow in another message, with a view toward using it on a separate occasion.

After this speech United Nations Command requested one half hour recess. Following recess United Nations Command restated its previous position and said that the Communist item 3 was not acceptable for the agenda and recommended that our original proposal of the 4 item agenda be agreed upon as the agenda for the Armistice conf. The remainder of the session was taken up by the Communist attempt to secure United Nations Command agreement on their item 3 and the United Nations Command delegation refusing to accept this item. This argument continued for one and a half hours, at the end of which time United Nations Command suggested a recess for lunch until 1430K. Communists suggested the recess be extended until 1600K. United Nations Command then suggested we meet the following day at 1000K which was agreed upon.

Part 5.

Conclusions:

a. It is the opinion of the United Nations Command delegation that the Communist delegation is using tactics of introducing propaganda on withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea with the apparent design of creating enough political pressure to force the instruction of the United Nations Command and the delegation to accept that topic as an agenda item.

b. I have the impression that recent press reports of substantial progress being made in armistice negotiations are apt to create in the minds of a considerable segment of both American and free world public opinion, a belief that an armistice is measurably near. In cold fact, current negotiations concern only topics for inclusion in an agenda. Even if and when complete agreement is reached on an agenda we shall then merely have entered the discussion stage of an armistice itself.