795.00/7–1951
The Secretary of State to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Morrison)1
Dear Mr. Morrison: I was most happy to get, through Sir Oliver Franks, your thoughts on possible developments in Korea.2 It is most helpful to me to get your ideas on this personal and tentative basis and I hasten to give you mine in the same way. My colleagues in the Department will go over with me what you have said and I shall write you again in a short time. It may be useful to you in the meantime to have the impressions which have been forming in my mind. These, of course, do not represent governmental views.
I was delighted that you express such confidence in General Ridgway. I have known him for some time and everything that I have seen of him has increased my admiration. In fact, some years ago I tried to steal him from the Army for a limited period. But I failed. I am glad now that I did not succeed because I am sure that it would have interrupted his military career and that he would not now be where he is. He is a fine soldier and administrator. In addition, he has gifts of leadership and statesmanship which are just what is needed at the present time both in Japan and in Korea. I think you can be sure that he will conduct the negotiations with wisdom and firmness, that he understands the delicacy of the situation, the importance of the objectives, and that he will do nothing provocative or untoward. [Page 699] You can be sure also that we will keep in close touch with you throughout the negotiations through Sir Oliver Franks and Mr. Gifford as well as by personal correspondence when the time permits. Only by such consultation can we have the full understanding which the great importance of the matters at stake requires.
I think my own attitude toward the possibility of success in the negotiations is one, more of caution than of optimism. I agree with you that the signs point to a desire on the part of the Russians to end the fighting, but I think that they wish to end it on terms and in a way which will not interfere with the achievement of their purposes. I, too, am less sure about the Chinese. But again believe that if they do desire to end the fighting, it is on terms which will be advantageous to them and to which they will stubbornly adhere. The reports from the field confirm your reports from Peiping that the build-up of their military striking force is continuing. Their wish to widen the negotiations beyond purely military matters seems directed to achieve two points—the acceptance of the 38th parallel as the median point of the demilitarized zone, and the agreement now for a rapid evacuation of all non-Korean forces. If there is a difference in the attitude of the Chinese and the Russians, it seems likely to me that it lies in the scope of what they seek to accomplish through these negotiations. I believe that both wish to achieve Communist control of the peninsula. I think it likely that the Russians have a wider purpose which is to use the armistice as the first step in a series of proposals designed to slow down, if not stop, the building of the military defenses of the West. If this is so, the Russians may be inclined to take a longer range view than the Chinese of the narrower purpose of achieving control of the peninsula. But I agree with you fully that we cannot expect any public rift between them.
The attitude of the South Koreans is a problem of which we are very much aware and with which we are doing all in our power to cope. Here there are two main problems. One is a wide fear and apprehension among government officials and the population generally of being left alone to be overwhelmed by the Communists. After what the country has been through, I think this worry is natural and one which we are trying to meet forthrightly. They are entitled, I think, to valid assurance that militarily, economically and politically the nations associated in their defense through the United Nations will stand behind them. The other problem lies in the personality and attitude of President Rhee, who believes, I think, quite genuinely that the failure to unify Korea by force is a defeat and if accepted as a basis of the armistice will result in the destruction of the Republic. Both General Ridgway and Ambassador Muccio have been at great pains to go over the whole situation with him, and, although he continues to [Page 700] revert to this point of view, I am hopeful that they will make progress in convincing him that his attitude is not in the true interest of Korea. I do not believe that the negotiations will break down by reason of any action by the Korean Government.
In regard to “a general settlement in Korea” I have given, and am giving, a great deal of thought to the matter. My present thoughts are only tentative ones but they accord with your own views that the prospects of bringing one about are not good. I think it probable that we should regard an armistice as something with which we must live for a considerable time and that therefore it must be adapted to this end. In thinking about a general settlement, two things seem to stand out. One is that the purpose on the Communist side is to eliminate us and all western influence from Korea. The other is that, although they have not been able to do this, the military cost and the consequences of our attempting to unify Korea by force are greater than it is wise or possible to pay. Therefore it seems to me that the idea of unifying Korea through the UN by negotiation involves the attempt to get the Communists to give up their basic and publicly-stated policy and also to achieve a result which we are not able to achieve by force. I see no reason to believe that this can be done and that therefore to accept any sort of a unification which the Communists would be willing to give would be to concede to them a Communist-dominated Korea.
