Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Korea and China, Volume VII, Part 1

Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 84: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command (Ridgway)

secret
operational immediate

Washington, 19 July 1951—6:15 p. m.

JCS 96802. From JCS for CINCUNC.

Subj is Communist insistence upon discussing withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea.

1. We cannot withdraw UN Forces from Korea for a long time nor can we now undertake a commitment to do so in the future. If Communists insist upon this item’s being on the agenda, it may well be the breaking point and we would expect full support both at home and by our Allies in treating it as such.

2. The present question, therefore, is whether the mil refusal to discuss the withdrawal of foreign troops is in fact a breaking point for the Communists, and if so, how we should proceed to clarify the situation both in the mtg and before public opinion.

3. As for the agenda itself, we believe you should try now to obtain a broad item which does not commit us to mil discussion of withdrawal of troops, or concede that it is part of armistice arrangements, even though it is broad enough to permit the other side to air its views on the subj unilaterally. In connection with item 3 of the proposed Communist agenda as contained in your HNC 048¹ we suggest that you might at a suitable time propose that their item 3 might be amended to read: “Measures to insure against the resumption of hostilities and acts of armed forces in Korea.” Your negotiators in suggesting this amendment might orally state that the proposal is broad enough to permit Communists to air their views unilaterally on subj of withdrawal of foreign troops. The basic position which you have taken in regard to mil discussion of withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea continues to receive our fullest approval.

4. In further negotiations on this point you should continue to use folg themes:

A. Present talks are strictly mil in character and have to do with a mil armistice. Mil cdrs are not to become involved in political questions which can only be settled by UN and by govts concerned. Withdrawal of foreign forces from Korea is a matter which can only be considered in relation to a final settlement of Korean question.

B. UN Forces are in Korea by reason of decisions made by govts to send them to Korea in response to a request of UN. Their withdrawal is a matter to be decided by the same authorities.

5. If necessary to avoid a breakdown in armistice talks we are prepared to make a distinction between eventual discussion of mutual reduction of foreign forces in Korea and discussion of withdrawal of all such forces. If an acceptable armistice is concluded and its terms are carried out faithfully by all concerned, a reduction in foreign forces in Korea might be accomplished at some time in the future as a mil matter. You are authorized to agree, at the appropriate time in negotiations, that some mil machinery representing opposing cdrs might take up at some time in future the question of mutual reduction of foreign forces in Korea. No reduction can be agreed upon or discussed prior to or in connection with an armistice and no agreement can now be made as to formula on which mutual reduction might take place. Such questions must be determined by circumstances at the time.

6. Unless Communist delegations have instructions to persist in a full and early withdrawal of all foreign forces in Korea, to which we cannot agree, position authorized in para 5, above, might be a major card in your hand in relation to bargining on other points. We strongly prefer solution suggested in para 3, above.

7. There is some press speculation from Korea to effect that Friday² is the day of decision and that talks may break down on that day. We believe it important that talks not break down until there has been an opportunity for full governmental consideration of the situation and for discussion with certain other key govts. Unless other side clearly breaks off talks, you should break off only on specific instructions to do so.

8. In connection with para 4, above, Sec State has today made folg statement:

“Communist delegation at Kaesong has raised question of withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea in connection with an armistice. UN delegation has stated that it cannot go into this question, which is political in character and can only be settled by UN and the govts concerned.

“This is no theoretical argument as to whether question is political or mil. UN Forces are in Korea because of decisions made by govts to send them to Korea in response to a request by UN. They are there to repel aggression and to restore international peace and security in the area.

“If there is an effective armistice, a UN Force must remain in Korea until a genuine peace has been firmly established and Korean people have assurance that they can work out their future free from the fear of aggression. Size of UN Force remaining in Korea will depend upon circumstances and, particularly, upon faithfulness with which an armistice is carried out.

“Korea’s neighbors know that presence of UN Forces in Korea constitutes no danger or threat to themselves. Repeated expressions of policy by UN and, indeed, the very nature of that organization, furnish them entirely adequate guarantees on this point.

“Once before, foreign forces were withdrawn from Korea as a part of a UN plan to reach a final settlement of the Korean problem. The Communists defied this effort and committed aggression against ROK. The Korean people can be assured that a repetition of this act will not be tolerated.”³

1. Dated July 10, p. 649.
2. July 20.

3. Mr. Acheson’s statement was released to the press on July 19 and is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 30, 1951, p. 188.

   General Ridgway made the following comment in his telegram C–67348, July 20, from Tokyo:

   “I believe that Secretary Acheson’s statement of 19 July regarding ‘the withdrawal of foreign troops from Korea’ will have a positive beneficial effect on the general situation here and perhaps on the armistice negotiations. The timing of this statement was especially fortunate, coming as it did immediately after Admiral Joy, on my instructions, had informed the Communist delegation that the United Nations Command delegation would definitely not agree to the inclusion of this item on the agenda, and would not discuss the matter further.” (Lot 55D128: Black Book, Tab 90)