If this analysis is right and one turns to a general settlement based upon a divided Korea, one then encounters the grave probability that the South Koreans would not accept such a settlement and might be driven to actions which would either make an armistice impossible or lead to a renewal of conflict if an armistice had been entered into.
Furthermore, a general settlement based upon an agreed document seems to me to have certain illusory aspects. Such a document would not change the Communists’ purposes. It would not prevent the buildup of Communist forces in Manchuria, but it might create a political and military situation in which great temptations remained to the Communists to attempt another coup. Perhaps then the best hope is that an armistice might develop into a situation of enough stability so that, with the presence of some UN forces over a period of time and with the general increase of the strength of the West, including the development through the peace treaty of a friendly Japan, temptation toward renewed effort by the Communists in Korea might be removed by the obvious seriousness of such action.
I think those thoughts bring me out at about the point where your own thinking has taken you. I am sure they have developed nothing new but it may be useful to you to see how my mind is running.
It is very hard for me to guess whether the Chinese, were the situation [Page 701] to develop somewhat as I have suggested, would turn to their internal problems or whether they would break out in adventures elsewhere. As a pure speculation, I put forward the suggestion that perhaps here Russian and Chinese desires might be different. If the Russians are intent, as all signs seem to me to indicate, upon a program of lulling us all into abandoning our defensive efforts, and if they correctly understand the reactions of the West (which is very doubtful) they ought to want a period of quiet in the Far East. This ought to lead them to deprecate outbreaks by the Chinese and to dissuade the Chinese from them. But their thinking might lead them to different conclusions. They might believe that continued trouble in the Far East might lead us to enter into some general agreements which they could use to the grave detriment of the whole western position in the Far East. I think they would be wrong as to this reaction, at least in the United States.
To the Chinese, the situation might appear differently. It might seem to them that the prizes to be obtained by aggression in Indochina or Burma or Siam or in all of them, were very great and that the costs were not very high. They might believe that actions of this sort would help them internally. I think we can have no assurance that they would not take such an attitude, but I again hasten to say that these thoughts are pure speculation.
General Ridgway is fully alive to the military situation in the event that the armistice negotiations break down. He is taking all necessary precautions. I am assured that his position is very strong indeed. While this is so, we fully agree that the responsibility for any resumption of the fighting must lie with the other side and that this must be the clear public understanding. I think that the way General Ridgway has handled the negotiations shows how fully he appreciates this.3
Sincerely yours,
- Telegram 468, July 19, to London (not printed), which transmitted to the Embassy a summary of this letter, indicated that the text was given to Ambassador Franks by the Secretary for forwarding to Mr. Morrison (795.00/7–1951).↩
- See the attachment to the memorandum of conversation by Mr. Johnson, July 14, p. 675.↩
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Mr. Morrison replied in a personal message to Mr. Acheson, dated July 24, the text of which was delivered to the Department of State on July 25 and read as follows:
“Thank you very much for your personal message on possible developments in Korea which I received through Sir Oliver Franks.
“I am extremely interested in the views you express and very gratified to know that our thinking on the problem of Korea is on the same lines. There is no easy solution to the problem and we shall have to wait and see the way things work out, meanwhile remaining vigilant, as you so rightly point out, against any Russian attempt to throw us off our guard and to undermine the defence of the West.
“We shall be giving further thought to the whole problem in the light of our preliminary exchange of views and of developments in the situation; and I shall much look forward to having a talk with you about Korea when we meet in September.
“In response to your request I have taken steps to treat your letter in a most personal and secret way.” (795.00/7–2551)
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